Alex Psilakis, Author at IELR Blog

Trump Tightens Asylum Rules to Curb Migration

May 3, 2019 by Alex Psilakis Leave a Comment

On April 29, 2019, President Trump issued a memorandum to Attorney General William Barr and Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Kevin McAleenan. Within the memo, President Trump outlined a number of policies meant to tighten immigration and asylum rules, while lowering the vast number of asylum seekers attempting to enter the U.S. One such policy calls on immigration courts to process and offer final administrative adjudication on all asylum applications within 180 days of their filing. The memo also proposes implementing an asylum application fee, as well as a fee for asylum applicants seeking to attain employment authorization while they wait for their application to be processed. Furthermore, the memo calls for new regulations that prevent migrants who have entered the U.S. illegally, or have attempted to do so, from acquiring or retaining employment authorization. The president has given the Attorney General and Acting Secretary of Homeland Security 90 days to carry out these reforms.

The president’s proposed policy reforms have sparked their fair share of controversy. “There’s a reason that we give people work permits while they are waiting for asylum,” said Michelle Brané, director of migrant rights and justice at the Women’s Refugee Commission, “[its] so that they can support themselves and don’t have to be depending on government assistance during that time.” Ms. Brané further questioned the Trump administration’s decision to impose a fee on asylum seekers, stating that, “The entire idea of asylum is that it’s something that you need because you are fleeing some sort of violence or persecution, and to then say that it’s only accessible to people who can pay a fee doesn’t make sense.”

Though the president may seek to implement drastic regulations that bring the situation at the border to a rapid close, the true status of the situation makes such a move incredibly difficult. There are currently more than 800,000 cases pending in immigration courts, and it typically takes nearly two years for courts to fully process cases. Approximately 100,000 migrants are currently approaching the southern border each month, and that number is expected to surpass one million within a year. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) currently houses over 50,000 migrants – one of its highest numbers in history – which is nearly 5,000 more than the maximum of 45,274 mandated by Congress. This is over a third more migrants than the daily average of those housed in 2016, which sat at 34,376. With this immense number – a number that is currently growing – of asylum seekers approaching the southern border each month, it will likely take more than a few policy proposals to adequately address the situation.

As with previous asylum-oriented policies, these are expected to face legal challenges if they are eventually implemented. Last fall, for example, a federal judge blocked an executive order that sought to prohibit Central Americans who entered the U.S. through legal ports of entry from pursuing asylum protections. Federal judges have also prevented the Trump administration, albeit temporarily, from stripping funding from “sanctuary” cities, revoking temporary work permits, and repealing deportation protections for approximately one million immigrants shielded under past presidential administrations.

Even those that support the Trump administration’s efforts question what effect, if any, executive actions will have on the border situation. “There’s a limit to what regulation is going to be able to do,” said Mark Krikorian, executive director of the Center for Immigration Studies, which promotes lower immigration levels. “I just don’t see how this can be dealt with short of legislative changes.”

The president’s decision will do little to benefit the U.S.’s relationship with its regional neighbors, particularly Mexico and a number of Central American countries, which has taken a steep dive over the past few months. In March, President Trump threatened to close the U.S.-Mexico border, a move that would have not only left an immense number of asylum seekers hoping to enter the U.S. in limbo, but dealt a deep, immediate blow to the economy on both sides of the border. Additionally, the president pledged to cut off aid to Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras for failing to limit the flow of asylum seekers to the U.S. Though public officials, such as President Andrés Manuel López Obrador of Mexico, stressed that such aid is key to promoting development and reducing violence – steps that would likely lead to lower migration rates in the future – President Trump did not budge. While both episodes have, for the most part, faded from the public eye, they nevertheless strained the U.S.’s relationship with these Latin American countries. The president’s move to tighten asylum rules will only strain relations further.

This act by the Trump administration is one of many that have come before, and will likely come again. Though the president has faced numerous legal obstacles in his effort to tighten asylum regulations and limit the immigrant flow through the southern border, such obstacles have never dampened his will. Those that have opposed him, meanwhile, like Democrats and civil society organizations, have also retained their will to challenge the legality of the administration’s moves at every step of the way. For both the president and his legal challengers, this moment is no different. Nevertheless, it is a situation worth observing to understand how far the executive may go to enforce their will on immigration and asylum policy.

North Korean Embassy Raid: As Answers Emerge, Many Questions Remain

May 1, 2019 by Alex Psilakis 1 Comment

In early April, the IELR Blog reported on the break-in at the North Korean Embassy in Madrid. Though Spain sought the extradition of those involved in the raid, the U.S. refused to comment on the situation, let alone offer their open assistance. As a result, it appeared as though the assailants had escaped, leaving behind a complex political incident that entangled the U.S., North Korea, and Spain, all in the shadow of the failed Trump-Kim summit of February 2019.

One month later, the case continues to develop. On April 23, 2019, the U.S. arrested Christopher Philip Ahn, a U.S. citizen and former Marine, for his involvement in the raid. Spain, who put out the arrest warrant against Ahn, has filed a number of charges against him, including robbery, illegal restraint, and associating with criminal organization. U.S. enforcement officials learned of Ahn’s participation in the raid when Adrian Hong Chang, the de facto leader of the group, informed the FBI of Ahn’s involvement. Video surveillance captured images of Ahn as well. Awaiting extradition, Judge Jean Rosenbluth denied Ahn bond, forcing him to remain in custody.

Just days after Ahn’s arrest, U.S. authorities issued an arrest warrant for Hong Chang himself. A Mexican citizen with permanent residency in the U.S., Hong Chang faces charges similar to those of Ahn, including breaking and entering, as well as causing injuries. The arrest warrant – which references information provided by Spanish authorities – labels Hong Chang as the architect and leader of the seven-person raid.

