By Konstantina Zivla[1]
I. Introduction
Interpol is widely perceived by the public and the media as an international police force with powers to investigate, arrest, and pursue individuals across borders.[2] This perception is inaccurate. Interpol does not conduct investigations, does not determine guilt or innocence, and does not possess arrest powers. Put simply, Interpol is neither a “Global Police” in the traditional sense nor a “Court” that issues Red Notices against “guilty people.” Nevertheless, despite this formally limited mandate, Interpol plays a decisive role in international criminal cooperation. Its mechanisms, particularly Red Notices and diffusions, can trigger arrests, restrict liberty, and severely affect the personal, professional, and economic lives of the individuals concerned.
Interpol’s power lies not in enforcement, but in coordination. By facilitating the circulation of requests between National Central Bureaus (“NCBs”) and maintaining a global database of wanted persons, Interpol acts as a multiplier for national criminal proceedings. A single decision by the Interpol General Secretariat to issue a Red Notice may result in immediate arrest in one jurisdiction, travel bans in another, and prolonged uncertainty in a third. As such, Interpol’s procedures raise profound questions concerning legality, proportionality, discretion, and the protection of fundamental rights.
This article examines the legal framework governing the publication of Interpol Red Notices, focusing on the minimum criteria for publication and the General Secretariat’s discretion. Particular attention is given to Section 2 of Interpol’s Rules on the Processing of Data (“RPD”),[3] which form the legal backbone of the Red Notice system.
II. Interpol’s Role in the Apprehension of Wanted Persons
Interpol fulfils two principal functions in relation to wanted individuals. First, it maintains a centralized database containing information on persons sought by its member countries. Second, it serves as a conduit for communication between NCBs, particularly when urgent action, including provisional arrest, is sought.
Although Interpol does not investigate or arrest individuals directly, its actions have tangible and often immediate effects on personal liberty. The transmission of information between NCBs can result in an arrest at a border checkpoint. Inclusion in Interpol’s databases can lead to travel restrictions, visa refusals, banking disruptions, reputational damage, and professional exclusion. These consequences arise even before any judicial scrutiny takes place in the state where the individual is located. It is precisely because of these significant effects that Interpol’s internal procedures, safeguards, and review mechanisms merit close legal scrutiny.
III. Red Notices: Definition and Purpose
Contrary to public belief, a Red Notice is not an international arrest warrant.[4] It is an alert issued by Interpol’s General Secretariat at the request of an NCB of one of the 196 Interpol member countries. Its purpose is to seek the location of a wanted person and to request their detention, arrest, or restriction of movement for the purposes of extradition, surrender, or similar lawful action (Αrt. 82 of the RPD).[5]
However, these objectives do not create a legal obligation for the remaining 195 Interpol member countries to arrest the individual concerned. The legal effect of a Red Notice depends entirely on domestic law. While some states treat Red Notices as a sufficient basis for provisional arrest, others require prior judicial authorization or additional national procedures. In practice, however, Red Notices frequently operate as de facto arrest triggers, particularly in jurisdictions that apply automatic or semi-automatic enforcement mechanisms.
IV. Minimum Criteria for Red Notice’s Publication: Article 83(1) RPD
a) Serious Ordinary-Law Crime
The first and most fundamental requirement is that the offense concerned qualifies as a “serious ordinary-law crime.” This concept is not expressly defined in Article 83 of the RPD.[6] Nonetheless, Interpol has historically limited its activities to ordinary criminal matters to preserve its neutrality and comply with Article 3 of its Constitution, which prohibits involvement in political, military, religious, or racial matters.[7]
Article 83(1)(a)(i) of the RPD explicitly excludes certain categories of offenses from eligibility for Red Notices. These include offenses that raise controversial issues relating to: (a) behavioral or cultural norms, (b) offenses relating to family or private matters, and (c) offenses of an administrative nature or arising from private disputes, unless they are linked to serious crime or organized criminal activity.
The first category covers offenses such as prostitution, surrogacy-related conduct, pornography offenses not linked to serious crime, personal drug use, and offenses affecting honor. The second category concerns offenses such as adultery, abortion, euthanasia, child support and alimony disputes, and certain parental child-abduction cases involving conflicting custody decisions. The third category encompasses offenses of an administrative nature or arising from private disputes, such as traffic and licensing violations, labour-law infringements, defamation, unfunded checks, and regulatory or financial breaches lacking personal gain, corruption, fraud, or serious harm.[8] Although this non-exhaustive list provides guidance, it does not constrain the Secretariat’s discretion in individual cases.
b) Penalty Thresholds
The second criterion relates to the seriousness of the penalty attached to the offense. Where a person is sought for prosecution, the conduct must be punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least two years or a more serious penalty. Where a person is sought to serve a sentence, the individual must have been sentenced to at least six months’ imprisonment, or at least six months of the sentence must remain to be served.[9]
These thresholds are intended to ensure proportionality and to prevent the misuse of Interpol mechanisms for minor or trivial offenses. However, as discussed below, compliance with these thresholds does not automatically preclude the exercise of discretion in exceptional cases.
c) Interest in International Police Cooperation
The third criterion is broadly formulated: the request must be “of interest for the purposes of international police cooperation.”[10] This requirement is inherently flexible and grants the General Secretariat considerable latitude. Almost any cross-border criminal allegation can arguably be framed as engaging international police cooperation, particularly in an era of global mobility and transnational financial activity. This criterion establishes a general eligibility requirement that serves as a broad baseline filter and is ordinarily satisfied when a request involves cross-border elements or the potential involvement of more than one jurisdiction. In practice, it sets a low threshold and serves primarily to confirm that Interpol’s involvement is justified ratione materiae.
d) Discretion of the Interpol General Secretariat
Moving forward to Paragraph (b) of Article 83, the RPD grants an exceptional discretionary power to the General Secretariat. Particularly, it allows the Secretariat to authorize publication of a Red Notice even where the core substantive criteria in (i) (serious ordinary-law crime) and/or (ii) (penalty thresholds) are not met, provided that, following consultation with the requesting National Central Bureau or international entity, the General Secretariat considers the notice to be of particular importance to international police cooperation. Unlike criterion (iii), which operates as a routine condition of admissibility, paragraph (b) explicitly permits departure from otherwise mandatory legal thresholds on the basis of perceived operational importance.
