The IELR sends everyone best wishes for a warm and joyous holiday season. 2018 was momentous for the international enforcement community.

On bilateral enforcement cooperation, the IELR reported on the U.S. and Brazil starting a permanent forum on security, covering inter alia: drug and money laundering issues; alien smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal migration.

Among the stories we covered were also many battles in cybercrime. The IELR covered some U.S. indictments of Chinese state hackers, alleging stealing technology and a coordinated announcement by five governments condemning the cybercirmes and theft of IP.  The U.S. imposed sanctions for Russian cyber interference with the 2016 U.S. elections and, and there were also developments on U.S. and international law on election interference.  The Democratic National Committee sued the Russian government and the Trump campaign for election interference and related offenses.

Tax transparency and enforcement remained in the news with the EU proposal requiring reporting on tax intermediaries of aggressive tax planning and the OECD initiatives on mandatory disclosure rules to combat CRS avoidance and offshore structures and preventing abuse of RBI schemes to circumvent the CRS.  The IELR covered several prosecutions arising out of the Paradise Papers.  The U.S. revised Voluntary Disclosure rules at the end of the year and indicted professionals and a U.S. taxpayer for tax offenses arising from the Panama Papers.  The OECD and World Bank published a guide for more effective cooperation between tax authorities and anti-corruption authorities in combating tax and corruption crimes. The German police conducted a search warrant of Deutsche Bank for tax crimes arising out of the Paradise Papers. Five countries formed the Joint Chiefs of Global (Tax) Enforcement (Jr), illustrating the emerging coordination strategy of minilateral alliances and a shift from treaties to informal, nonbinding soft-law accords and transnational governmental networks.

With respect to money laundering, bank secrecy, and transparency, the President lost on three decisions on the alleged violations of the emoluments clause.  Meanwhile, FinCEN issued an advisory on human rights abuses by corruption senior political figures. The ICJ declared jurisdiction and adjudicated a suit brought by Equatorial Guinea against France.  The IMF adopted a new framework for anti-corruption and good governance.  Investigations in multiple countries against the Danish Bank for money laundering in its Estonian branch continued.  The EU adopted 5^th AML/CFT Directive and the Directive on the Use of Financial and Other Information.  The IELR also reported on the FATF report on intermediaries and beneficial ownership information and its report on professional money laundering.  The FAFT-MENAFATF Joint Plenary focused on combating terrorism-financing, human trafficking, and AML enforcement.

On transnational corruption the independent counsel and the U.S. Department of Justice prosecuted many high-visibility cases involving violations of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), including ones involving former Trump campaign manager Paul Manafort and his assistant Rick Gates, and the DOJ released 50 advisory opinions on FARA. The IELR covered the progress of prosecutors in Malaysia, the U.S. and Switzerland on 1MDB cases, including ones in Malaysia, Switzerland.  In Peru, the Supreme Court revoked Fujimori’s pardon and returned him to prison.  The U.S. entered into many joint settlements with foreign governments, including on Keppel and Petrobras.  The IELR covered the U.S. Justice policy on coordinated resolutions in corporate penalties.  The World Bank Office of Suspension and Debarment published a new report.

The major focus of international enforcement of the Trump Administration continued to be on migration.  Madeline Henshaw-Green covered many migration enforcement developments, such as the Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ elimination of the requirement of full hearings for asylum seekers, and the rise of xenophobic, anti-immigrant policies in American and European governments. The U.S. courts required that the executive branch  dismiss an alien charged with a narcotics crime, while detained for deportation purposes. Prof. Plachta covered recent initiatives by international organizations, such as the UNODC and EU to tackle the problem of migrant smuggling. Zarine Kharazian reported on the UN General Assembly’s approval of a sweeping migration accord. A U.S. court sentenced a Bosnian Serb for concealing participation in war crimes.

On counter-terrorism, international organizations updated their counter-terrorism strategies.  The IELR covered a case in which the U.S. appellate court barred the U.S. government from forcibly transferring a U.S. ISIS suspect.  Prof. Plachta reported on a UN Secretary-General report on the threat posed by ISIL and the European Parliament’s recommendation on terrorism-financing.

With respect to human trafficking, the U.S. Congress enacted a law enabling civil and criminal liability for interactive computer services.