Hong Chang has been on the move from the moment the raid ended. Calling an Uber to escape the scene of the raid, Hong Chang acted under the alias “Oswaldo Trump.” When the Uber parked too close to the police stationed outside the embassy, he cancelled it and called a new one. He travelled to Toldeo, Spain, then onto Lisbon, Portugal, where he flew to the U.S. The day after the attack, he called and set up a meeting with FBI agents in New York. He informed the agents of his role in the raid, and turned over the items that he captured, which included pen drives and hard drives. He claimed that, though they carried dangerous weapons like knives, they did not display them. Hong Chang also voluntarily met with FBI agents in Los Angeles, where he informed them of Ahn’s role in the raid. Yet with the recent release of the arrest warrant, these attempts to garner the favorable treatment of U.S. law enforcement officials appear to have failed. U.S. authorities believe that Hong Chang lies somewhere in the Central District of California, but his exact location remains unknown.

Hong Chang’s lawyer, Lee Wolosky , has sharply criticized U.S. authorities for accepting North Korea’s version of the story. “In due time,” he stated, “We expect to be able to present additional evidence that contradicts the story made up by the North Korean government.” Wolowsky also represents the Free Joseon, an organization that seeks the overthrow of the Kim regime in North Korea. Though Free Joseon originally claimed responsibility for the raid, they have since reneged on that statement, instead arguing that they were invited into the embassy. Free Joseon has, however, committed sharp acts of protest against the Kim regime in the past. They took credit for saving the surviving family members of Kim Jong Nam, the half-brother that Kim Jong Un allegedly assassinated in 2017. They also spray-painted their name and symbol on the North Korean Embassy in Malaysia in March, alongside the phrase, “We shall rise.” They released a video of a man smashing images of Kim Jong Il and Kim Il Sung, the previous two leaders of North Korea, as well. Such an act is viewed as heretical in North Korea, since figures of the regime are meant to be viewed with absolute reverence and respect.

Two months on from the February 22 raid, much remains publically unknown. Though U.S. authorities have arrested one man in connection with the raid and are pursuing another, the whereabouts and status of the five other assailants remains a mystery. Furthermore, it remains to be seen how far the U.S. will be willing to go to assist in the prosecution of U.S. individuals who committed crimes in the North Korean embassy. While the U.S. may be upholding their obligations to Spain under international law, executing warrants and preparing individuals for extradition, each step the U.S. takes in this direction indirectly supports the Kim regime. After the FBI returned the items stolen from the embassy to Spain, Spain promptly returned them to North Korea. Additionally, the U.S. has shown little hesitation in moving forward with extradition proceedings against those allegedly involved in the raid, like Ahn.

Since the U.S. and Spain are bound by an extradition treaty, the U.S. is legally bound to follow through on processing the request. Certain exemptions within the treaty could potentially allow the U.S. to avoid extraditing those involved in the raid. According to Article 5, Section 3 of the treaty, extradition shall not be granted when the offense in question is of a “political character.” The raid on the embassy could be viewed as a political act, since it was carried out as a form of protest against the Kim regime. However, the political exemption likely does not apply to this case because the exemption is so narrow. Courts usually recognize the political offense exception when the act committed is done so directly against the state, and possesses none of the elements of an ordinary crime. Rarely are violent acts considered, but if they are, they are minor and almost never involve innocent civilians. Typical crimes exempted include treason, sedition, and espionage, which normally involve peaceful acts like speaking out against the government or demonstrating peacefully. Since Spain is not seeking the extradition of the assailants on these charges, as they are instead focusing on crimes like breaking and entering and causing injuries, it is unlikely that the political exemption will apply in this case.

The raid has undoubtedly placed the U.S. in a difficult situation. In observing the case as it develops, it is worth analyzing how the U.S. balances its legal obligations to Spain with its adversarial attitude toward North Korea. Additionally, five of the seven assailants remain on the run, one of which includes a South Korean national. How legal proceedings develop against these individuals – if any do – will prove worth considering as well. Seeking answers to the many questions that remain, the IELR Blog will continue to monitor the ramifications of the raid in the U.S. and around the world.

Current Case Against Former Somali Commander and Current Virginia Resident Showcases the Reach of the Torture Victim Protection Act

April 23, 2019 by Alex Psilakis 2 Comments

On May 13, 2019, Colonel Yusuf Abdi Ali, former commander of the Somali National Army, will stand trial for his alleged involvement in the torture and attempted extrajudicial killing of Farhan Warfaa. Col. Ali, referred to as Tukeh, served under Somalia’s Said Barre regime, which ruled through a military dictatorship from 1969-1991. However, after the regime was overthrown, Col. Tukeh moved to Canada, and then the U.S., where he retained permanent residency status since 1996.

Mr. Warfaa alleges that Col. Tukeh captured him just before civil war broke out. Col. Tukeh rounded up Mr. Warfaa, alongside the other men and boys in the village, and transferred them to the Military Headquarters of the 5^th Brigade of the Somali National Army, where Col. Tukeh served as the commanding officer. Mr. Warfaa claims that Col. Tukeh tortured and interrogated him, eventually shooting him five times at point-blank range, assuming him dead. Somehow, though, he survived, and Col. Tukeh’s soldiers later released him in exchange for payment from Mr. Warfaa’s family. He further alleges that Col. Tukeh targeted him and his village because of their ethnic status, being members of the Isaaq clan. Col. Tukeh allegedly disarmed Isaaq soldiers under his leadership, sending them to Hargeisa to face massacre alongside their own. As many as 200,000 individuals were executed in Hargeisa under the Said Barre regime, though with a near-countless number of bodies in mass graves, no one knows exactly how many people were killed.

