Diplomatic Affairs Archives | Page 2 of 2

Iran’s Foreign Minister Claims Trump’s Sanctions are Response to Declined Invitation

August 13, 2019 by Alexandra Haris Leave a Comment

On July 31, the Trump administration imposed sanctions against Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif for complying with the Iranian ‘regime.’

Five days later, Zarif responded by claiming the Trump administration imposed financial sanctions on him in response to his declined invitation to visit the White House.

The current situation of Iranian sanctions has both the U.S. and Iran pointing fingers at the other. The U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control claimed it was imposing the sanctions on Zarif for acting on behalf of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Khamenei was recently placed under U.S. sanctions as well. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said, “Javad Zarif implements the reckless agenda of Iran’s Supreme Leader…The United States is sending a clear message to the Iranian regime that its recent behavior is completely unacceptable.” On the other hand, Zarif responded by saying the restrictions are a “failure of democracy” and he was told while in New York for United Nations (UN) meetings that if he didn’t accept an invitation to the White House, Trump would sanction him. He also claimed the U.S. was designating him because he is Iran’s primary spokesperson around the world. U.S. officials have yet to confirm his statements.

The Trump administration issued sanctions against Zarif that would block any property or interests he has in the U.S. These financial sanctions sound damaging; however, Zarif claims they will have no effect on him or his family as he has no property or interests outside of Iran. The Trump administration would not elaborate on how many assets Zarif has in the U.S. financial system, eluding that the strain placed on him may, in fact, be minimal.

After announcing the sanctions, the Trump administration faced some domestic praise and backlash. An avid supporter of the president, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R – SC), said he believes Zarif deserved the sanctions since he is empowering a regime that is “the largest state sponsor of terrorism.” Others, however, are more doubtful. Sen. Chris Murphy (D – CT) questioned the administration by saying “If our position is really that we want to negotiate with Iran then maybe we shouldn’t sanction their chief negotiator.” Murphy is referring to Trump’s goal of negotiating a new nuclear deal with Iran and he is correct when he states that Zarif is the primary negotiator between the U.S. and Iran. Even Republican Senator Rand Paul spoke out against Trump’s move, stating that sanctioning diplomats will bring less diplomacy.

Though the Trump administration does not consider Zarif to be a decision-maker, he undeniably played an instrumental role in the 2015 Nuclear Deal and has been the primary negotiator between the two nations in recent years.

While this is one of the more dramatic moves Trump has placed on Iran, it may not be the last. A State Department official claimed that the White House is attempting to block Zarif from acquiring a visa to attend the September UN General Assembly in New York. Although a spokesperson for the department later denied it, saying the U.S. takes its obligations as host of the UN seriously and his visits can still be allowed on a “case-by-case basis.”

These sanctions were announced as tensions between the U.S. and Iran continue to mount. In May 2018, Trump withdrew from the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement, claiming Iran failed to address its ballistic missile program. The goal of the agreement, backed by the Obama administration, was to encourage Iran to dismantle its nuclear program in exchange for relief from economic sanctions. Shortly after backing out of the deal, Trump began a “maximum pressure campaign” to isolate Tehran and re-impose the sanctions that were lifted under the agreement. Predictably, Iran responded by resuming nuclear activities.

In addition to Trump’s sanctions, the U.S. and its allies have been at odds with Iranian forces in the Persian Gulf, where Iran has tried to impede the passage of commercial tankers in the Strait of Hormuz. Recently, in June, Iran shot down a U.S. Navy spy drone and, in July, seized a British-flagged tanker that it said had violated maritime law. This action was interpreted as retaliation for Britain’s involvement in detaining an Iranian oil tanker near Gibraltar on July 4. Iran called the event an “act of piracy” but Britain alleged that the vessel was heading for a Syrian refinery at Baniyas, a violation of European Union sanctions.

Trump has claimed he would like a broader deal with Iran that would address its nuclear program, ballistic missile development, and support for proxy forces in the Middle East, but these additional sanctions are sure to undercut that goal. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said on Wednesday the administration still seeks a diplomatic solution but “the only path forward is a comprehensive deal that addresses the full range of its threats. Until then, our campaign of diplomatic isolation and maximum economic pressure will continue.”

It is unclear what practical implications the Trump administration’s actions will bring, but more is sure to unfold in the coming weeks as Zarif travels to New York City for UN meetings.

