IELR Blog

Official Blog of the International Enforcement Law Reporter

STEP Public Policy Committee Publishes New Report on Tackling Economic Crime

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By Emily Hong

The STEP Public Policy Committee has recently published a critical new report, Tackling Economic Crime, which delves into global efforts to combat financial crime and offers pragmatic recommendations to address the gaps in existing Anti Money Laundering (AML) and Counter-Terrorist Financing (CTF) frameworks. As an organization representing professionals in trust and estate planning across 95 countries, STEP leverages its members’ extensive expertise to offer technical and policy advice.1 This input aims to foster more effective AML and CTF strategies, particularly in succession planning, where trusts often play a central role.

Financial crimes, such as money laundering, tax evasion, and terrorist financing, persist as major threats to global financial systems. Despite the establishment of measures like AML frameworks and trust regulations, these crimes continue to thrive due to inefficiencies in reporting and administrative processes.2 Trusts, though legitimate tools for wealth management and succession planning, are sometimes exploited for illicit purposes, making them a focal point in global discussions on economic crime prevention.

Tackling Economic Crime examines the current measures in place to combat these crimes and offers recommendations to strengthen these systems rather than suggesting an increase in regulations. STEP advocates for improving the quality of existing data and enhancing the implementation of established frameworks – emphasizing that while global efforts like those from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the European Union have been effective in collecting significant amounts of information, the focus now should be on improving how this information is processed, administered, and used.3

One of the report’s main proposals is improving the quality and processing of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), which play a critical role in identifying economic crime. A lack of detailed guidance for filing these reports has led to an overwhelming number of incorrect or unnecessary submissions, which strain government resources and dilute the effectiveness of the system. By investing in more detailed guidance and enhancing the processing mechanisms for SARs, authorities can focus on legitimate threats and improve the overall efficiency of their AML efforts.

The report also addresses the growing burden of compliance checks across jurisdictions, which has resulted in rising costs for customers and a significant duplication of efforts. STEP recommends introducing a ‘compliance passport’ that would streamline the verification process across borders.4 Such a passport would allow entities to demonstrate AML compliance in multiple jurisdictions, reducing the distortions in transparency regimes and simplifying the compliance landscape. This would be particularly beneficial for multinational entities operating in multiple regulatory environments, as it would enhance the certainty of their AML compliance while reducing regulatory friction.

Additionally, the report emphasizes the need to verify beneficial ownership information in company and trust registers. In many countries, beneficial ownership data is not verified, which severely limits the practical utility of this information in combatting money laundering and other illegal activities.5 STEP advocates for requiring obliged entities to verify this data, which would make it more difficult for criminals to conceal their identities behind complex corporate structures. In cases where entities do not have a registrable beneficial owner, STEP proposes that these entities be required to provide a fuller explanation for their status – this would give authorities greater certainty and allow them to focus their resources on cases where criminal intent may be suspected.

Strengthening whistleblowing frameworks globally is another recommendation put forward in the report: Whistleblowing is a crucial tool in uncovering corruption, fraud, and other forms of economic crime, but in many jurisdictions, whistleblowers face risks such as compromised safety and legal repercussions. STEP calls for jurisdictions with weak whistleblowing protections to review and strengthen their frameworks, ensuring that whistleblowers can report wrongdoing without fear of retaliation.

Finally, STEP recommends the adoption of a unified global standard for AML and CTF compliance. While many jurisdictions have adopted FATF’s recommendations, inconsistencies remain, with some countries implementing divergent standards. This lack of uniformity exposes systems to criminal risks and undermines global efforts to combat financial crime. STEP advocates for all jurisdictions to agree on one global standard, ensuring that international financial regulations are consistent and non-discriminatory.

Citations:

Emily Hong is a fall editorial intern for the IELR. She is a sophomore at Johns Hopkins studying International Studies and Economics.

[1] STEP (2024). Tackling Economic Crime: Expert analysis of existing measures to combat financial crime and practical recommendations on how to address the gaps, STEP, https://www.step.org/knowledge-hub/tackling-economic-crime

[2] IMF (2024). Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT), IMF, https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/Financial-Integrity/amlcft

[3] STEP, supra note 1.

[4] Id.

[5] FATF (2014). GUIDANCE ON TRANSPARENCY AND BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP, FATF, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/guidance/Guidance-transparency-beneficial-ownership.pdf.coredownload.pdf

Webinar The arms trafficking menace in the Caribbean: Understanding the Crime & Litigation Dynamics

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On Thursday September 26, from 5:00-7:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, the Institute of International Relations, University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad, the Caribbean Policy Consortium, and the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section will host a webinar on

The arms trafficking  menace in the Caribbean: Understanding the Crime & Litigation Dynamics

Moderator: Prof. Ivelaw Griffith, will moderate.

Dr Malisa Neptune-Figaro,  Department of Behavioural Sciences, The University, of the West Indies, T&T, will discuss “Unveiling the Threats: Illicit Firearms in the Caribbean;”

Dr. Tres-Ann Kremer,  Caribbean Regional Director, Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, will discuss “Strategy, Policy and Delivery: Addressing Guns and Violence as a Public Health Issue in the Caribbean;”

Mr. Callixtus Joseph,  Assistant Director, Policy, Strategy and Innovation, CARICOM IMPACS, will address “Impact and Implications of Illicit Firearms: Pathways to Change;”

Mr. Ivan Carpio,  State Department, Caribbean Security Initiative, will focus on “Examining US Government, initiatives Including Cooperation with Caribbean Governments;”

Mr. Bruce Zagaris,  Partner, Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP and  Fellow, Caribbean Policy Consortium, will look at the “Status of U.S. litigation against gun manufacturers and distributors: Suits  outside the U.S.”