Economic sanctions continued to be a hot area.  In particular, the Trump Administration announced its withdrawal from the JCPOA and re-imposition of unilateral Iran sanctions.  In response the EU started a process to activate blacking statute against the unilateral sanctions and initiate a vehicle to fund Iran transactions to circumvent the unilateral U.S. sanctions.   Maximilian Raileanu and I reported on the ICJ decision on Iran’s application to start proceedings against the U.S. for violating the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights and subsequently I reported on the ICJ ‘s grant of provisions measures to Iran with respect to the U.S. sanctions. Treasury issued CAATSA reports on Russian senior foreign political officials.  BIS published a notice requesting information on emerging technologies.  The IELR covered Russia’s existing and anticipated measures in response to international economic sanctions against Russia. The U.S. armed and action against circumventions of North Korean sanctions.  Pres. Trump reversed ZTE penalties in exchange for trade concessions with China.  The U.S. and the Lima Group put diplomatic and financial pressure on the Maduro regime in Venezuela.  The U.S. banned the Venezuela’s new crypto-currency.

Prof. Plachta reported on the Council of Europe’s resolution on the destruction and illegal trafficking of cultural heritage.

Maria O’Sullivan discussed the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical  Weapons (OPCW) decision to attribute blame for chemical weapons violations, setting the stage for accountability for the attacks on civilians in Syria and the Skripals and Sturgess cases in Britain.  In this regard, I reported on Britain’s charges against two Russians in the attacks against the Skripals and on U.S. sanctions on Russia for violation of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Treaty.

On transnational organized crime, the Council of Europe adopted a resolution on fighting organized crime through confiscation.  The U.S. charged four Chinese and six U.S. residents in international drug and laundering conspiracy involving opioids.  Prof. Luz Nagle discussed how the jailing of Gustavo Villegas, a peacemaker, threatened Colombia’s demobilization of transborder criminal organizations and urban criminal gangs.  I reported on Guatemala’s denial of visas to principal officials of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), the major body for prosecuting organized crime and corruption, as the U.S. stood silent.

With respect to international anti-trust, the U.S. Antitrust Division led discussions on achieving a multilateral framework in competition law investigation and enforcement.  Société Général agreed to pay $1.3 billion to settle U.S.-French charges on bribes to Libya and Libor fixes.

On international environmental enforcement Henshaw-Green reported on the Chinese government’s reinstating the ban on the use of rhino and tiger parts after outcries from environmental groups.  I covered INTERPOL’s coordinating international enforcement operations against marine pollution.

With respect to international securities enforcement, I reported on the actions by U.S. and U.K. enforcement and regulatory authorities against stock manipulation (i.e., pump and dump) scheme with the use of offshore entities.

Concerning extraterritorial jurisdiction I reported on the Pakistan-U.S. clash over a U.S. diplomat’s accidental killing of a motorcyclist.  Kharazian reported on the suit brought by the parents of Otto Warmbier against N. Korea under the FSIA for their son’s torture and wrongful death.

With respect to international human rights, Prof. Plachta reported on the ECtHR decision in Krombach/Bamerski and the ECtHR Grand Chamber’s decision (Nait-Liman v. Switzerland), adopting a restrictive interpretation the right of access to a court in torture cases.

Extradition and extradition alternatives stories, including Ecuador’s conferring citizenship on Julian Assange, remained important. A major story was Canada’s arrest and granting bail to Meng Wanzhou, Huawei’s CFO, on a U.S. extradition request. The U.S. demanded the release of Americans forbidden from leaving China until a fugitive father Liu Changming returns.  The U.S. sting operation snagged a Chinese intelligence officer in Belgium who was sent to the U.S. for conspiring and attempting to commit economic espionage and steal trade secrets from multiple U.S. aviation and aerospace companies. Prof. Michael Plachta, our correspondent in the EU, continued his coverage of efforts, including by the European Court of Human Rights, to hold accountable extralegal kidnapping in the war against terrorism.  Plachta also covered the ne bis in idem principle as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the EU and the same courts allowing EU Members to refuse execution of European Arrest Warrants from Poland.  Plachta reported on a case allowing a European Arrest Warrant to the UK despite Brexit.

Yurij Nemets covered INTERPOL’s trimming the individual right to access information in its files.

With respect to international organizations, INTERPOL and UNODC heads discussed measures to strengthen enforcement cooperation.