Trump Caves to Mounting Pressure and Imposes Second Round of Sanctions on Moscow

August 9, 2019 by Alexandra Haris Leave a Comment

On August 1, 2019, the U.S. State and Treasury Departments announced Trump signed an executive order to impose additional sanctions on Russia. This is Trump’s second round of sanctions in response to increased congressional pressure to inflict greater punishment on Russia after they conducted a nerve agent attack in 2018 against a former Russian spy who Putin labeled a “traitor” and “scumbag.”

The sanctions target Russia’s economy and, according to analysts, have escalated tensions to be on par with the Cold War era. The executive order gives the Trump administration power to sanction countries that violate global chemical and biological weapons treaties, including the ability to prohibit U.S. financial institutions, like the World Bank, from lending to them. The official sanctions are as follows: “US opposition to loans or other assistance to Russia from international financial institutions (IFIs), such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF); a prohibition on U.S. banks (1) participating in the primary market for non-ruble denominated bonds issued by the Russian sovereign after August 26, 2019, and (2) lending non-ruble denominated funds to the Russian sovereign after August 26, 2019; and additional licensing restrictions on the export to Russia of US goods and technology on the Commerce Department-controlled list.”

The sanctions are drawn from the Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Act. However, the State Department used waiver authorities to weaken the sanctions from those outlined in the Act – especially the banning of US bank loans to Russia, which will not apply to ruble transactions or to loans to state-owned enterprises.

The Trump administration imposed a first round of sanctions on Russia last year, after it concurred with the U.K.’s conclusion that Moscow was involved in exposing former Russian double agent, Sergei Skripal, and his daughter, Yulia, to a military-grade nerve agent, Novichok, in southwestern Britain. Additionally, the U.S. expelled 60 Russians from Moscow’s embassy. The administration stated that “more draconian” sanctions would be imposed in 90 days unless Russia gives “reliable assurances” that it will no longer use chemical weapons and allow inspections by the United Nations (UN). However, after 90 days there were no assurances and no signs of more sanctions. As a result, congressional pressure on Trump to impose additional sanctions continued to build until now, seven months later, when the administration decided to carry out its promise.

In response, Russian officials claimed they complied with the sanction’s campaign and that the U.S. political system is to blame. According to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, “Sadly, the remnants of what was called the Russian-American partnership are now being sacrificed because of the demands of those who simply use relations with Russia as an instrument of domestic political struggle in the United States.” The lawmaker continued by shrugging off the potential consequences of the sanctions, claiming that the country is self-sufficient and this is not a significant threat to the economy. That being said, shortly after the Trump administration announced the sanctions, the Russian ruble plunged against the dollar and the country’s benchmark RTS stock index dipped 3 percent.

While the sanctions have potential to damage Russia’s economy, some economists say they will not have much of an impact since Russia has foreign currency and gold reserves exceeding $500 billion, preventing the need to borrow. In fact, the country’s dependence on U.S. loans is already waning. After sanctions were imposed following the Crimea annexation, Moscow’s U.S. bank loans fell from $45 billion in 2013 to $10 billion this year. On the other hand, the State Department claims that the sanctions will “restrict Russia’s access to the multilateral development bank system and…could curtail Russia’s access to billions of dollars of bilateral commercial activity within the United States.”

Prior to the executive order announcement, Trump faced criticism from lawmakers for delaying “legally mandated action” to follow up on the first round of sanctions. In November 2018, the administration was required to determine if Russia had given the assurances they were no longer using chemical weapons, or else the country would face more sanctions. While Russia never gave these assurances, a second round of sanctions were never imposed. To defend the delay, the Trump administration said the State Department was “consulting with Congress”. Congressional pressure increased last week when the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s top Democrat and Republican sent a letter to the president threatening congressional, “corrective”, action. To Congress’ relief, the second round of sanctions came this month, a day after Trump participated in a phone call with Vladimir Putin to discuss the wildfires currently ravaging through Russia.

As tensions between the U.S. and Russia continue to rise, the future relationship between the two powers remains unclear. While Trump invited Putin to a second summit in Washington last month, the governments are continuously at odds; choosing to be more confrontational than cooperative on seemingly every recent matter. Predictions about the U.S.-Russia relationship moving forward are pure speculation and will depend on domestic developments and international trends. Tensions could dissipate if one nation decides to take a backseat, or tensions could remain in the permanent state if neither country backs down from confrontation or competition.