Registration is free.  A registration link is below:

https://sta-uwi-edu.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_dGY8rk_2QmeDp7yRC3kh4w

 

Fugitive Italian Crime Leader Caught in Slovenia After Six Months on the Run

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By Emily Hong

On August 20, 2024, authorities from Italy and Slovenia, supported by Eurojust, successfully apprehended Salvatore Roberto Perricciolo, leader of an Italian organized crime group (OCG). Perricciolo, 40, is a fugitive of Calabrian origin who had been on the run for six months following his conviction for crimes including drug trafficking, extortion, and kidnapping.1 His arrest in Koper, Slovenia, marks a significant achievement in the ongoing battle against organized crime in Europe.

As leader of an OCG, Perricciolo not only oversaw cocaine trafficking operations across Italy but also was involved in robbery, fraud, embezzlement, extortion, kidnapping, and illegal possession of weapons. In a separate trial, he was found guilty of mafia-related offenses, further solidifying his position as a dangerous figure within the criminal network.2

In February of 2024, before his final sentencing by Italy’s Court of Cassation, Perricciolo promptly fled – escaping his impending 21-year prison sentence and prompting a national and European Arrest Warrant. Despite the challenges law enforcement officials faced during their months of investigation, they were able to track Perricciolo to Slovenia, where he had been hiding in the port city of Koper.

The success of this operation can largely be attributed to the involvement of Eurojust, the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation. Eurojust played a pivotal role by executing a European Investigation Order (EIO), a crucial legal tool that allowed for swift and coordinated investigative measures across borders. The EIO is a “a judicial decision which has been issued or validated by a judicial authority of a Member State to have one or several specific investigative measure(s) carried out in another Member State” without the lengthy procedures typically associated with mutual legal assistance treaties.3

The EIO issued in this case authorized extensive surveillance activities in Slovenia – phone tapping, physical tailing, and other forms of monitoring – to pinpoint Perricciolo’s exact location within just ten days of its execution.4 The success of the operation underscores the importance of surveillance in modern law enforcement, especially in cases involving high-profile fugitives with the resources and expertise to evade capture. In particular, wiretapping, when conducted legally and with proper oversight, can provide invaluable real-time information that is often crucial for the success of such operations.

Perricciolo’s arrest highlights the evolving nature of European law enforcement in addressing transnational crime. The effectiveness of Eurojust in this case demonstrates its growing importance in the European legal landscape, particularly in complex cases requiring swift action and rapid coordination between borders. Furthermore, the use of the EIO in this operation exemplifies its value as a tool for a streamlined and efficient approach to law enforcement. The quick execution of the EIO in this case shows how it can be leveraged to expedite justice and prevent criminals from taking advantage of bureaucratic delays.

The success of this operation sets a precedent for future international cooperation in law enforcement – demonstrating that when countries work collaboratively, supported by institutions like Eurojust, they can effectively tackle even the most challenging of criminal cases. However, it also highlights how cross-border judicial coordination and communication between national authorities will be crucial to ensure that such operations can be conducted swiftly and successfully.

 

 

Emily Hong is a fall editorial intern for the IELR. She is a sophomore at Johns Hopkins studying International Studies and Economics.

 

[1] Eurojust (2024). Fugitive Italian crime leader arrested in Slovenia, Eurojust, https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/news/fugitive-italian-crime-leader-arrested-slovenia#:~:text=A%20fast%20and%20coordinated%20action,a%2021%2Dyear%20prison%20sentence.

[2] Castori (2024). The super fugitive Salvatore Perricciolo arrested in Koper, il Resto del Carlino, https://www.ilrestodelcarlino.it/marche/cronaca/tesoro-latitante-casa-auto-confisca-perricciolo-4f77ea5d

[3] Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0041

[4] The Slovenia Times (2024). Fugitive Italian crime boss arrested in Slovenia, Slovenia Times, https://sloveniatimes.com/40761/fugitive-italian-crime-boss-arrested-in-slovenia

 

 

SUPREME COURT DECIDES THAT DEFENDANTS ACCUSED OF SECURITIES ANTIFRAUD VIOLATIONS BY THE SEC ARE ENTITLED TO A JURY TRIAL IN FEDERAL COURT

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The Implications of the SEC v. Jarkesy Supreme Court Decision

By Morinsola Tinubu and Bruce Zagaris

 

On June 27, 2024, the Supreme Court issued a decision in SEC v. Jarkesy, finding that when the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) claims a defendant has violated securities antifraud provisions and pursues civil penalties, the defendant is entitled to a jury trial in federal court according to the Seventh Amendment. This decision is significant because it places limitations on the SEC’s use of its in-house tribunal with administrative law judges (ALJs), which the SEC commonly uses when presenting antifraud claims. The decision also has important implications for international enforcement cases involving civil penalties.

In 2011, the SEC launched an investigation into George Jarkesy and Patriot28, LLC., his firm. Two years later, the SEC pursued an enforcement action seeking civil penalties against Jarkesy and his firm. According to the SEC, Jarkesy allegedly misled investors regarding certain features of funds he managed, “including the fund’s strategies, service providers, and value, in violation of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.”1 The SEC adjudicated the matter through its in-house tribunal and an ALJ determined Jarkesy was liable for securities fraud and must pay $300,000 as a civil monetary penalty. Shortly after the ALJ decision, Jarkesy presented the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for their review. The U.S. Court of Appeals reversed the decision and remanded the case, claiming the SEC violated Jarkesy’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial when it adjudicated the case in-house.