While Col. Tukeh will face trial on May 13, the path to this trial has been long and laborious. Mr. Warfaa first brought claims against Col. Tukeh in 2004, suing him under the U.S. Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act. Due to multiple delays and stays, the case did not go to court until 2014, when the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed Mr. Warfaa’s claims regarding the Alien Tort Statute. However, the court also dismissed Col. Tukeh’s claim that he deserved immunity as a foreign official. In 2016, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s ruling, allowing Mr. Warfaa to move forward in suing Col. Tukeh under the Torture Victims Protection Act. In 2017, the Supreme Court refused a request for judicial review of the decision, eliminating a final technical hurdle to Mr. Warfaa’s lawsuit.

While the dismissal of the Alien Tort Statute means that Mr. Warfaa cannot sue Col. Tukeh for war crimes and crimes against humanity, the Torture Victim Protection Act allows him to seek justice for the alleged torture and attempted extrajudicial killing he experienced. Passed in 1991, the Torture Victim Protection Act allows victims of torture or extrajudicial killings to pursue civil actions against their alleged perpetrators. Victims – or, in the cases of extrajudicial killings, legal representatives or claimants – may file a lawsuit against those that act under actual or apparent authority of any foreign nation. However, before seeking remedies in the U.S., victims must exhaust “adequate and available remedies” where the alleged crime occurred.

Mr. Warfaa’s legal representation, the Center for Justice and Accountability (CJA), has experience in carrying out suits against abusers of the Said Barre regime. After CJA filed suit against General Mohammad Ali Samantar, Samantar was deemed liable for human rights atrocities. As a result, he had to pay $21 million to Somali survivors represented by CJA. In 2013, CJA also won a judgement Col. Abdi Aden Magan, the former chief of the Somali National Security Service. CJA represented Abukar Hassan Ahmed, a law professor and human rights advocate, who experienced physical and emotional trauma at the hands of Col. Magan. Professor Ahmed won $15 million in damages from Col. Magan.

No sum of money can adequately make up for the damages that victims of torture and extrajudicial killings experience at the hands of ruthless officials. However, policies like the Torture Victim Protection Act at least offer a remedy in which victims may hold accountable those that cause them so much suffering. Though Mr. Warfaa will never be able to forget the pain he alleges he experienced at the hands of Col. Tukeh, his victory in court would provide him the opportunity to label Col. Tukeh the criminal that he has always seen him as.

XIX World Congress of Criminology Set to Unite Experts from around the World

April 22, 2019 by Alex Psilakis Leave a Comment

Background

On October 27, 2019, the 19^th World Congress of Criminology will commence in Doha, Qatar. The Congress, which will run from October 27-31, will gather academics, researchers, professionals, and policy makers to consider relevant, contemporary issues in crime and criminology. Since its inaugural event in 1938 in Rome, Congresses have been held throughout the world, visiting cities including Rio de Janeiro (2003), Barcelona (2008), and New Delhi (2016).

Sponsors and Supporters

This year’s event in Doha symbolizes the truly global reach of the Congress, as well as of those sponsoring and supporting it. The group that plays the largest role in organizing the Congress – and has since its commencement – is the International Society for Criminology (ISC). Founded in 1937, the ISC strives to support activities and research aimed at fostering a better understanding of the crime phenomenon on a global scale. It also works to translate research into policy making and programmatic interventions, as well as assist in the creation of top-tier criminology and criminal justice programs. Additionally, the ISC publishes the International Annals of Criminology alongside Cambridge University Press, emphasizing their deep involvement in the subject matter.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), through its Education for Justice (E4J) initiative, is another one of the major organizations supporting the Congress. The E4J initiative seeks to support the Doha Declaration of 2015, which calls for universal education amongst children, as well as the prevention of terrorism, corruption, and crime. The E4J initiative has crafted educational materials, such as university modules and teaching guides, in their effort to develop a culture of lawfulness among children and youth. Finally, the Qatar University College of Law is another one of the Congress’s supporters.

Topics and Presentations

The Congress will cover a wide range of topical areas and issues. The Congress will focus on a number of general areas, which include “Science, Technology and Teaching in Criminology,” as well as “Researching, Investigating and Preventing Crime.” Yet it will still touch on a wide variety of topics, which include international law and human rights. Themes covered within this field are to include “International Criminal Law and International Criminal Courts,” “Immigration and Crime,” and “Transnational Crime.” Alongside these, the Congress will consider comparative studies related to criminology and criminal justice. Specific issues areas to be discussed include “Globalization and Crime Trends,” alongside “Cross-Regional and Cross-National Comparison.”

The Congress offers not only an immense variety of topics for presenters to discuss, but a diverse array of ways through which they may present their projects. Individuals may not only present a paper, but hold a roundtable session, present a poster, or participate in a workshop. Participants may even read poetry, literature, or a similar form of creative work that is in some way related to criminology or criminal justice. Through offering this flexibility, the Congress hopes to create a diverse, energetic environment that allows discussion on criminology and criminal justice to thrive however possible.

Additional Information

The submission deadline for the Congress is August 15, though materials are accepted on a rolling, first-come-first-serve basis. Authors must submit the title of their work, as well as an abstract, here. Individuals may also register for the Congress here. If you have any questions, you may contact the Congress by filling out this form.