Stay tuned on the IELR blog as more developments unravel.

Mexico Responds to Attack on Nationals in the U.S.

August 9, 2019 by Linda Friedman Ramirez Leave a Comment

By Linda Friedman Ramirez

One day after the August 3, 2019 mass shooting in El Paso, Texas, Mexico’s Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard released a statement angrily condemning the attack.^[1] At least eight Mexican nationals were killed by a single gunman, apparently motivated by animus toward immigrants.^[2]

Ebrard said that Mexico would ask U.S. officials to share information on how the gun used in the shooting was obtained and will consider legal action against whoever turns out to be responsible for the sale of the assault weapon used in the crime.^[3] The Foreign Minister advised that the Mexican government would also consider charging the suspect, identified as a 21-year-old Texan, with committing terrorist acts against Mexicans in the United States. ^[4]

“As far as I know, this would be the first case of this type in history,” Ebrard said. “The Mexican government could even seek to extradite the suspect. For Mexico, this individual is a terrorist.”^[5] Ebrard also suggested that Mexico will convene a conference of all Spanish speaking countries with communities in the United States, to advocate for the rights of Hispanics in the U.S.^[6]

On Monday, August 5, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador took a less confrontational position, but urged the U.S. to enact gun control in the wake of Saturday’s shooting that has now killed 22 people and injured dozens more. “We are very respectful of what other governments decide, but we think that these unfortunate events in the U.S. should prompt reflection, analysis, and the decision to control the indiscriminate sale of guns.”^[7] However, as recently as April 26, 2019, President Trump pledged at the National Rifle Association’s (NRA) Annual Convention to “unsign” the newly negotiated United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, which entered into force in 2014. The treaty is designed to limit international sales of conventional arms to prevent weapons from getting into the hands of human rights abusers. While the US has signed, the Senate never ratified the treaty due to pressure from the NRA.^[8] Trump announced that he was instructing Congress to stop the ratification process, and “return the treaty back to me in the Oval Office where I will dispose of it.”^[9]

Lopez Obrador is likely also aware that the United States has not yet ratified the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA). The Convention requires parties to criminalize the illegal manufacture, import, or export of high-powered weapons. It also provides for information exchange and cooperation on initiatives including the marking and tracing of weapons and the identification of criminal transit routes. President Bill Clinton signed CIFTA in 1997 and submitted it for ratification to the Senate, but the Senate has not yet ratified the treaty.

Lopez Obrador’s relationship with the U.S. President during the past year has been a surprise to some, in view of his very clear critique of Trump’s rhetoric about Mexicans while Lopez Obrador was a presidential candidate. In April 2019, Mexican journalist León Krauze questioned why President Lopez Obrador was not standing up to Trump.^[10] He recalled that, “Two years ago, as he was gearing up for a historic campaign that would earn him the Mexican presidency in a landslide, Andrés Manuel López Obrador held gatherings with Mexican communities in the United States in what turned out to be both a listening tour and an opportunity to articulate a denunciation of Donald Trump’s immigration policy.”^[11]

Krauze referred to a statement by then candidate Lopez Obredor: “These sly yet irresponsible neo fascists want to build walls and make the United States an enormous ghetto. They liken our fellow Mexicans and immigrants in general to the Jews who were stigmatized and persecuted in Hitler’s time.”^[12]

Lopez Obrador’s simple request that the United States take unspecified action about gun control in the United States, seems to pale in comparison to his fiery speeches. As it is unlikely that an extradition of the alleged shooter will ever come to pass, what could be more significant is the extent to which the optics of Mexican nationals being attacked in the United States with a lopsidedly weak response by Lopez Obrador could result in new political instability in Mexico.

[Read more…]

Indictment of Couple for Illegal Wildlife Trafficking Illustrates Significance of International Cooperation

August 7, 2019 by Alexandra Haris Leave a Comment

On July 24, 2019, a federal grand jury unsealed an indictment for a Florida couple charged with conspiracy and trafficking of protected wildlife. The couple, Novita Indah and Larry Malugin, specifically received charges of smuggling wildlife from Indonesia to the United States and selling the wildlife from their home in Port Richey, Florida.