With respect to international evidence gathering, prior to the resolution by the U.S. Supreme Court of the Microsoft challenge to the warrant provisions of the Stored Electronic Communications Act, President Trump signed into law The Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (“CLOUD”) Act on March 23, 2018. It establishes processes and procedures for law enforcement requests for data in other countries. The Act may reach certain data located in other countries. The Act also allows certain foreign governments to enter into new bilateral agreements with the U.S. that will prequalify them to make foreign law-enforcement requests directly to U.S. service providers, rather than via the U.S. government under a mutual legal assistance treaty. Zarine Kharazian covered U.S. v. Microsoft Corp. She and I also covered the state of the playing field within and outside the U.S. after the enactment of the CLOUD Act.

With respect to international tribunals, Prof. Plachta discussed the Khmer Rouge Tribunal convicted two persons of genocide and the ICC Prosecutor’s requests for ruling on jurisdiction in order to start an investigation, and the recent developments in the Palestine situation   before the ICC.

In the gap of actions by international tribunals, national courts in France, Germany, Sweden and the U.S. acted on alleged atrocities in Rwanda, Syria and elsewhere.  Prof. Plachta discussed the MH17 joint investigation team’s interim report pointing at the Russian Federation for liability in the downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 over the conflict zone in eastern Ukraine in 2014.

Non-governmental organizations continued to play major roles. Fair Trials and REDRESS released a report on how the use of evidence obtained by torture is still widespread in criminal trials across the world.  Linda Ramirez reported on the case brought by the Center for Constitutional Rights against the Assad regime for the death of war reporter Marie Colvin.

Professor Michael Plachta contributed many articles on economic integration and international enforcement, including the outcomes of the meetings of the EU’s Justice and Home Affairs Council, including its non-cash fraud directive, cross-border access to e-evidence, and enforcement cooperation with external actors, including the U.S. and the Western Balkans.  I covered the enforcement cooperation provisions in the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

Zarine Kharazian has continued her stellar work as the assistant editor.  Her work on the blog has resulted in 6,155 visits as of December 23 and reached 378 visits on Dec. 22.  She continues almost every weekend to play in bands. Our new intern Evan Schleicher has contributed a blog post on the Russian seizure of Ukrainian vessels and a decision by a German appellate court in a conviction of persons for atrocities in Rwanda.

In December William Hein and Co. started carrying the IELR and has archived the IELR back to its first publication in 1985.  Hein joins LexisNexis, WestLaw, and EBSCO as databases carrying the IELR.  Premium subscribers can use the IELR search engine to identify and read all the back issues on our website.

We hope you enjoyed reading the IELR in 2018 as much as we enjoyed publishing it!

Best wishes for the New Year,

The IELR Team

This retrospective will be published in Volume 35, Issue 1 of the International Enforcement Law Reporter.

On Sunday November 25^th, three Ukrainian vessels were captured by the Russian coast guard while travelling through the Kerch Strait and several soldiers were injured in the short firefight which ensued. The strait, which lies between the Russian mainland and the disputed territory of Crimea has been a flashpoint for conflict between the two nations already, with the Kremlin notably building a bridge over the strait in a symbolic display of Russian control of the region.

Both countries have argued that the other country violated international law. Russian officials claim that the Ukrainian vessels violated their territorial waters, while Ukrainian authorities have pointed to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea as evidence that, in fact, it is Russia who has violated international law.

The question of who violated international law ultimately comes down largely to the legal standing of Crimea. The 2014 annexation of Crimea precipitated by a revolution in Ukraine is not recognized by Ukraine, the U.S. or the vast majority of nations. However, some nations including China, North Korea and Iran have recognized it. Russia, operating under the understanding that Crimea is a Russian holding, has claimed that the vessels were in Russian “territorial sea,” which extends up to 12 nautical miles from a country’s coastline.

Looking to the 2014 referendum on the legal status of Crimea, it becomes clear that both internal and international law were not sufficiently upheld. Article 2 of the Ukrainian Constitution establishes that “Ukraine shall be a unitary state” and that the “territory of Ukraine within its present border is indivisible and inviolable.” Article 134 goes further than this, calling Crimea an “inseparable constituent part of Ukraine.” However, these articles are not enough to gauge the legality of the referendum in terms of international law, as Constitutional violations represent domestic, rather than international, matters. According to the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice referendums can only be held on one question, which should be answerable with a yes or a no. Further, there must be a regulatory referendum law, a neutrality of public authorities, and an absence or restraint of military forces of either side of the referendum. None of these conditions were sufficiently met by the referendum, rendering it invalid by international law. Given the unchanged legal status of Crimea with respect to international law, there is a customary claim to coastal State status which can be made by Ukraine.