Utilizing International Cooperation and Networking, the State Department Strives to Strengthen Global Enforcement Efforts

April 16, 2019 by Alex Psilakis Leave a Comment

During the week of April 15, 2019, enforcement agents from around the world will meet in the United States for the fifth annual Towards a More Safe and Secure World International Visitor Leadership Program. International law enforcement, security, counternarcotic, and judicial officials from 56 countries will meet with their U.S. counterparts in 16 cities, focusing on how to improve efforts in combatting transnational crime and countering terrorism. The program will begin in Washington, DC, where plenary sessions will occur at the State Department and National Defense University involving security experts from both the public and private sector.

After meeting in Washington, the foreign officials will visit small and medium-sized cities throughout the U.S., conversing with law enforcement officers and public officials of the federal, regional, and local level. Program consultations will analyze mutual threats related to issues including border security, money laundering, and cyber security. The three-week program will wrap up with two events. First, the St. Petersburg Police Department will host a Multijurisdictional Counterdrug Taskforce Training program in Tampa, Florida. Finally, the FBI’s New York Field Office will co-host the Combatting Transnational Crime Global Cooperation Conference in New York City.

The State Department has outlined a number of project objectives they hope to fulfill in their efforts. They aim to strengthen global cooperation mechanisms to combat terrorism and other transnational crime threats. The State Department also hopes to better understand the means by which they impede global criminal activities including drug trafficking and trafficking in persons. They seek to improve partnerships between community-based organizations and law enforcement agents as well. Furthermore, they desire to address conflicts related to balancing law enforcement and security, while protecting civil liberties. These objectives, among the others they possess, emphasize how the State Department is taking serious, substantive steps to improve international enforcement cooperation, while developing a network of foreign officials more likely to trust one another and work together.

Now in its fifth year, the Towards a More Safe and Secure World program has brought a vast array of officials to the U.S. to study a variety of issues. In 2018, 80 security and law enforcement officials traveled to the U.S. with the program. This included Simon Cheung, a Chief Inspector with the Hong Kong Police Force, as well as Joseph Lengmang, a Director General of a government peacebuilding agency in Nigeria. Mr. Lengmang praised the program, noting, “I am very confident that [the program] is going to lead to a resounding working relationship among nations. Security is the responsibility of everyone, and it’s not going to be possible to think that one single country would have the capacity to deal with transnational challenges and crimes.”

One state that has taken a great deal away from the program is Bosnia and Herzegovina. While Bosnia looked to U.S. and international standards when rebuilding their judiciary and police after the Yugoslav Wars, they continue to recognize the value of international cooperation and networking. Edin Jahic, chief of the Section for Fighting Organized Crime and Corruption at Bosnia’s Ministry of Security, attended the program in 2018 and voiced his deep support for it. He stressed that his country has adopted U.S. mechanisms, such as plea agreements and a witness protection program, which have proven highly successful. He also valued the opportunity to meet private sector and university analysts, as well as develop relationships with his European counterparts.

“I am very fortunate to meet these guys,” said Jahic. “We’ve already made some friendships that are going to last more than these three weeks and, of course, it’s going to be very helpful for my future job.”

The experiences and thoughts of Mr. Jahic emulate what success within the Towards a More Safe and Secure World International Visitor Leadership Program looks like. Through promoting international enforcement cooperation and developing a global network of actors, the State Department is taking the steps needed to assist themselves and the global community in confronting transnational crime and terrorism. The program also illustrates how states (e.g., the U.S.), help develop international networks.

Arrested and Awaiting Potential Extradition, Julian Assange Set to Face Judgement

April 11, 2019 by Alex Psilakis Leave a Comment

On April 11, 2019 WikiLeaks co-founder Julian Assange was arrested at the Ecuadorian embassy in London. Upon Ecuador’s invitation, British authorities entered the embassy and detained Assange, charging him with failure to surrender to the court in a previous case. Yet British authorities eventually commented that they arrested Assange on the United States’ behalf. The U.S., who unsealed an indictment against Assange the same day that he was arrested in the UK, are pursuing his extradition for his efforts to disclose classified information that the government believes would have injured the U.S. But even this potential outcome faces complications. Prior to confirming Assange’s exit from the embassy, President Moreno of Ecuador insisted that the UK refuse to extradite Assange to a country in which he could face torture or the death penalty as a form of punishment. The UK confirmed this agreement in writing. Although Assange would only face a maximum sentence of five years if convicted of the U.S. charges against him, this condition nevertheless complicates a case that already crosses multiple borders and fosters intense emotional polarization.

Filed in March 2018 but unsealed on April 11, the U.S. indictment against Assange alleges that the WikiLeaks co-founder attempted to hack into and steal classified information on the U.S. government. Specifically, the charge states that Assange sought to break a password to a classified U.S. government computer, conspiring to commit computer intrusion. Had the plan succeeded, Manning could have browsed computers with a username that did not belong to her, making it difficult for authorities to spot Manning as the source of the break-in. The indictment notes how Chelsea Manning, who was imprisoned for violating the Espionage Act, not only assisted Assange in this process, but in many before it. Manning allegedly provided Assange 250,000 State Department cables, 800 Guantanamo Bay detainee assessment briefs, and hundreds of thousands war-related significant activities reports on the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. He would then post such information to WikiLeaks, making it publically available. Even though the indictment makes clear that Assange and Manning formed a password-breaking agreement, it makes no mention as to whether the plot succeeded, or if it was even carried out. Additionally, some view the narrowness of this allegation as a means to avoiding conflicts with the First Amendment’s guarantee to freedom of the press.

A controversial figure, Assange has proven elusive amongst law enforcement agents for the past decade or so. He first faced charges in 1995, when Australian authorities accused him of committing a number of hacking activities. He plead guilty and paid fines worth thousands of Australian dollars, but he did not receive jail time because he pledged never to reoffend. He founded WikiLeaks in 2006, and both he and the organization rose to prominence in 2010, when they released footage of a U.S. helicopter targeting civilians in Iraq. He published a trove of classified military documents on the U.S. conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan soon after.