In 2011, the couple began selling protected wildlife on eBay to international buyers from their Indonesian home. They would falsely label packages to conceal their shipments’. For the next six years, Indah and Malgin continued this practice throughout their moves to Puerto Rico and, ultimately, to Florida in 2013. On January 12, 2017, the couple’s illicit business came to a halt when the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) executed a search warrant and recovered 369 wildlife articles from their home. Among the seized articles were Javan spitting cobras, reticulated pythons, and a babirusa skill (a rare Indonesian pig known for its tusks).

The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) protects the recovered wildlife. In a press release addressing the indictment, Assistant Attorney General Jeffery Bossert Clark said, “the Department of Justice will seek to prosecute individuals who flout this treaty and other important environmental laws.” As a result, Indah and Malugin face a maximum sentence of 20 years of incarceration on charges of smuggling and 5 years for violating the Lacey Act – which prohibits the trade of illegally procured wildlife.

CITES and the Lacey Act have been extremely useful when it comes to capturing and penalizing illegal wildlife traffickers. The two policies work together and illustrate how much more impactful legislation can be when countries concur on the need to protect endangered species and actually implement effectively the enforcement provisions.

First, CITES, an international treaty boasting 183 member states, signed in 1973 and protects over 35,000 species. Its overarching goal is to ensure that international trade does not threaten the survival of wildlife. It functions through a system of classification, which categorizes species in Appendices I to III. Appendix I prohibits all trade for the species listed as highly endangered. Appendix II permits trade, but only for those in exporting countries with a permit. These permits are issued only when there is scientific evidence that trade will not adversely affect the species. Lastly, Appendix III covers species that only need a certificate of origin to be traded. Elephants, for example, are protected under Appendix I and II due to geographically differentiated threats. Countries can allow permit-holders to trade the species, but only if the nation can demonstrate that ivory trade will not result in the species’ decline. If they cannot prove this, the country’s elephants will be listed under Appendix I and will not be allowed for trade.

The Lacey Act, adopted in 1900 as the first federal law protecting wildlife, is U.S. legislation that makes it unlawful to trade fish, wildlife, or plants that are sold in violation of U.S. law or another entity’s law. As a result, the policy covers all wildlife CITES’ protects. Additionally, the Act aims to restore game and birds in areas of the country where they have been depleted. However, while the main goal of CITES is to ensure trade does not impede wildlife survival, the Lacey Act is primarily utilized today to prevent the importation or spread of non-native species. The policy has faced some major violators. Most recently, in 2016, Lumber Liquidators was found guilty of violating the Act and sentenced to more than $13 million in fines – the largest penalty in the history of the legislation. For more of a discussion on this topic, please refer to the most recent issue of the IELR.

Although containing some distinct differences, CITES and the Lacey Act are united in their mission to abate illegal wildlife trade. Not only do their purposes align, but their unity also encompasses working together to strengthen enforcement of these trading issues. As portrayed in the indictment of Indah and Malugin, the couple will face a maximum sentence of 20 years for smuggling wildlife protected under CITES. However, they could receive an additional five years for violating the Lacey Act as they traded these animals within the U.S. The coupling of the two policies creates a larger disincentive and a stronger enforcement of illegal wildlife trading.

In the future, this will be important for the U.S. to keep in mind. Because demand for protected wildlife products spans the globe, suppliers will sell to whichever markets they can access. In addition, enforcement of international suppliers recognize coordination between international organizations, such as INTERPOL, and national law enforcement. Unfortunately, CITES itself does not have enforcement mechanisms of its own.

As the indictment of Indah and Malugin proves, international teamwork and cooperation is vital to strengthen enforcement and action on key global issues. Hopefully this is a lesson that current administrations can take note of and implement in the future. No matter if they do or do not, the IELR will be there to cover it.

Even as the Courts Continue to Strike Down His Migration Policies, the President Presses On

July 30, 2019 by Alex Psilakis Leave a Comment

Over the past few weeks, the Trump administration has taken a number of steps to slow the rate at which asylum seekers may receive admittance into the U.S.

On July 24, 2019, a federal court dealt yet another blow to the Trump administration’s asylum policy. Ruling from San Francisco, U.S. District Judge Jon S. Tigar struck down the Trump administration’s most recent effort to stem the flow of migrants attempting to apply for asylum. On July 16, the Trump administration issued a new rule, declaring that migrants must apply for – and be denied – asylum in all the countries that they pass through on their way to the U.S. if they want to be considered for asylum there. A migrant hoping to make their way to the U.S. from El Salvador or Honduras, for example, would have to apply for and be denied asylum in both Guatemala and Mexico if they simply wanted to apply in the U.S. While the Trump administration believed that such a policy would crack down on those seeking to “[exploit] American generosity,” Judge Tigar disagreed. He ultimately issued a preliminary injunction against the Trump administration, blocking the policy as well as ordering that the government reinstitute the previously-existing system.