The notion of what constitutes a matter of “particular importance” to international police cooperation is not specified in the Rules, nor in any Decisions of the Commission for the Control of Interpol’s Files (“CCF”). It is instead deliberately framed in broad and open-ended terms, allowing the General Secretariat to address situations that could not reasonably have been anticipated at the time of the Rules’ adoption.
Taken cumulatively, this drafting choice confers upon the General Secretariat an exceptionally wide margin of discretion. While a degree of discretion is inherent in administrative decision-making, discretion of such breadth risks undermining legal certainty and foreseeability, which lie at the very core of the right to a fair trial as enshrined in Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, within the normative framework in which the Organization pursues its objectives under Article 2(1) of its Constitution.[11]
V. Minimum Data Requirements: Article 83(2) RPD
In addition to substantive criteria, Article 83(2) of the RPD imposes strict requirements concerning the information that must accompany a Red Notice request. Except for the Identification Data, the requesting NCB must provide a clear and succinct summary of the facts, detailing the alleged criminal conduct, time, and location. The request must specify the charges, the applicable legal provisions, the maximum possible penalty or sentence, and reference a valid arrest warrant or judicial decision having the same effect.
VI. Legal Review by the General Secretariat
Before publication, all Red Notices are subject to a legal review by the Interpol General Secretariat. Article 86 of the RPD emphasizes that this review must ensure compliance with Interpol’s Constitution, particularly Articles 2 and 3. However, the Rules provide little transparency into how this review operates in practice.
First, the concept of a “legal review” is left open to interpretation. The RPD do not specify their scope, content, or methodology, nor do they clarify whether the assessment involves a substantive examination of the underlying facts or is limited to the requesting State’s allegations.
Second, the provision is further silent on the requirements of reason-giving and traceability. It neither obliges the General Secretariat to articulate the legal reasoning of its assessment nor to retain a record capable of meaningful ex post review by the Commission for the Control of Interpol’s Files. As a result, the review process remains opaque, reducing the obligation to conduct a legal review to a largely formalistic exercise.
VII. Final Remarks
Interpol Red Notices are not arrest warrants, nor are they issued under the same conditions as domestic arrest orders. They operate within Interpol’s own legal framework and are governed by specific provisions and criteria. Article 83 of the RPD establishes minimum safeguards while conferring a broad margin of discretion on the Interpol General Secretariat. This is not to imply that all Red Notices are issued unlawfully. This is to suggest that the flexibility of the rules creates uncertainty about whether all Red Notices are issued lawfully. The long-documented misuse of Interpol’s Red Notice system for political purposes provides concrete support to this concern.[12]
[1] Konstantina Zivla is an International Lawyer and Associate Member at Guernica 37 Chambers (London) specializing in Interpol Notices and cross-border criminal enforcement.
[2] https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/interpol-arrests-3700-suspects-global-trafficking-crackdown-129560370.
[3] Interpol’s Rules on the Processing of Data (“RPD”) govern all data processing in the INTERPOL Information System, including that surrounding the issuance of all colour-coded Notices. The provisions specific to Red Notices can be found in Section 2. Available at: https://www.interpol.int/en/content/download/5694/file/26%20E%20RulesProcessingData_RPD.pdf/
[4] INTERPOL, View and Search Public Red Notices for Wanted Persons, https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/Red-Notices/View-Red-Notices (Accessed 3 February 2026).
[5] Article 82 of the RPD: “Red notices are published at the request of a National Central Bureau or an international entity with powers of investigation and prosecution in criminal matters in order to seek the location of a wanted person and his/her detention, arrest or restriction of movement for the purpose of extradition, surrender, or similar lawful action.”.
[6] Article 83(1)(a)(i) of the RPD.
[7] Article 3 of Interpol’s Constitution: “ It is strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character”.
[8] INTERPOL, List of specific offences for which Red Notices may not be issued, https://share.google/zDms2IqxB3VKLCO5w (Accessed 10 January 2026).
[9] Article 83(1)(a)(ii) of the RPD.
[10] Article 83(1)(a)(iii) of the RPD.
[11] Article 2(1) of Interpol’s Constitution: “[Interpol’s] aims are: (1) To ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police authorities within the limits of the laws existing in the different countries and in the spirit of the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”).
[12] European Parliament, Misuse of Interpol’s Red Notices and impact on human rights – recent developments, January 2019, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/603472/EXPO_STU(2019)603472_EN.pdf (Accessed February 8, 2026); Ted R. Bromund, How the Abuse of Interpol Contributes to Transnational Repression, 14 July 2025, https://newlinesinstitute.org/intl-law-peace/how-the-abuse-of-interpol-contributes-to-transnational-repression/ (Accessed February 9, 2026).