In that same year, the Swedish Prosecutor’s Office issued two arrest warrants against Assange, charging him with two separate cases of rape and molestation, which he denied. The charges came two days after he applied for residency in Sweden, seeking to take advantage of its strong laws in favor of whistleblowers. Though the charges were rapidly dropped, they were picked up again months later (and included an additional charge of unlawful coercion), when Assange arrived in London. Sweden issued an international arrest warrant for Assange, leading to a year-long battle in the British courts that eventually saw the UK Supreme Court rule in favor of his extradition to Sweden. Months later, in August 2012, the Ecuadorian embassy in London granted Assange asylum, fearing for his human rights were he to be extradited to Sweden. Sweden dropped the sexual molestation and unlawful coercion charges against Assange in 2015, as well as the rape charge in 2017, yet Assange remained in the embassy. Though the UK and Ecuador attempted to negotiate his release on multiple occasions, the talks continually failed, as Assange feared that arrest by UK authorities would lead to extradition to the U.S. Nevertheless, on April 11, 2019, Ecuador revoked their protection of Assange, and invited British authorities into the embassy to arrest him.

In a video released online, President Moreno of Ecuador noted why he rescinded Assange’s claim to asylum. He criticized Assange for continuing to interfere in the internal affairs of individual states, which included publishing a wide array of documents tied to the Vatican in January 2019. He further condemned Assange for apparently remaining involved in WikiLeaks, when his status as an asylum grantee prevented him from getting involved in the affairs of other countries. Yet he stressed that, prior to revoking Assange’s claim, he gained a written guarantee from the UK that they would not extradite Assange to a country that could employ torture or the death penalty on him. Reports also indicate that Assange continually clashed with embassy staff. His WikiLeaks-related activities caused the embassy to strip him of internet access. Additionally, the embassy imposed tighter rules on him in late 2018, pushing him to pay his medical and phone bills, as well as better clean up after his pet cat.

After the arrest, District Judge Michael Snow of the UK wasted little time in finding Assange guilty of the 2012 charge of failing to surrender to the court. Although he would face up to 12 months in prison for this charge, it remains to be seen whether he will serve this time (or any time) in the UK, or if he will undergo extradition to the U.S. He is set to appear at the Westminster Magistrates’ Court on May 2 through video link to address the topic of extradition. The Swedish Prosecution Authority has even begun to consider reopening their investigation into an Assange, as the statute of limitations expires in August 2020.

Reactions to the arrest – and potential extradition – have proven mixed in the UK and across the globe. While Prime Minister Theresa May praised the ruling, noting that “in the UK, no one is above the law,” the opposition Labour Leader Jeremy Corbyn objects to extradition, instead claiming that Assange brought to light “evidence of atrocities in Iraq and Afghanistan.” The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) made clear their sharp opposition to the arrest and extradition request, declaring that “any prosecution by the United States of Mr. Assange for Wikileaks’ publishing operations would be unprecedented and unconstitutional, and would open the door to criminal investigations of other news organizations.”

According to his lawyer, Assange kept his comments brief, saying, “I told you so.”

While some view Assange’s arrest as an unjust attack against a freedom fighter, others view it as a long-deserved takedown of a criminal. Additionally, his potential extradition to the U.S. dramatically raises the stakes of the situation. Though some government officials and civil society activists believe a U.S. conviction of Assange a stab at the First Amendment, the Department of Justice has filed specific, narrow charges against Assange in the hope of making that point mute. Debate will undoubtedly continue on the legality of Assange’s actions, only to escalate when the U.S. decides whether or not to extradite him to the U.S.

In Targeting Venezuela, The Trump Administration Targets Cuba

April 9, 2019 by Alex Psilakis Leave a Comment

On April 5, 2019, the Trump administration announced its decision to issue sanctions against 34 ships owned or operated by Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A., the state-run oil company. The administration also levied sanctions against two international companies that ship Venezuelan oil to Cuba. Days later, on April 8, the Trump administration issued another ruling against Cuba, prohibiting Cuban athletes from playing in the MLB unless they defected. Although MLB officials asserted that they worked closely alongside the Treasury Department in 2018 before signing any sort of agreement with Cuba, the Trump administration displayed no hesitancy in striking down such a deal. Both of these decisions, which took place within a week of each other, reveal a new, serious strategy of the Trump administration: to pressure Venezuela and Cuba.

While the Trump administration has unquestionably issued these sanctions to further tighten the financial stranglehold on Venezuela, one primary objective of these levies is to cut off the oil trade to Cuba. On average, Venezuela ships Cuba 20,000 to 50,000 barrels of oil a day. In response, Cuba shares intelligence and counterintelligence services with them.

This relationship is founded in history. Although Venezuela proved a close ally of the U.S. during the Cold War, that position changed when Hugo Chavez rose to the presidency in 1999. Chavez, who viewed Cuba’s Fidel Castro as a sort of mentor, sought to aid the state, which had been struggling economically due to U.S. sanctions and the collapse of its long-time ally – the Soviet Union. After nearly falling victim to a coup attempt in 2002, Chavez eagerly embraced a new relationship with Cuba. In return for providing the Caribbean country free and subsidized oil, Cuba would offer Venezuela intelligence and military assistance, as well as doctors and teachers. Under Chavez’s successor, Nicolas Maduro, oil shipments to Cuba climbed as high as 100,000 barrels a day. Yet the number of Cuban operatives in Venezuela, as well as what role those operatives are acting in, remains a subject of debate. The Trump administration alleges that 20,000-25,000 Cuban individuals are serving in Venezuela’s military and intelligence services, as well as Maduro’s private guard. The Cuban government, which asserts that the number is 20,000, has stated that nearly all Cuban personnel in Venezuela are working in humanitarian roles, specifically as doctors and teachers.