In June 2024, the Supreme Court, in a six to three decision written by Chief Justice Roberts, supported the Court of Appeals’ decision, claiming Jarkesy is entitled to a jury trial according to the Seventh Amendment. More specifically, the court emphasized that the Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial for “suits at common law” including statutory claims that appear to be “legal in nature.”2 The Court argued that the civil monetary penalties the SEC sought were “legal in nature” and were created to “punish and deter” wrongdoers versus establishing a public right or restoring the “status quo.”3  Additionally, the Court argued that the “cause of action” for securities fraud centers around the same behavior forbidden by common law fraud which further suggests that the claims are legal and therefore subject to the Seventh Amendment.4

The SEC claimed their case fell under the criteria for the public rights exception to the Seventh Amendment, which grants Congress permission to designate certain matters for decision by federal agencies instead of juries if the case could be decided solely by the legislative or executive branches of government.5 However, the majority opinion of the Court sustained that the goal of the suit takes precedence over its basis. In this case, the SEC sought to pursue legal claims similar to those at common law which meant the public right exception was not applicable despite the suit’s statutory foundation.6 According to Chief Justice John Roberts, the determining factor of whether something is a public right is if it is “made of the stuff traditional actions at common law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789.”7 To further his point, Roberts referred to the “government’s ‘power to collect revenue’, Congress’ ‘plenary power of immigration’, and the ‘exclusive power’ of the ‘political branches’ over tariffs” as prime examples of cases in which the jury trial does not apply.8 Roberts also frequently referenced the Granfinanciera v. Nordberg decision of 1989, which held that the public rights exception did “not protect a claim in a bankruptcy proceeding to recover a fraudulent conveyance.”9 The similarities between the statutory action for fraudulent conveyance and the current case further supported the Supreme Court’s decision.

 

Analysis

The SEC v. Jarkesy decision means the SEC will no longer be permitted to require defendants accused of securities fraud to stand before an ALJ and defend themselves. This has significant implications for the SEC and other federal regulatory agencies. One concern is the limited resources of federal regulatory agencies. Generally, in-house tribunal proceedings cost less than jury trials which means many agencies will be forced to spread their current resources thin. For example, the majority of IRS cases do not reach federal court and like most other agencies, they lack the resources to have frequent trials. This dynamic may incentivize agencies to be more selective of which cases they choose to take to trial. Another outcome is that the SEC and other agencies may present federal courts with more time-consuming cases.

The decision may also create more obstacles for federal regulatory agencies seeking to make claims tied to common law or civil penalties involving international enforcement. It is unclear, for example, whether the Environmental Protection Agency claims will require a jury trial. In some ways, one could argue that because the EPA pursues penalties that are similar in nature to the common-law claim that does not qualify as a public right. Therefore, if the EPA were to make a claim that is connected to a “historical cause of action available at common law,” the Jarkesy decision may be applicable.10 However, the fate of federal regulatory agencies in general is unclear and cases will have to be examined individually to determine whether they fall under the Jarkesy decision.

The bulk of IRS international enforcement cases involving civil penalties pursuant to IRC § 6662 (for accuracy-related penalties) and I.R.C. §§ 6677 and 6038 (for foreign information return penalties, do not involve trials.  The dissenting opinion by Justice Sotomayor, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined, pointed out that there are, at the very least, more than two dozen agencies that can impose civil penalties in administrative proceedings.  They include many agencies with substantial amounts of international enforcement authority and cases, such as the Department of Justice, the Commodities Future Trading Commission, and the U.S. Department of Treasury. Hence, we can expect a ton of litigation in international enforcement cases involving civil penalties.

 

 

Morin is a legal assistant at Berliner Corcoran & Rowe. She recently graduated from Williams College where she studied Political Science and Spanish.

[1] Meghan E. Flinn, Varu Chilakamarri, Theodore L. Kornobis, Michael Culhane Harper, Jarkesy’s Impact on Agency Enforcement Proceedings: Potential Implications for the SEC and Beyond, July 3, 2024, K&L Gates.

Jarkesy’s Impact on SEC In-House Proceedings: Potential Implications for SEC Enforcement and Beyond | HUB | K&L Gates (klgates.com)

[2] Id.

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] Ronald Mann, Justices limit major SEC tool to penalize fraud, June 28, 2024, SCOTUSblog.

Justices limit major SEC tool to penalize fraud – SCOTUSblog

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Jarkesy’s Potential Implications for EPA Administrative Proceedings, July 10, 2024, Sidley.

Jarkesy’s Potential Implications for EPA Administrative Proceedings | Environmental and Energy Brief (sidley.com)

EUROPOL OPERATION RESULTS IN ARREST OF MINISTRY OF INTERIOR OF NORTH MACEDONIA EMPLOYEE FOR EURO COUNTERFEITING.

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Employee Who Allegedly Produced Hundreds of Thousands of Euros was Arrested in Kosovo.

By Kaila Hall

 

On August 6, 2024, Europol announced1 that authorities in Pristina, Kosovo had arrested an employee of the Ministry of Interior of North Macedonia for allegedly counterfeiting hundreds of thousands of €2 coins over the last two years. The suspect, a 34-year-old male, was arrested on August 4. Authorities also seized a counterfeiting currency machine as well as thousands of assembled coins, rings, and core blanks found in North Macedonia.

In the months leading up to the arrest, Kosovar and North Macedonian authorities worked with Europol and Eurojust to launch a joint investigation team (JIT) and share critical intelligence on the suspect’s activities. Participants in the JIT included the Special Prosecution Office of the Republic of Kosovo, the Basic Prosecution in Skopje, and Eurojust’s Western Balkans Criminal Justice Project. Additionally, the Kosovo Police, the Investigative Centre of the Public Prosecutor’s Office Skopje, and the Ministry of Interior of North Macedonia conducted investigative activities.