It seems that, even if the Russian premise that it controls Crimea is accepted, Russian actions clearly violated customary international law and agreements in multiple ways. Principally, a 2003 bilateral agreement between Russia and the Ukraine guarantees free navigation in the sea of Azov and the strait of Kerch by state non-commercial vessels. This agreement also notes that dispute settlement must be regulated by agreement between the parties, which means that, absent a consensus on the legality of this action by Russia and Ukraine, the issue of legality must default to precedent. Russia has repeatedly violated this agreement. In July 2017, the Russian Ministry of Transport implemented an order which allows Russian authorities to deny any vessel except Russian warships access to the Sea of Azov during specified time periods.

Finally, the 1997 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation (FCN-Treaty) states that Russia and Ukraine guarantee freedom of transit across each other’s territory in accord with generally recognized norms of international law. This treaty calls to mind a central question: does customary international law support the Ukrainian or the Russian side of this dispute? If the waters are determined to be internal waters, the ICJ’s 1992 judgment in the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute can be referenced, as there was an “existing right of innocent passage” both because of “historical reasons” and “practical necessities.” The existence of multiple written agreements supporting free navigation further suggests preexisting customary freedom of transit for Russian and Ukrainian ships. The previous discussion of the legal status of Crimea makes it abundantly clear that, in the final analysis, Ukraine has the most clear and rigorous claim to customary coastal State rights in the area in which the Ukrainian ships were seized.

The United States, along with China, Russia, and Iran, has refused to sign a new cybersecurity pact supported by over 50 countries and a host of technology industry leaders this week.

French President Emmanuel Macron introduced the initiative, called The Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace, at UNESCO’s annual Internet Governance Forum in Paris on November 12, 2018.

The Terms

The accord’s signatories agree to collaborate in order to:

• Prevent and recover from cyber attacks that threaten individuals, institutions, or critical infrastructure;
• Prevent activity that attempts to damage the free and fair flow of information on the Internet;
• Strengthen capacity to prevent election interference by foreign adversaries through malicious cyber attacks;
• Prevent theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets;
• Prevent the proliferation of malicious ICT tools;
• Fortify the security of digital products and services;
• Encourage the adoption of “advanced cyber hygiene”for all actors;
• Stop non-State actors from “hacking-back,” and
• Promote international norms and confidence-building measures in cyberspace.

While the Paris Call is not legally binding, it nonetheless serves as a symbol of adherence to diplomatic norms and principles in cyberspace. In a post on Microsoft’s blog, Microsoft President and Chief Legal Officer Brad Smith praised the accord for furthering both state and non-state actors’ commitment to digital peace. “The Paris Call is an important step on the path toward digital peace, creating a stronger foundation for progress ahead,” Smith wrote. “It calls for strong commitments in support of clear principles and strong norms to protect citizens and civilian infrastructure from systemic or indiscriminate cyber attacks. Similarly, it calls for governments, tech companies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to work together to protect our democracies and electoral processes from nation-state cyber threats.”

In Bad Company

The United States’ absence from the agreement is notable – most U.S. allies, including all European member states, signed on to the Paris Call. Most members of the Five Eyes signals intelligence network – the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Canada – also signed on (Australia and the United States are the exceptions). In addition, more than 200 companies, many of them large multinationals based in the United States as well as NGOs, have also supported it. Among these non-state signatories are Microsoft, Google, Facebook, Accenture, Salesforce, MasterCard, Visa, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, and Nestle.

By refusing to sign the Paris Call, the United States finds itself in the company of several repressive regimes, as well as states with active cyberwar programs. Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Israel have yet to sign the agreement. The United States has not revealed its reason to abstain from the Call thus far, but also has not ruled out supporting it.

Interpol president Meng Hongwei has resigned, according to reports by various news outlets on Sunday, October 7.

The surprise announcement comes just over a week after Meng’s wife reported him missing, after he left France to travel home to  China. His wife later reported that the last communication she received with him was a text message containing the knife emoji.