This decision contradicted one made that same day, but in a different court. U.S. District Judge Timothy J. Kelly, ruling on a similar case in Washington, DC, argued that the Trump administration’s policy would not cause “irreparable harm” to the two advocacy groups who opposed the new rule. However, the ruling by Judge Tigar supersedes Kelly’s, as the rule does not have the possibility of being carried out until the proper judicial authorities may better understand the legal issues surrounding the case. If the Trump administration appeals the decision – which it is likely to – then the Ninth Circuit Court will review the case.

The Trump administration announced this policy without garnering the explicit consent of Guatemala and Mexico. However, it has since made some progress. On July 26, the U.S. and Guatemala signed a new migration agreement, in which Guatemala confirmed its status as a so-called “safe third country.” Yet Guatemala did not do so eagerly. Threatening to impose tariffs, the Trump administration mandated that Guatemala either implement a new migration accord on the U.S.’ terms or risk economic backlash. Even though the President achieved this deal, it is an ironic victory of sorts, as Guatemala actually has the highest number of asylum seekers and migrants captured at the U.S. southern border.

This step by the Trump administration to tighten U.S. migration policy is not the only one it has made in recent weeks. On July 22, the Trump administration announced that it will dramatically expand its fast-track deportation policy. Under the fast-track system, immigration officers may deport anyone that has illegally resided in the U.S. for less than two years, without allowing said individual to appear before a judge. Though implemented in 1996, the policy garnered little attention until 2004, when the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) stated that it would enforce the policy against those that were arrested within two weeks of arriving in the U.S. by land and detained within 100 miles of the border. With its broader scope, however, the Trump administration has expanded the policy’s reach. Acting DHS secretary Kevin McAleenan stressed that the administration is implementing this policy with the chief goal of reducing the immense case backlog, which is weighing down courts and overwhelming accommodations in southern border detention facilities.

The ACLU pledged to sue the administration and block the policy. “Under this unlawful plan, immigrants who have lived here for years would be deported with less due process than people get in traffic court,” stated Omar Jawdat, director of the ACLU’s Immigrants’ Rights Project. Critics of the policy also stressed that it may be difficult for those that have resided in the U.S. for more than two years to prove so, potentially leading to the deportation of individuals not targeted under the act. Only a limited set of exceptions may protect individuals from being deported under the policy, such as displaying fear at returning home.

In addition to both of these policies, the Trump administration announced that they would narrow the scope of individuals whom they would qualify as asylum seekers. Federal law allows migrants to apply for asylum if they meet at least one of a handful of preconditions, which include a fear of persecution in their home country because of their race, nationality, or political opinions. The law extends to cover members of “particular social groups,” which has included members of families specifically targeted by extremely dangerous groups, like drug cartels. Attorney General William P. Barr, speaking on behalf of the Trump administration noted that the U.S. now viewed members of families through a far narrower lens. Instead of simply possessing “genetic ties” to a family typically targeted by dangerous groups, the family in question should possess “socially distinct” traits. These families would likely include, according to Barr, “large and prominent clans” that have previously undergone persecution in certain countries.

Migrant advocacy groups are likely to challenge this policy in court. The Catholic Legal Immigration Network, for example, has already lamented the law as “shameful.”

Though these policies – or, more specifically, their interpretation – may be new, they reveal nothing new about the Trump administration’s migration policy. Earlier this year, President Trump issued a number of rules meant to tighten U.S. migration policy. These included charging a fee for those seeking to apply for asylum, as well as a fee for those pursuing employment authorizations while waiting for the processing of their asylum application. Continuing this approach with his most recent rules, the President has shown little hesitation in shrinking migration numbers at deep costs, even though almost every step is met with legal backlash. Additionally, the Trump administration’s willingness to pressure states like Guatemala into accepting a migration accord that better meets their interests emphasizes the short-term scope of the White House’s strategy. Even though the administration may achieve this deal and benefit from it in the short-term, it will invariably damage the U.S.’ relationship with Guatemala – and Central America – in the long-term. Not only will these states experience instability from the influx of asylum seekers, but they will resent being bullied into accepting an agreement they never wanted as well.