In May 2023, Eurojust launched2 the Western Balkans Criminal Justice Project to “enhance judicial cooperation within and with the Western Balkans.” The initiative also “aims to strengthen judicial cooperation within the Western Balkans as well as between the region and the EU in the fight against organised crime and terrorism.” Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia are involved in this project. Given Kosovo’s volatile political situation and increased threats of terrorism, Eurojust’s ability to initiate and coordinate JITs is critical.

To combat euro counterfeiting, Europol also provides intelligence and operational support to investigations on behalf of the European Union Central Office. Europol utilizes advanced technology to identify and target counterfeiting networks. The European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT),3 which “strengthens intelligence, strategic and operational” cross-border cooperation, funded the investigation.

News of this latest euro counterfeiting operation in the Republic of Kosovo comes as the nation grapples with increasing currency counterfeiting in recent years. Although Kosovo is not in the Eurozone, it adopted the euro as its currency in 2002. As of September 2023, the Pristina Police’s forensic laboratory announced it had examined over 30,000 fake 2-euro coins- a drastic increase compared to 4,451 coins confiscated last year.4 In April 2023, police arrested two individuals for trying to smuggle over 10,000 counterfeit coins into Kosovo from North Macedonia.

In January 2023, the Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo issued5 a warning to consumers as a result of counterfeit coins in circulation. The Central Bank reiterated that “counterfeiting money is a criminal offense and is sanctioned according to Article 296 of the Criminal Code No. 06/L-074 of the Republic of Kosovo and Articles 19 and 20 of Law No. 03/L-209 on Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo, anyone who produces, puts into circulation, transports, accepts, uses or possesses counterfeit money to put it into circulation as genuine, is punished by a fine or imprisonment.”

 

Kaila Hall is an intern at IELR. She is a rising senior at Cornell University.

 

[1] Europol (2024). Employee of the Ministry of Interior of North Macedonia arrested in Kosovo* for euro counterfeiting, Europol Media & Press,

https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/employee-of-ministry-of-interior-of-north-macedonia-arrested-in-kosovo-for-euro-counterfeiting

 

[2] Eurojust (2023). Launch of new project to enhance judicial cooperation within and with the Western Balkans, Eurojust Press Releases and News,

https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/news/launch-new-project-enhance-judicial-cooperation-within-and-western-balkans

 

[3] Eurojust (2024). EMPACT, Eurojust ​​​​​​​​​​​​https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/empact

 

[4] Fatos Bytyci (2023). Kosovo so awash with fake euro coins they are accepted as payment, Reuters,

​​https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kosovo-so-awash-with-fake-euro-coins-they-are-accepted-payment-2023-09-21/

 

[5] Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo (2023). The Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo gives additional instructions for increased caution from counterfeit coins in circulation, Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo

https://bqk-kos.org/the-central-bank-of-the-republic-of-kosovo-gives-additional-instructions-for-increased-caution-from-counterfeit-coins-in-circulation/?lang=en

 

INTERPOL RECOVERS $40 MILLION FROM INTERNATIONAL EMAIL SCAM

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Timor Leste and Singapore Crack Down on Business Email Fraud

By Kaila Hall

 

On August 6, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) announced1 that it worked with Singapore and Timor Leste to recover over $40 million defrauded in an international business email compromise scam. INTERPOL’s Global Rapid Intervention of Payments (I-GRIP) mechanism facilitated the coordination efforts between international law enforcement entities and helped successfully recuperate the money.

In 1923, INTERPOL was established2 to facilitate police cooperation in investigations worldwide. Currently, INTERPOL has 196 member countries and has developed its legal framework and procedures. INTERPOL enables police agencies across the world to share and access data on crimes and criminals through the I-24/7 communications platform.

On July 15, 2024, a Singapore firm received a fraudulent email and transferred $42.3 million to the supplier via a bank account in Timor Leste a few days later. A week later, the Singaporean firm identified the fraud after the legitimate supplier notified them that they had not been paid. The Singapore Police Force filed a report and began coordinating the recovery operation through I-GRIP, which expedites assistance requests in the event of financial crime. On July 24, INTERPOL confirmed that it had recovered over $39 million with the assistance of Timor Leste authorities. In the days following the initial operation, Timor Leste arrested seven individuals in connection with the email scam and intercepted an additional $2 million.

Established in 2022, the I-GRIP mechanism assists in INTERPOL’s financial recovery efforts in the event of fraud. In June 2024, INTERPOL used the mechanism to intercept3 $331,000 of Spanish money in a fraudulent email compromise originating in Hong Kong, China. During the June operation, 6,745 bank accounts worldwide had been frozen and over $257 million in assets were confiscated.

In response to the July 2024 recovery operation, Isaac Oginni, Director of INTERPOL’s Financial Crime and Anti-Corruption Centre stated that “Speed is crucial to successfully intercepting the proceeds of online scams, with police, financial intelligence units and banks cooperating across multiple jurisdictions in a race against time.” Oginni also praised the cooperation between authorities in Singapore and Timor Leste as “exemplary” and stated how it “demonstrates how quick action through INTERPOL can help recover funds taken from the fraud victims and identify the perpetrators.”

Singapore’s Director Commercial Affairs Department, David Chew, affirmed that “When money flees across our borders, law enforcement must be able to not just sense-make but also have the available legal and international systems in place to speedily follow and seize it. It can do it with the help of supranational bodies like INTERPOL and law enforcement in the recipient country. The successful recovery of more than USD 40 million in this case stands as a testament to law enforcement’s ability to do this. This achievement underscores the invaluable crime-fighting role of cross-border partnership in safeguarding the global financial system.”4

Amid the rise of transnational organized crime and financial crimes, INTERPOL has warned5 consumers and businesses of theft, fraud, deception, blackmail, and money-laundering. INTERPOL has also released common sense rules individuals and corporations can follow to reduce their risk of falling for phishing and other forms of fraud. Last month, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network and the Office of Foreign Assets Control also released a joint notice6 with the Federal Bureau of Investigation warning financial institutions of timeshare fraud by Mexican transnational criminal organizations.