On Monday,  October 8, China’s Ministry of Public Security released a statement confirming that Meng had been detained by party authorities upon his arrival in China as part of an anti-corruption probe. According to a  translation of the press release by the Associated Press, the Minister of Public Security, Zhao Lezhi, stated that “[w]e should deeply recognize the serious damage that Meng Hongwei’s bribe-taking and suspected violations of the law have caused the party and the cause of public security and deeply learn from this lesson.” The statement also said that Meng’s alleged corruption had “definitely dealt a blow to China’s image.”

China has not released further details on the charges against Meng, and observers suspect they are politically motivated. The Economist noted that the language in the Ministry of Public Security’s statement stressed the need  for “absolute loyalty” and “resolute support” to Xi Jinping. It is also worth nothing that, as of April, Meng was apparently no longer a member of the Ministry of Public Security’s party committee.

China has faced ongoing criticism from human rights bodies for its abuse of Interpol’s “red notice” system. In September of last year, Human Rights Watch penned a letter to the international police agency expressing concerns about China’s misuse of the red notice. “In recent years, the Chinese government, against Interpol’s regulations, has tried to control and persecute dissidents and activists abroad by issuing politically motivated red notices through Interpol,” the letter stated.

For more information on this webinar, please visit see: https://www.grceducators.com/Increasing-Criminal-Risks-of-Intermediaries-for-Cross-Border-Financial-Crimes.

In the last couple of decades, the world has experienced growing prosecutions of intermediaries for cross-border financial crimes. A U.S. bank was convicted by a Spanish court for moving money in the Pinochet criminal investigation instead of freezing it. The U.S. and State of New York have brought criminal cases against banks for a variety of financial crimes, especially economic sanctions. The U.S. DOJ has had an Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program for Swiss Banks. The UK Criminal Finance Act of 2017 makes foreign enablers liable for failing to prevent UK tax evasion. The OECD requires tax authorities enforcing the Common Reporting Standard to make intermediaries liable for circumventing the rules. An EU directive requires reporting of aggressive offshore cross-border tax schemes. Increasingly, law enforcement agencies, whether anti-trust, tax, and/or securities enforcement, are entering into new formal and informal enforcement cooperation agreements. Governments and courts increasingly make the liability of entities and executives dependent on prevention and post-conviction monitorships. International organizations and informal groups, such as FATF, the G20, the G7, and the FSF continue to promulgate new due diligence and enforcement requirements for governments.

Please join Bruce Zagaris, Esq., Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP, adjunct professor, Texas A&M Law Faculty, author of INTERNATIONAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND MATERIALS (Cambridge U. Press, 2d ed., 2015 ), and editor of the International Enforcement Law Reporter (www.ielr.com) for a discussion of the increasing criminal and enforcement risks of intermediaries, including financial institutions and lawyers, for cross-border crimes.

The program will discuss:

• New tax transparency, entity transparency, reporting, and gatekeeper initiatives
• Prioritization of corporate/entity liability
• Increased prosecution of  intermediaries for tax, anti-corruption, and money laundering violations
• Increased use of asset forfeiture
• Growing criminalization and convergence of tax, money laundering, anti-corruption, and other financial crimes
• Increased importance of NGOs, whistleblowers, and the media
• Due diligence against enhanced threats of liability
  

Learning Objective

1. Learn the international trends to hold intermediaries liable criminally and civilly
2. Learn what is the extraterritorial nature of many of the national laws
3. How are international organizations and informal transnational government networks making laws and requiring governments and the private sector to respond
4. Responses (e.g., improved due diligence by professional associations and firms) required by intermediaries
   

Topic Background

See the course summary above. In addition, examples of topic developments are: FinCEN Advisories on human rights abuses by corrupt senior political figures; joint settlements by the U.S. and other governments on convictions of Siemens, Odebrecht; joint enforcement cooperation agreements between Brazil and other countries on Odebrecht; the formation by the U.S. and 4 Tax Authorities of the Joint Chiefs of Tax Enforcement (J5); the issuance by the OECD of a document to prevent abuse of Residence and Citizenship by Investment Schemes to Circumvent the CRS; the indictment by the Special Counsel of Agents (Manafort and Gates) for misleading statements on Foreign Agent Registration Act; several Swiss banks and professionals have been convicted for conspiring to help U.S. taxpayers commit tax and related crimes; over 80 Swiss banks participated in the DOJ’s Offshore Voluntary Program for Swiss banks.