Nevertheless, the Trump administration is anxious to limit Cuba’s role of influence in Venezuela however possible. In a statement on April 5, Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin made this clear, noting,

“Cuba has been an underlying force fueling Venezuela’s descent into crisis. Treasury is taking action against vessels and entities transporting oil, providing a lifeline to keep the illegitimate Maduro regime afloat. Cuba continues to profit from, and prop up, the illegitimate Maduro regime through oil-for-repression schemes as they attempt to keep Maduro in power. The United States remains committed to a transition to democracy in Venezuela and to holding the Cuban regime accountable for its direct involvement in Venezuela’s demise.”

To continue this pressure, the Trump administration announced – just three days after their implementation of sanctions – that Cuban athletes could not play in the MLB unless they defected from Cuba. On December 19, 2018, the MLB Players Association and the Cuban Baseball Federation (FCB) signed a deal that made is possible for Cuban nationals to play in the MLB without defecting from their home country. Similarly to agreements with Japan or Korea, the FCB would streamline the process for players joining the MLB, while retaining approximately 15-25% of their financial earnings. The MLB pursued this deal because, under the sanctions regime, Cubans must go to dangerously great lengths to play baseball in the U.S., often working with – and falling victim to – the ploys of smuggling syndicates. The MLB received legal authority to carry out such a deal in 2016, when the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) granted them a license to enter into a business arrangement with the FCB. Even though the Trump administration displayed skepticism of the deal’s legality up until its signing, OFAC nevertheless assured the MLB that the license was still valid.

The Trump administration’s ruling on April 8 overruled that assurance. Justifying their decision, a Trump administration official argued that the Obama administration inadequately interpreted the law. Additionally, they claimed that the Cuban government was taking part in human trafficking. Citing “facts recently brought to their attention” and discussions with the State Department, OFAC instead decided to prohibit the deal. OFAC further claimed that the FCB was tied to the Cuban government, and therefore ineligible to receive payments from U.S. businesses like the MLB. While such financial arrangements were possible under the Obama administration, the Trump administration has pulled a sharp one-eighty, implementing sanctions and embargos, while offering fiery rhetoric.

The Trump administration has made no secret of the fact that these rulings – the imposition of sanctions on April 5 and the overruling of the MLB-FCB agreement on April 8 – are direct retaliatory measures for Cuba’s assistance to the Maduro regime. When asked on Fox News if the MLB ruling was meant to pressure Cuba, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo replied, “Yep.” He further stated that the administration was “going to do everything we can to pull [Cuba] out” of Venezuela.

The timing of these decisions is by no means a coincidence. As the Trump administration is desperate to unseat Maduro as President of Venezuela, the U.S. is attempting to weaken his regime however possible. But even this has become more complicated, as Russia recently sent 100 military personnel to Venezuela offer technical assistance, dramatically disrupting any U.S. decision to pursue further involvement in the region. Since the administration has made clear from its first day in office how deeply it opposes Cuba’s regime, this mutual pushback against Venezuela and Cuba can be regarded as a sort of two-for-one deal. Yet it remains to be seen how effective these measures will prove in their effort to pull Cuba out of Venezuela. With a relationship rooted in over two decades of history, both regimes – who are desperate to hang onto power in times of economic trouble – will continue to oppose the Trump administration. Russia’s willingness to get involved in the region, regardless of the scale of such involvement, will further bolster the confidence of Cuba and Venezuela, while forcing the U.S. to deeply consider how they wish to proceed.

Trump Administration Set to Label Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps a Foreign Terrorist Organization

April 8, 2019 by Alex Psilakis Leave a Comment

On April 8, 2019, the Trump administration announced their plan to designate Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), as noted under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. President Trump elaborated on the decision in a statement, declaring that,

“This unprecedented step, led by the Department of State, recognizes the reality that Iran is not only a State Sponsor of Terrorism, but that the IRGC actively participates in, finances, and promotes terrorism as a tool of statecraft. The IRGC is the Iranian government’s primary means of directing and implementing its global terrorist campaign.”

The State Department released a Fact Sheet outlining the specific reasons for which they declared the IRGC an FTO. They note, for example, that they held the IRGC responsible for the deaths of at least 603 American service members in Iraq since 2003, which constitutes 17% of American personnel killed in the region from 2003-2011. The State Department singles out one unit within the IRGC for specific condemnation – the Qods Force. They argued that the Qods Force has planned to carry out terrorist attacks in countries such as Germany, Kenya, and Turkey. Additionally, the Fact Sheet asserts that the Qods Force plotted an attack against the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. in the U.S. Even though these attempted terrorist attacks in the U.S. and abroad were foiled, the Fact Sheet places great emphasis on the fact that they were plotted and nearly carried out. The State Department further criticizes the IRGC for their continued support to terrorist organizations, noting their tendency to offer groups like Hezbollah and Hamas assistance through means including financial and material support, training, and technology transfer. The Fact Sheet also points to Iran’s tendency to harbor terrorists sanctioned by states like the U.S. as a reason for the designation.

The State Department emphasizes that this designation is another step in the Trump administration’s long-term effort to maximize pressure against Iran’s present regime. Prior to the designation, the Trump administration had already sanctioned over 900 individuals, entities, aircrafts, and vessels related to Iran. Yet the State Department Fact Sheet makes clear that the Trump administration is not taking a wholly unprecedented step. Instead, they are building off of the legacy of past administrations. The Fact Sheet notes, for example, that the IRGC was previously sanctioned via Executive Order in 2007, 2011, and 2012. The organization was sanctioned in 2007 for supporting Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile program, and again in 2011 and 2012 for its connection to Iran’s human rights abuses.