 

Kaila Hall is an intern at IELR. She is a rising senior at Cornell University.

 

[1] INTERPOL (2024). Police recover over USD 40 million from international email scam, INTERPOL News,

https://www.interpol.int/News-and-Events/News/2024/Police-recover-over-USD-40-million-from-international-email-scam

[2] INTERPOL. What is INTERPOL?, INTERPOL. https://www.interpol.int/Who-we-are/What-is-INTERPOL.

 

[3] INTERPOL (2024). USD 257 million seized in global police crackdown against online scams, INTERPOL News, https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2024/USD-257-million-seized-in-global-police-crackdown-against-online-scams

 

[4] Singapore Police Force (2024). International Cooperation Leading To The Biggest Recovery Of Over Usd 40 Million Linked To Business Email Compromise Scam, Singapore Police Force Media Room,

https://www.police.gov.sg/Media-Room/News/20240803_international_cooperation_leading_to_the_biggest_recovery_of_over_usd_40_mil

 

[5] INTERPOL (2024). Financial crime – don’t become a victim!, INTERPOL Financial Crime, https://www.interpol.int/Crimes/Financial-crime/Financial-crime-don-t-become-a-victim

 

[6] Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (2024).

FinCEN, OFAC, and FBI Joint Notice on Timeshare Fraud Associated with Mexico-Based Transnational Criminal Organizations, FinCEN.

https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FinCEN-Joint-Notice-Timeshare-Mexico-508C-FINAL.pdf

 

 

INTERNATIONAL OPERATION RESULTS IN 15 ARRESTS OF ALLEGED MEMBERS OF ALBANIAN ORGANIZED CRIME GROUP

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Operation GORGON Raids Lead to Seizure of Real Estate and Cash Assets

By Kaila Hall

 

On July 31, 2024, European authorities1 conducted raids in Tirana, Albania that resulted in the arrests of 15 suspected members of a major Albanian organized crime group. During Operation GORGON, Albanian, Belgian, Dutch, and French authorities worked with the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) to carry out raids that seized real estate and €1 million in cash.

Authorities believe that this criminal group is responsible for contract killings, drug trafficking, and cryptocurrency money laundering. Several police agencies have linked this criminal group with at least seven murders both inside and outside Albania between 2019 and 2020. Europol did not release the name of the high-profile Albanian crime organization.

Based on SKY ECC data, Europol established key details on the criminal network’s activities. This information was subsequently provided to the Albanian Special Prosecution Office for Anticorruption and Organised Crime, which launched an investigation. Additionally, authorities found that the criminal network had hired assassins to execute members of rival Albanian gangs.

On July 31, Europol sent three members from its European Serious Organised Crime Centre and European Cybercrime Centre to Tirana to help carry out the raids. Additional participants in the investigation include Albania’s National Bureau of Investigation and State Police, as well as Belgium’s Federal Police, France’s National Police, and the Dutch National Police.

Europol announced that it had arrested a “prominent money launderer” in Albania’s capital. The individual revealed that he had collaborated with numerous high-profile gangs. He was predominantly involved in murders, corruption, and large-scale drug trafficking.

Founded in 1998, Europol aims to “support its Member States in preventing and combating all forms of serious international and organized crime, cybercrime and terrorism.”2 Europol’s mission and international law enforcement capabilities have helped conduct investigations into transnational organized crime and drug trafficking operations.

The July 31 operation was Europol’s second anti-drug trafficking operation that led to the arrests of Albanian gang members this year. In February 2024, Italian and Albanian authorities worked with Eurojust and Europol to conduct an operation against a major drug trafficking network.3 Authorities found heroin, cocaine, and marijuana smuggled into Germany and Spain. The operation led to 59 arrests in Albania, Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom.

In recent years, Albania has dealt with a surge in transnational organized crime. In February 2024, police in Ecuador and Spain arrested4 over 30 people as part of an investigation into Albanian organized crime in February as well. In 2019, British news outlets reported5 that the Albanian mafia had seized control of the UK drug trafficking industry, primarily smuggling cocaine in east London.

To combat the rise in transnational organized crime, Eurojust and Albania signed a Cooperation Agreement in October 2018.6 In December 2023, the United Nations Security Council also adopted the Presidential Statement7 on Transnational Organized Crime, of which Albania is a signatory. The statement urges states to bolster international cooperation, laws, and borders to combat crime.

 

Kaila Hall is an intern at IELR. She is a rising senior at Cornell University.

 

[1] Europol (2024). 15 arrested in crackdown on high-profile Albanian criminal network, Europol Media & Press, https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/15-arrested-in-crackdown-high-profile-albanian-criminal-network

 

[2] Europol (2024). Our Thinking, About Europol,

https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/our-thinking

 

[3] Europol (2024). Major blow to Albanian drug trafficking network: 59 arrests across Europe, Europol Media & Press, https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/major-blow-to-albanian-drug-trafficking-network-59-arrests-across-europe

 

[4] Alexandra Valencia (2024). At least 30 arrested in Ecuador, Spain in Albanian mafia probe, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/least-30-arrested-ecuador-spain-during-investigation-into-albanian-mafia-2024-02-06/

 

[5] Mark Townsend (2019). Kings of cocaine: how the Albanian mafia seized control of the UK drugs trade, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/13/kings-of-cocaine-albanian-mafia-uk-drugs-crime

 

[6] European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (2024). Albania, European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation,

https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/states-and-partners/third-countries/liaison-prosecutors/albania#:~:text=Eurojust%20and%20Albania%20signed%20a,and%2022%20joint%20investigation%20teams