Who Should Attend

1. Compliance officials for financial institutions and related entities
2. Professionals involved in wealth planning and management
3. Regulatory and enforcement officials
4. Academicians involved in international white collar crime law; international law; criminal law; international relations; and criminal justice
5. Civil servants in international organizations
6. Lawyers, accountants and other professionals involved in cross-border business

The HM Revenue & Customs of the United Kingdom’s Requirement to Correct (RTC) deadline is approaching on September 30, 2018.

The new legal requirement was enacted in the Finance (No. 2) Act 2017, and obligates anyone with undeclared UK tax liabilities involving offshore income or assets to disclose the relevant information about this non-compliance to HMRC by the deadline. 

The Sept. 30 date is also the date by which more than 100 countries are scheduled to exchange data on financial accounts under the Common Reporting Standard. 

The rule relates to liabilities for the UK Income Tax, Capital Gains Tax, and Inheritance Tax.  It only applies to tax non-compliance committed before April 6, 2017.

According to the HMRC’s guidance note: “Failure to disclose the relevant information to HMRC by September 30, 2018, will result in liability for a new penalty which is likely to be much higher than the existing penalties.  In all cases where a penalty applies, there will be a standard penalty equivalent to 200% of the tax liability which should have been disclosed to HMRC under the RTC but was not.  This penalty can be reduced depending on the level of cooperation and timeliness of the disclosure.”

Joeseph Erwin is an attorney based in Dallas, Texas. He may be reached at Joe@ErwinTaxLaw.com, or: Law Office of Joseph M. Erwin, 100 Crescent Court, Suite 700 Dallas, Texas 75201-2112 USA | Tel.214.969.6890 | Fax.214.969.5707 | www.erwintaxlaw.com | www.itsgnetwork.com.

For nearly a year and a half, American citizens and government officials have been debating the degree of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.  It has been alleged that Vladimir Putin and the Russian government developed a clear preference for at the time candidate Trump to win the election.  The Russians attempted to infiltrate state election infrastructure while creating a system to utilize social media platforms to influence the election.  Three reports have been released detailing the Russian’s involvement, or lack thereof.

The first is the Intelligence Community Assessment (“ICA”) created by the CIA, NSA, and FBI in January 2017.  This report “assessed that Russian activities in the run-up to the 2016 presidential election represented a significant escalation in the long history of Russian attempts to interfere in U.S. domestic politics.”  President Obama tasked the Intelligence Community with creating this report and thousands of files and pages were examined to reach their ultimate conclusion that the “Russians created a comprehensive and multifaceted campaign against the U.S.”  President Trump and many others within the U.S. government refuted the claims that his campaign colluded with the Russian government to win the election.

The second released report, published by the House Intelligence Committee, supported President Trump’s claim that his campaign did not work with the Russian government, but it did conclude that the Russian government interfered with the election, as reported in the ICA.  The report found that the ICA’s conclusions on Putin’s strategic intentions did not utilize proper analytic tradecraft and that there was no evidence of collusion, coordination, or conspiracy between the Trump campaign and the Russian government.  This was seen as a victory for President Trump and Republicans, while Democrats rejected these conclusions due to the alleged existence of ample evidence of collusion.

The third and most recent report was released on July 3^rd, 2018.  The report, published by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, found further evidence of Russian interference, and that the ICA utilized proper analytic tradecraft.  The report contradicts the House Committee Report because it concluded that President Putin approved of the media campaign to influence the elections.  The Senate investigators also rejected President Trump’s claims that the ICA was politically influenced and used to discredit his presidency.  However, the report is silent on the matter of collusion between President Trump’s campaign and the Russian government.  The answer to this national debate will come once special counsel Robert Mueller concludes his investigation into Russian meddling.  Mueller has already indicted 13 Russian nationals for interfering with the elections, and the Senate’s new report lends credibility to his decision.

The Senate’s full classified report has yet to be written and it could reveal more information that was not released to the public on July 3^rd, 2018.  Both the relevant House and Senate committees continue to gather information, but it is clear from these reports that Russia influenced a U.S. presidential election for their own political gain.  The Senate’s report can be seen as a victory for the rule of law and bipartisanship.