In his statement, President Trump made clear the consequences of violating this designation:

“If you are doing business with the IRGC, you will be bankrolling terrorism.”

As a result of the designation, the U.S. may deny entry to individuals that provided the IRGC material support, or take actions one step farther and prosecute those individuals for sanctions violations. Since many European and Asian companies deal with one of the IRGC’s numerous affiliates, this could further stress diplomatic relations between said countries and the U.S. The designation may also limit who U.S. troops and diplomats can communicate with in the Middle East, as Iraqi and Lebanese authorities are known to interact with IRGC officials or surrogates. Previous administrations have held back from making this great of a move against the IRGC for this very reason. The Pentagon, alongside U.S. intelligence agencies, have voiced concerns over how such a designation will limit their ability to interact with allies like those in Iraq and Lebanon. Shia militias associated with the Qods Force fought alongside the U.S. Air Force against the Islamic State at the Battle of Tikrit, proving key allies that helped achieve victory. Additionally, U.S.-backed Iraqi and Kurdish personnel have embraced the titanic burden of taking in the tens – if not hundreds – of thousands of refugees spawned from the recent fighting. Such cooperation will become immensely complicated, if not prohibited, when the designation takes effect on April 15.

Iran, meanwhile, has sharply condemned the Trump administration’s decision. Iran’s Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif, has urged President Hassan Rouhani to label U.S. forces in the region as terrorists. He has specifically sought to target the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), which oversees U.S. operations across 20 states in the Middle East and parts of Asia. Iranian parliamentarians have also threatened to label portions of the U.S. military as terrorist groups.

While the decision to designate the IRGC as an FTO emphasizes how seriously the U.S. treats the threat of Iran, it further reveals the short-sighted nature of the Trump administration’s overall policy toward the Islamic Republic. By failing to adequately communicate with U.S. agencies like the Department of Defense, as well as isolating U.S. allies that have proven essential partners in military operations including the fight against ISIS, the Trump administration is set to implement a policy that leaves far too much room for collateral damage. As eager as past presidential administrations have been to punish the IRGC for their illicit, dangerous actions, those same administrations recognized that labeling the group an FTO would make an overly-complex situation nearly unmanageable. Even though this decision suits the Trump administration’s interests, it has frustrated parties within the U.S. and around the globe. Yet as this type of approach has not hindered the Trump administration’s dedication unraveling the Iran nuclear deal, it will almost certainly not hinder their approach here.

U.S. Revokes Entry Visa for ICC Prosecutor over Afghanistan Row

April 5, 2019 by Alex Psilakis 1 Comment

On March 15, 2019, the IELR Blog detailed how the Trump administration pledged to block the entry of International Criminal Court (ICC) officials seeking to investigate U.S. personnel. On April 5, the Trump administration kept their word, revoking the visa of Public Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda.

“We can confirm that the U.S. authorities have revoked the prosecutor’s visa for entry into the U.S.,” Bensouda’s office wrote.

Since 2017, Bensouda, alongside her colleagues at the ICC, have been investigating alleged war crimes in Afghanistan. The investigation has reviewed allegations against all parties, including Afghan security forces and the Taliban, as well as U.S. personnel. The investigation may even expand to consider CIA activity within Afghan detention centers. A 2017 report from the Prosecutor’s office, which requested permission to launch the aforementioned investigation, made this clear, noting,

“The information available provides a reasonable basis to believe that members of the United States of America (“US”) armed forces and members of the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) committed acts of torture, cruel treatment, outrages upon personal dignity, rape and sexual violence against conflict-related detainees in Afghanistan and other locations, principally in the 2003-2004 period.”

The State Department has not been shy in opposing the ICC’s efforts. When they denied Bensouda’s visa, their logic fell on this harsh line, as a spokesperson stated,

“The United States will take the necessary steps to protect its sovereignty and to protect our people from unjust investigation and prosecution by the International Criminal Court…One such measure now being implemented restricts the issuance of U.S. visas for those ICC officials who are determined to be directly responsible for any ICC effort to conduct a formal investigation of U.S. or allied personnel without the relevant country’s consent.”

Although the U.S. signed the Rome Statute in 1998, bringing the court into existence, they never ratified the treaty, meaning that they are under no legal obligation to abide by the court’s decisions. The U.S. has long feared that officially joining the ICC would dramatically impede their judicial sovereignty. In 2001, the U.S. implemented the American Service Members’ Protection Act, which provides U.S. and allied personnel immunity from the ICC. Yet most American allies, such as Germany, have proven firm supporters of the court since its foundation.

The ICC, meanwhile, has taken this attack by the U.S. in stride. Since Afghanistan signed onto the Rome Statute in 2003, the ICC believes that they possess the right to try American personnel if they please. “The ICC, as a court of law, will continue to do its work undeterred, in accordance with those principles and the overarching idea of the rule of law,” the court said. Bensouda and her office personally specified that they would be a part of that work, stating, “The prosecutor and her office will continue to undertake that statutory duty with utmost commitment and professionalism, without fear or favor.”