 

[7] United Nations Security Council (2023). Security Council Adopts Presidential Statement on Transnational Organized Crime, Urges States to Ramp Up Cooperation, Laws, Borders to Combat It, UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases,

https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15516.doc.htm

AMERICAN JOURNALIST EVAN GERSHKOVICH AND PAUL WHELAN RELEASED IN PRISONER EXCHANGE

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Russia Agrees to Prisoner Swap After Lengthy Negotiations Process

By Kaila Hall

 

On August 1, 2024, Turkish officials confirmed1 the Russian release of Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich and U.S. Marine veteran Paul Whelan. The prisoner swap occurred at an airport in Ankara, Turkey. The deal resulted in the release of over 20 previously detained individuals from seven countries, including the US, Russia, Germany, Poland, Slovenia, Norway, and Belarus. Turkey announced that in exchange, Germany released Vadim Krasikov, a convicted Russian assassin. Russian dissidents Ilya Yashin and Vladimir Kara-Murza were also reportedly released. This was the largest prisoner exchange since the Cold War.

WSJ reporter Evan Gershkovich was arrested in Russia in March 2023 and had been detained for 16 months. On July 19, 2024, he was sentenced to 16 years in a maximum-security penal colony after his conviction on espionage charges. Gershkovich, the son of Soviet-era emigres to the U.S., was born in the United States. His journalism career focused on the region. According to the WSJ, “Evan was detained by Russia’s Federal Security Service in the city of Yekaterinburg while on a reporting assignment in the country. He had full press credentials from Russia’s foreign ministry.”2 In April 2023, the U.S. Department of State designated3 Gershkovich as a “U.S. Citizen wrongfully detained by a foreign government,” as defined under the “Robert Levinson Hostage Recovery and Hostage-Taking Accountability Act.”4 In his recent book In the Shadows, Hostage negotiator Mickey Bergman also describes his efforts to release Paul Whelan, Evan Gershkovich, and numerous others.

On June 15, 2020, American Marine veteran Paul Whelan was also convicted on espionage charges and sentenced to 16 years in prison. He served 5 years of that sentence and had been detained for over 2,000 days. On July 19, 2022, President Biden signed an executive order on “Bolstering Efforts to Bring Hostages and Wrongfully Detained United States Nationals Home.”5 On July 27, 2022, Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced that the United States had made a “significant offer” to secure professional basketball player Brittney Griner’s release. American news agencies reported that the offer included trading Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout for Griner and Whelan. On December 8, 2022, Griner and fellow American Trevor Reed were released from Russia. Upon Griner and Reed’s releases, Whelan told CNN that he was happy that they were released, but said, “I am greatly disappointed that more has not been done to secure my release, especially as the four year anniversary of my arrest is coming up.”6

In exchange for Gershkovich, Whelan, and many others, Western countries released Vadim Krasikov, a Russian individual who was serving a life sentence in a German prison for the 2019 killing of Zelimkhan “Tornike” Khangoshvili. The victim, a Georgian citizen of Chechen descent, had claimed asylum in Germany7 and had fought Russian troops in Chechnya. Shortly after Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s death in February 2024, sources close to Navalny announced8 that talks had been taking place to exchange him for Krasikov.

After the prisoner exchange deal was announced, President Biden addressed9 the nation and stated that the “deal that made this possible was a feat of diplomacy and friendship” with American allies. He also announced that the agreement permitted the exchange of four Americans, five Germans, and seven Russian political prisoners. House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Michael McCaul also reacted10 to the deal, saying: “I am thrilled Evan, Paul, Alsu, Vladimir, and many others who have been illegally held by Putin’s regime are finally coming home to their families. But I remain concerned that continuing to trade innocent Americans for actual Russian criminals held in the U.S. and elsewhere sends a dangerous message to Putin that only encourages further hostage taking by his regime.”

 

Kaila Hall is an intern at IELR. She is a rising senior at Cornell University.

 

[1] Anton Troianovski, M.M. and B.H. (2024) Live updates: Russia releases Evan Gershkovich in sweeping prisoner swap, Turkish officials say, The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/08/01/world/russia-prisoner-swap-us.

 

[2] Wall Street Journal (2024) Follow updates on Evan Gershkovich, WSJ reporter detained in Russia — #istandwithevan, Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/news/evan-gershkovich

 

[3] Michael Crowley (2023) The State Department declares Evan Gershkovich ‘wrongfully detained’ by Russia., The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/11/world/europe/evan-gershkovich-russia-hostage-detained.html

 

[4] Bob Menendez, (2019) S.712 – Robert Levinson Hostage Recovery and Hostage-Taking Accountability Act, Congress.gov. www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/712.

 

[5] Joseph Biden, (2022) Executive order on bolstering efforts to bring hostages and wrongfully detained United States Nationals Home, The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/07/19/executive-order-on-bolstering-efforts-to-bring-hostages-and-wrongfully-detained-united-states-nationals-home/

[6] Jennifer Hansler. (2022) Exclusive: Paul Whelan tells CNN he is ‘disappointed’ that more has not been done to secure his release | CNN politics, CNN.

https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/08/politics/paul-whelan-cnn-interview-brittney-griner/index.html

 

[7] Elise Morton. (2024) Who is Vadim Krasikov, a Russian jailed in Germany and linked to a possible prisoner exchange?, AP News. https://apnews.com/article/vadim-krasikov-navalny-prisoner-swap-russia-germany-db84e1f39b8c5dc0cbeedf3bcd22860c

 

[8] Dasha Latvinova. (2024) Navalny aides say the Russian opposition leader was close to being freed before his death, AP News.

https://apnews.com/article/russia-navalny-prison-death-swap-ce214909b1088a1d67fa9cd323864f50

 

