The Implications of the SEC v. Jarkesy Supreme Court Decision
By Morinsola Tinubu and Bruce Zagaris
On June 27, 2024, the Supreme Court issued a decision in SEC v. Jarkesy, finding that when the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) claims a defendant has violated securities antifraud provisions and pursues civil penalties, the defendant is entitled to a jury trial in federal court according to the Seventh Amendment. This decision is significant because it places limitations on the SEC’s use of its in-house tribunal with administrative law judges (ALJs), which the SEC commonly uses when presenting antifraud claims. The decision also has important implications for international enforcement cases involving civil penalties.
In 2011, the SEC launched an investigation into George Jarkesy and Patriot28, LLC., his firm. Two years later, the SEC pursued an enforcement action seeking civil penalties against Jarkesy and his firm. According to the SEC, Jarkesy allegedly misled investors regarding certain features of funds he managed, “including the fund’s strategies, service providers, and value, in violation of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.”1 The SEC adjudicated the matter through its in-house tribunal and an ALJ determined Jarkesy was liable for securities fraud and must pay $300,000 as a civil monetary penalty. Shortly after the ALJ decision, Jarkesy presented the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for their review. The U.S. Court of Appeals reversed the decision and remanded the case, claiming the SEC violated Jarkesy’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial when it adjudicated the case in-house.
In June 2024, the Supreme Court, in a six to three decision written by Chief Justice Roberts, supported the Court of Appeals’ decision, claiming Jarkesy is entitled to a jury trial according to the Seventh Amendment. More specifically, the court emphasized that the Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial for “suits at common law” including statutory claims that appear to be “legal in nature.”2 The Court argued that the civil monetary penalties the SEC sought were “legal in nature” and were created to “punish and deter” wrongdoers versus establishing a public right or restoring the “status quo.”3 Additionally, the Court argued that the “cause of action” for securities fraud centers around the same behavior forbidden by common law fraud which further suggests that the claims are legal and therefore subject to the Seventh Amendment.4
The SEC claimed their case fell under the criteria for the public rights exception to the Seventh Amendment, which grants Congress permission to designate certain matters for decision by federal agencies instead of juries if the case could be decided solely by the legislative or executive branches of government.5 However, the majority opinion of the Court sustained that the goal of the suit takes precedence over its basis. In this case, the SEC sought to pursue legal claims similar to those at common law which meant the public right exception was not applicable despite the suit’s statutory foundation.6 According to Chief Justice John Roberts, the determining factor of whether something is a public right is if it is “made of the stuff traditional actions at common law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789.”7 To further his point, Roberts referred to the “government’s ‘power to collect revenue’, Congress’ ‘plenary power of immigration’, and the ‘exclusive power’ of the ‘political branches’ over tariffs” as prime examples of cases in which the jury trial does not apply.8 Roberts also frequently referenced the Granfinanciera v. Nordberg decision of 1989, which held that the public rights exception did “not protect a claim in a bankruptcy proceeding to recover a fraudulent conveyance.”9 The similarities between the statutory action for fraudulent conveyance and the current case further supported the Supreme Court’s decision.
Analysis
The SEC v. Jarkesy decision means the SEC will no longer be permitted to require defendants accused of securities fraud to stand before an ALJ and defend themselves. This has significant implications for the SEC and other federal regulatory agencies. One concern is the limited resources of federal regulatory agencies. Generally, in-house tribunal proceedings cost less than jury trials which means many agencies will be forced to spread their current resources thin. For example, the majority of IRS cases do not reach federal court and like most other agencies, they lack the resources to have frequent trials. This dynamic may incentivize agencies to be more selective of which cases they choose to take to trial. Another outcome is that the SEC and other agencies may present federal courts with more time-consuming cases.
The decision may also create more obstacles for federal regulatory agencies seeking to make claims tied to common law or civil penalties involving international enforcement. It is unclear, for example, whether the Environmental Protection Agency claims will require a jury trial. In some ways, one could argue that because the EPA pursues penalties that are similar in nature to the common-law claim that does not qualify as a public right. Therefore, if the EPA were to make a claim that is connected to a “historical cause of action available at common law,” the Jarkesy decision may be applicable.10 However, the fate of federal regulatory agencies in general is unclear and cases will have to be examined individually to determine whether they fall under the Jarkesy decision.
The bulk of IRS international enforcement cases involving civil penalties pursuant to IRC § 6662 (for accuracy-related penalties) and I.R.C. §§ 6677 and 6038 (for foreign information return penalties, do not involve trials. The dissenting opinion by Justice Sotomayor, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined, pointed out that there are, at the very least, more than two dozen agencies that can impose civil penalties in administrative proceedings. They include many agencies with substantial amounts of international enforcement authority and cases, such as the Department of Justice, the Commodities Future Trading Commission, and the U.S. Department of Treasury. Hence, we can expect a ton of litigation in international enforcement cases involving civil penalties.
Morin is a legal assistant at Berliner Corcoran & Rowe. She recently graduated from Williams College where she studied Political Science and Spanish.
[1] Meghan E. Flinn, Varu Chilakamarri, Theodore L. Kornobis, Michael Culhane Harper, Jarkesy’s Impact on Agency Enforcement Proceedings: Potential Implications for the SEC and Beyond, July 3, 2024, K&L Gates.
[2] Id.
[3] Id.
[4] Id.
[5] Id.
[6] Id.
[7] Ronald Mann, Justices limit major SEC tool to penalize fraud, June 28, 2024, SCOTUSblog.
Justices limit major SEC tool to penalize fraud – SCOTUSblog
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
[10] Jarkesy’s Potential Implications for EPA Administrative Proceedings, July 10, 2024, Sidley.
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