These statements by both the U.S. and ICC should not be viewed as surprising. In March, both sides claimed that they would do as they have done, with the U.S. pledging to prohibit entry of those ICC members investigating U.S. personnel, and the ICC pledging to continue their investigation regardless. Nevertheless, the rapid deterioration in relations still serves as a surprise, as the U.S. has never gone this far in their opposition to the international institution. The Trump administration, however, is no stranger to breaking with precedent, whether that be by moving the U.S. embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, questioning the value of NATO, or threatening to close the U.S.-Mexico border. With no side willing to back down, this conflict between the U.S. and ICC is set to continue until the court releases the findings of its investigation. If charges are made against U.S. personnel – which the ICC has made clear is wholly likely – then this conflict will reach a new, unprecedented level; perhaps a level even unprecedented in the age of Trump.

From an international enforcement perspective, the controversy concerns whether a powerful state can assert its power to give impunity to its nationals when they are under investigation for war crimes. If the U.S. protects its nationals from investigation for these offenses, then other countries, such as Russia and China, will emulate them.

North Korean Embassy Raid in Madrid Leaves Us with More Questions than Answers

April 5, 2019 by Alex Psilakis Leave a Comment

On February 22, 2019, 10 masked individuals broke into the North Korean embassy in Madrid. They tied up the eight people present at the embassy, placed bags over their heads, and, in some cases, beat and interrogated them. The group paid particular attention to Yun Sok So, an official in the embassy’s economics department. They not only beat him, but continuously pressured him to abandon North Korea. The assailants also stole a number of items, including pen drives, computers, and hard drives. One embassy employee managed to escape during the lockdown, screaming from outside to attract the attention of others, and eventually, the police. Yet when the police knocked on the embassy’s front door, they met what looked like a North Korean diplomat, who informed them that nothing was wrong. The police left, allowing the group to continue their raid. Approximately five hours after their arrival, the assailants fled the scene, stealing vehicles from the embassy only to abandon them on a nearby street. Some reports noted that the assailants were freedom fighters seeking to liberate North Korea, while others claimed that the aggressors had ties to the CIA.

Yet as the weeks passed, the case only proved more complex. Evidence revealed that Kim Hyok Chol, one of Kim Jong-Un’s most revered diplomats, formerly served as the North Korean Ambassador to Spain, until he was expelled in 2017 because of the Kim regime’s continued nuclear testing. Kim Hyok Chol was seen as one of the prime architects of the Trump-Kim meeting in Vietnam, which occurred only days after the raid. Reports also indicated that individuals with ties to the U.S. and South Korea took part in the raid. Adrian Hong Chang, a Mexican citizen who currently resides in the U.S., led the raid. Hong Chang allegedly posed as a “managing partner” of a fictitious firm interested in investing in North Korea. He asked to meet with Yun Sok So, presenting a false business card. Moments later, the assailants stormed the embassy. When police checked in on the embassy during the raid, it was likely Hong Chang that convinced them that all was well and calmly turned them away. After the raid, Hong Chang traveled to Lisbon, where he flew back to the U.S. Five days later, he reached out to the FBI, offering to share the “audiovisual material” he acquired during the raid.

Spanish authorities also identified two other individuals that took part in the raid – U.S. citizen Sam Ruy and South Korean citizen Woo Ram Lee. Jose de la Mata, a judge on Spain’s national court, pioneered the investigation into the raid, and has since issued international arrest warrants for Hong Chang and Ruy. However, their exact locations are unknown, or have at least not been disclosed. The FBI, meanwhile, has refused to comment on the situation.

North Korea did not officially comment on the incident until March 31 – over a month after it occurred. They called the raid “a grave terrorist attack” that served as a “flagrant violation of international law.” According to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the raid was undeniably a violation of international law. Article 22, Section One of the Convention states that “the premises of the mission shall be inviolable,” while Section Three notes that, “the premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and the means of transport of the mission shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment or execution.” Judge de la Mata also mentioned that the raid could result in a variety of charges against the assailants, such as theft using violence, membership in a criminal organization, and illegal detention.

However, this is unlikely to deter the group that has since claimed responsibility for the raid. At the end of March – again, about a month after the raid – Free Joseon (Free North Korea) admitted to leading the raid. A defector group dedicated to overthrowing the North Korean government, Free Joseon has continually served as thorn in the side of the Kim regime. In 2017, they claimed to have taken Kim Han Sol under their protection. Kim Han Sol was the son of Kim Jong Nam, who was the brother to Kim Jong Un. Kim Jong Nam was mysteriously assassinated in 2017 – some think by his brother. Believing him under threat, Free Joseon (then known as Cheollima Civil Defense) stated that they secured Kim Han Sol’s protection. Kim Han Sol has not been seen in public since 2017, when he appeared in a video published by Cheollima Civil Defense.

The mystery and multiple layers behind this case make it sound like a spy thriller. Since North Korea rarely acknowledges events like these – events that may be viewed as failures by the regime – their willingness to do so here stresses not only how far word is spreading of the raid, but how frustrated the regime is by the raid itself. Additionally, U.S. ties to the raid are too coincidental to ignore. With Spanish reporters arguing that two of the raiders possessed ties to the CIA, and Judge de la Mata noting that one was a U.S. resident and another a U.S. citizen, suspicions that the U.S. was to some degree involved in the raid are becoming too pressing to ignore. The raid’s near-timing to the Trump-Kim talks in Vietnam – which the former North Korean Ambassador to Spain played a key role in orchestrating – only adds to the suspicions. Even though Free Joseon claimed responsibility for the raid, their involvement alongside U.S.-affiliated individuals begs the question – to what degree is the U.S. affiliated with the defector group? Finally, Spain’s decision to issue international arrest warrants for at least two individuals allegedly involved in the raid, as well as consider pressing further charges, emphasizes that Spain will not simply let this go, even though Spanish-North Korean relations are far from perfect.

Like a spy thriller, it is difficult to predict what answers, if any, we will get to this mystery.