[9] The Associated Press, (2024) Live updates: US and Russia complete biggest prisoner swap in post-Soviet history, freeing Gershkovich and Whelan, AP News.

https://apnews.com/live/updates-wall-street-journal-evan-gershkovich-prisoner-swap

[10] Michael McCaul. (2024) Chairman McCaul on reported prisoner swap bringing wrongfully detained Americans Home, Committee on Foreign Affairs. https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/press-release/chairman-mccaul-on-reported-prisoner-swap-bringing-wrongfully-detained-americans-home/

THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERPOL’S FIGHT AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION

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American Bar Association Presentation of the International Law and Criminal Justice Sections

By Kaila Hall

 

On July 22, 2024, the American Bar Association hosted a webinar1 on the latest developments in INTERPOL’s efforts aimed at curbing transnational repression and abuse of its systems. Speakers included Yaron Gottlieb, Executive Directorate at Office of Legal Affairs of INTERPOL, Wayne Salzgaber, former Director of INTERPOL Washington, and Ted R. Bromund, Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation. Michelle Estlund, founder and principal attorney of Estlund Law, and Yuriy L. Nemets, Managing Member at Nemets PLLC, also contributed to the discussion. Bruce Zagaris, partner at Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP, moderated the panel.

In 1923, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) was established2 to facilitate police cooperation in investigations worldwide. Currently, INTERPOL has 196 member countries and has developed its legal framework and procedures. INTERPOL enables police agencies across the world to share and access data on crimes and criminals through the I-24/7 communications platform. The inter-governmental organization is unaffiliated with the United Nations.

Yaron Gottlieb started by discussing INTERPOL’s notices and diffusion mechanisms that protect individual rights. He also reviewed the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files3 (CCF) reforms and provided updates regarding the Notice Diffusion Task Force (NDTF). Originally created in 2016 to streamline the notice review process, the NDTF has recently undergone a restructuring to form a “cluster-based system of review,” meaning requests are reviewed by a region-specific team. Gottlieb described the CCF’s missions of guiding personal data processing operations and conducting CCF compliance checks. If the Review Chamber finds a non-compliant request, INTERPOL and national databases must delete the notice.

Wayne Salzgaber followed with a discussion on how the United States National Central Bureau (USNCB) utilizes INTERPOL’s notice and diffusion resources. USNCB is the official U.S. point of contact with INTERPOL for police cooperation.4 Originating in the Department of the Treasury, USNCB is now co-managed by the Department of Homeland Security and significantly contributes data. Salzgaber stated that the “US does not recognize a notice diffusion as a necessary instrument alone for arrest or detention.” Instead, USNCB compiles notices and additional sources to make an informed decision in terms of enforcement.

Afterward, Ted Bromund provided political analysis on the election of INTERPOL’s Secretary General. Candidates included Valdecy Urquiza, Stephen Kavanagh, Mubita Nawa, and Faisal Shahkar. In June, INTERPOL’s Executive Committee endorsed Urquiza’s candidacy. Bromund expressed concerns about Urquiza, who has recently stated he plans to retain the membership of states that abuse INTERPOL’s rules. Accordingly, Bromund called for INTERPOL’s democratic members to focus on INTERPOL’s governance, particularly the Executive Committee because it is the only body that can uphold INTERPOL’s neutrality and mitigate subversion. The current Secretary General, Jürgen Stock, will leave office and the new Secretary General will be inaugurated in November 2024.

Next, Michelle Estlund examined recent CCF and National Central Bureau (NCB) responses to red notice subjects and child custody cases. She explained how Article 40 of the CCF statute provided a deadline for it to respond to requests, minimizing delays that greatly affected red notice subjects in the past. Estlund covered the 2018-09 and 2716 child custody cases. In Decision 2018-09, the CCF held that a yellow notice was not necessary to find the child, but it may be depending on the location. As such, INTERPOL deleted the yellow notice. In case 2716, INTERPOL decided to delete both the yellow and red notices. Lastly, she stressed the importance of NCB input in red notice cases when the individual is seeking access, correction, or deletion of data in INTERPOL’s system.

Yuriy Nemets outlined the CCF’s most recent policy decisions, starting with the refusal of extradition now linked to the government’s obligation to present a “succinct and clear description of the criminal activities of the wanted person.” The CCF has also reinstated the Operating Rules of the CCF article 14(5), II.E/RCCF/CCF/2008, which states that the release of information “provisions shall not apply if the Commission considers that the person who is the subject of the request has provided sufficient evidence showing that he/she knows that there is information about him/her in INTERPOL’s files.” The CCF also released three decisions on ne bis in idem, clarifying that the rule applies when it is “explicitly accepted by States under [a] bilateral or multilateral agreement.” It is not triggered when “parallel proceedings in two or more countries are based on the same facts and charges.”

 

Kaila Hall is an intern at IELR. She is a rising senior at Cornell University.

 

[1] American Bar Association, Latest Developments in INTERPOL’s Fight Against Transnational Repression, American Bar Association Events. https://www.americanbar.org/events-cle/mtg/web/443708465/

 

[2] INTERPOL, What is Interpol?, https://www.interpol.int/Who-we-are/What-is-INTERPOL.

 

[3] INTERPOL, Commission for the Control of Interpol’s files (CCF), INTERPOL. https://www.interpol.int/en/Who-we-are/Commission-for-the-Control-of-INTERPOL-s-Files-CCF#:~:text=The%20CCF%20is%20an%20independent,the%20rules%20of%20the%20Organization.&text=Any%20person%20has%20the%20right,them%20held%20in%20INTERPOL’s%20files.