With approximately 14 months until Election Day 2020, President Trump will almost certainly continue to come down hard on migration, viewing it as a key issue with his political base. Yet the price of this political move has proven, and will continue to prove, steep, with U.S. migrant policy constant under question, and the fates of tens of thousands – if not hundreds of thousands – of asylum seekers perpetually up in the air.

U.S. Announces New Sanctions against Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua

April 19, 2019 by Bruce Zagaris Leave a Comment

On April 17, 2019, the United States government announced new sanctions against Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua.

In a Miami speech, National Security Advisor John Bolton announced the Trump administration is reimposing limits on the amount of money Cuban Americans can send to relatives in Cuba and ordering new restrictions on U.S. citizen, nonfamily travel to Cuba. In a Miami speech last November, Bolton referred to the three countries as the “Troika of Tyranny.” in his new speech, Bolton called them “the three stooges of socialism.”

Also on April 17, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said the administration will remove restrictions that have prevented lawsuits from U.S. citizens seeking compensation for property expropriated by the Cuban governments when it came to power in 1958.

Venezuela

OFAC designated Banco Central de Venezuela, or the Central Bank of Venezuela, pursuant to E.O. 13850, as amended, for operating in the financial sector of the Venezuelan economy. Additionally, OFAC designated Josefa Ruzza Terán (Ruzza), pursuant to E.O. 13692, as amended, who is determined to be a current or former official of the Government of Venezuela. Multiple OFAC-designated individuals currently hold leadership positions with the Banco Central de Venezuela, including Simon Alejandro Zerpa Delgado and William Antonio Contreras, both of whom are Directors of the bank and were designated by OFAC pursuant to E.O. 13692 in 2017 and 2018, respectively.

Ruzza Terán is a Director of Banco Central de Venezuela. Additionally, Ruzza was appointed in July 2018 as a Director on the Board of Directors for the Venezuelan Department of Foreign Commerce, also known as CORPOVEX In May 2018, he was appointed the Vice President of Finance of Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A., which was designated on January 28, 2019, pursuant to E.O. 13850.

Nicaragua

On April 17, OFAC also designated Laureano Ortega Murillo, the son of Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega and Vice President Rosario Murillo, as well as Nicaraguan bank Banco Corporativo SA (BanCorp). Taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13851, the sanctions target corrupt financial operations and Ortega regime support networks. OFAC explained the individual and entity designated support a regime that, since April 2018, has cracked down on political opposition, leading to the death of 325 persons, the injury of more than 2,000, the imprisonment of hundreds of political and civil society actors, and over 42,000 Nicaraguans seeking refuge in Costa Rica.

Cuba

Pompeo explained the Trump administration will end waivers, activated by five presidents over the past 20 years, of Title III of Helms-Burton, enacted in 1996, permitting compensation lawsuits by U.S. citizens against any entity or person “trafficking” in confiscated property in Cuba. The law includes foreign companies and persons.

On April 17, 2019, a joint statement by Federica Mogherini, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada Chrystia Freeland and EU Commissioner for Trade Cecilia Malmström said “the EU and Canada consider the extraterritorial application of unilateral Cuba-related measures contrary to international law. We are determined to work together to protect the interests of our companies in the context of the WTO and by banning the enforcement or recognition of foreign judgements based on Title III, both in the EU and Canada.” They said their laws allow counter-claims, so the decision will lead to an unnecessary spiral of legal claims.

In a briefing the Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs Kimberly Breier characterized the activation of the Title III suits and reimposition of sanctions as supporting the Cuban people and denying resources to the regime, especially to the security services in Cuba. Yet, especially the travel restrictions will undermine the small amount of economic activity due to U.S. travel, much of which benefits Cubans who have operate their own bed and breakfast places, restaurants, and other Cubans that participate in the tourism sector.

The potentially challenging aspects of the new sanctions will be how to keep the support for U.S. action in Venezuela while reimposing sanctions on Cuba and allow suits under Title III of Helms-Burton, which will hurt Canada and the EU.

The next issue of the IELR will discuss in more detail these developments.