 

[4] Department of Justice (2023) Interpol – United States National Central Bureau, Department of Justice | INTERPOL – United States National Central Bureau | United States Department of Justice. https://www.justice.gov/doj/interpol-united-states-national-central-bureau

GERMAN NATIONAL SENTENCED TO DEATH IN BELARUS

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Minsk Regional Court Charges Former German Red Cross Employee with Mercenary Activity

By Kaila Hall

 

On July 19, 2024, human rights group Viasna announced1 that the Minsk Regional Court in Belarus had sentenced German citizen Rico Krieger to death. Krieger has been charged with six violations of the Belarusian Criminal Code, including “mercenary activity,” “agent activity,” “act of terrorism,” “creation of an extremist formation,” “intentional disrepair of a vehicle or communication lines,” and “illegal actions in relation to firearms, ammunition and explosives.” It is unclear what explosion the charges refer to. Viasna reported that, on June 24, Krieger was sentenced to death by firing squad.

The 29-year-old Krieger has previously worked as a medic for the German Red Cross, as well as an armed security officer in the U.S. Embassy in Berlin. Multiple sources have also confirmed that he has a minor child living in Germany.

Krieger has been held in custody since November 6th, 2023. The Belarusian Hajun Project believes2 the case “is related to the Kalinouski Regiment, specifically its unit – the ‘Western’ foreign mechanized battalion.” The Kalinouski Regiment3 denotes a Belarusian volunteer group assisting Ukraine in the war against Russia.

According to the Minsk Regional Court decision, Krieger was convicted of “arranging an explosion in order to influence decision-making by authorities, intimidate the population, destabilize public order (an act of terrorism) committed by a person who had previously committed a crime under Part 4 of Article 295 of the Criminal Code, as an organized group, that is, committing a crime under Part 3 Article 289 of the Criminal Code.” Viasna cannot confirm whether the verdict has been appealed and whether the death sentence has been carried out. The German Foreign Ministry has acknowledged Krieger’s sentence and has announced that it was communicating with Belarusian officials regarding the matter.4

International law prohibits5 the use of mercenaries during war times and in certain peaceful situations. In 1989, 46 countries, including Belarus and Germany, signed the United Nations International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries.6 Additionally, Article 4 of the Hague Convention V respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land7 from 1907 states that “a corps of combatants cannot be formed nor recruiting agencies opened on the territory of a neutral Power to assist the belligerents.” Article 2 of the United Nations Charter,8 Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (1949),9 and Article 47 of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict10 (1977) all prohibit the use of mercenaries.

In terms of capital punishment, Belarus remains the only European country where it is legal. The EU has previously issued its Guidelines on the Death Penalty,11 affirming that it “has a strong and unequivocal opposition to the death penalty in all times and in all circumstances. Therefore, and encouraged by the growing momentum towards [the] abolition of the death penalty worldwide, the EU will continue its long-standing campaign against the death penalty.” The EU has previously released several statements on death penalty sentences in Belarus, including Aliaksandr Asipovich’s execution12 in 2019 and Viktor Skrundik’s death sentence13 in 2020.

Several International human rights conventions14 also prohibit capital punishment. These include the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights, Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In 2018, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 73/175 to call for a moratorium on the use of the death penalty on the grounds that it “contributes to respect for human dignity and to the enhancement and progressive development.”

 

Kaila Hall is an intern at IELR. She is a rising senior at Cornell University.

 

[1] Viasna. “Employee of the German Red Cross Sentenced to Death in Belarus.” Spring96.org, 19 July 2024, spring96.org/en/news/115803. ‌

[2] Belarusian Hajun Project. “X.com.” X (Formerly Twitter), 19 July 2024, x.com/Hajun_BY/status/1814274591260311954. ‌

[3] Baboolal, Samara. “Belarus Court Sentences German National to Death on Mercenary Activity Charges.” Www.jurist.org, 20 July 2024, www.jurist.org/news/2024/07/germany-national-sentenced-to-death-at-belarus-court-for-mercenary-activity-among-other-charges/.

[4] ‌Escritt, Thomas. “German Citizen on Belarus Death Row, Foreign Ministry Says.” Reuters, 19 July 2024, www.reuters.com/world/europe/german-citizen-sentenced-death-belarus-belarusian-human-rights-group-viasna-2024-07-19/.

[5] “OHCHR | International Standards.” OHCHR, www.ohchr.org/en/node/3383/international-standards.

‌ [6] United Nations. “International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries.” United Nations Treaty Collection, 4 Dec. 1989, treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-6&chapter=18&clang=_en.

[7] ICRC. “Convention (v) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907.” International Humanitarian Law Databases, 1907, ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/200?OpenDocument.

[8] United Nations. “Charter of the United Nations.” United Nations, 1945, www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html.

[9] “OHCHR | Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.” Www.ohchr.org, 1949, www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/ProtectionOfCivilianPersons.aspx.

[10] United Nations. “Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.” United Nations OHCHR, 12 Aug. 1949, www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/geneva-convention-relative-protection-civilian-persons-time-war.

[11] European Union. “EU GUIDELINES on the DEATH PENALTY.” EEAS EU, www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/08_hr_guidelines_death_penalty_en.pdf.

[12] “EU Statement on the Death Penalty in Belarus | EEAS.” Www.eeas.europa.eu, 15 Jan. 2020, www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/council-europe/eu-statement-death-penalty-belarus_en?s=51. ‌

[13] “EU Statement on a New Death Sentence in Belarus | EEAS.” Www.eeas.europa.eu, 11 March 2020. www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/council-europe/eu-statement-new-death-sentence-belarus_en. ‌

[14] Hall, Kaila. “BANGLADESH SENTENCES BOTSWANA DRUG MULE to DEATH.” IELR Blog, 6 June 2024, ielrblog.com/index.php/2024/06/06/bangladesh-sentences-botswana-drug-mule-to-death/.

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