Former Manager for International Airline Pleads Guilty to Acting as an Agent of the Chinese Government without Notifying the Attorney General

April 19, 2019 by Bruce Zagaris Leave a Comment

On April 17, 2019, Ying Lin pleaded guilty in the U.S. District Court in Brooklyn, New York to serving as an agent for the People’s Republic of China without notifying the Attorney General, by working at the direction and control of military officers assigned to the Permanent Mission of the PRC to the United Nations. Lin, a former manager with an international air carrier headquartered in the PRC (the Air Carrier) improperly facilitated the transport of packages from John F. Kennedy International Airport to the PRC aboard Air Carrier flights as the behest of the PRC military officers and in violation of Transportation Security Administration (TSA) regulations.

The defendant’s actions helped Chinese military officers to evade U.S. law enforcement scrutiny of packages that they sent from New York to Beijing.

Charges

Lin, 48, worked for the Air Carrier from 2002 through Fall 2015 as a counter agent at JFK Airport and from Fall 2015 through April 2016 as the station manager at Newark Liberty International Airport. During her employment with Air Carrier, Lin accepted packages from PRC military officers, and placed those packages aboard Air Carrier flights to the PRC as unaccompanied luggage or checked the packages under the names of other passengers on those flights. Since the PRC military officers did not travel on those flights, Lin’s actions violated TSA regulations, requiring that checked baggage be accepted only from ticketed passengers. In addition, Lin encouraged other Air Carrier employees to assist the PRC military officers, instructing them that because the Air Carrier was a PRC company, their primary lo loyalty should be to the PRC.

For her illegal acts, Lin obtained benefits from the PRC Mission and PRC Consulate in New York. The benefits included tax-exempt purchases of liquor, cigarettes and electronic devices worth tens of thousands of dollars, and free contracting work at her two residences in Queens, by PRC construction workers who were allowed under the terms of their visas to work only on PRC government facilities.

Sentences and Law

When sentenced, Lin faces up to 10 years’ imprisonment. As part of the guilty plea, Lin agreed to forfeit approximately $25,000 as well as an additional $145,000 in connection with her resolution of the government’s forfeiture verdict in United States v. Zhong, No. 16-CR-614 (AMD).

In particular, Lin is charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 951(a). The statute requires a person who is, other than a diplomatic or consular officer or attaché, when she acts in the U.S. as an agent of a foreign government to first notify the Attorney General. The law excludes duly accredited diplomats and consuls and persons engaged in a legal commercial transaction.

Analysis

The indictment and plea illustrate increased prosecution for lack of transparency, namely persons representing foreign principals and governments who fail to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act or in this case fail to notify the Attorney General.

The current issue of the IELR will discuss the case in more detail.

North Korean Embassy Raid in Madrid Leaves Us with More Questions than Answers

April 5, 2019 by Alex Psilakis Leave a Comment

On February 22, 2019, 10 masked individuals broke into the North Korean embassy in Madrid. They tied up the eight people present at the embassy, placed bags over their heads, and, in some cases, beat and interrogated them. The group paid particular attention to Yun Sok So, an official in the embassy’s economics department. They not only beat him, but continuously pressured him to abandon North Korea. The assailants also stole a number of items, including pen drives, computers, and hard drives. One embassy employee managed to escape during the lockdown, screaming from outside to attract the attention of others, and eventually, the police. Yet when the police knocked on the embassy’s front door, they met what looked like a North Korean diplomat, who informed them that nothing was wrong. The police left, allowing the group to continue their raid. Approximately five hours after their arrival, the assailants fled the scene, stealing vehicles from the embassy only to abandon them on a nearby street. Some reports noted that the assailants were freedom fighters seeking to liberate North Korea, while others claimed that the aggressors had ties to the CIA.

Yet as the weeks passed, the case only proved more complex. Evidence revealed that Kim Hyok Chol, one of Kim Jong-Un’s most revered diplomats, formerly served as the North Korean Ambassador to Spain, until he was expelled in 2017 because of the Kim regime’s continued nuclear testing. Kim Hyok Chol was seen as one of the prime architects of the Trump-Kim meeting in Vietnam, which occurred only days after the raid. Reports also indicated that individuals with ties to the U.S. and South Korea took part in the raid. Adrian Hong Chang, a Mexican citizen who currently resides in the U.S., led the raid. Hong Chang allegedly posed as a “managing partner” of a fictitious firm interested in investing in North Korea. He asked to meet with Yun Sok So, presenting a false business card. Moments later, the assailants stormed the embassy. When police checked in on the embassy during the raid, it was likely Hong Chang that convinced them that all was well and calmly turned them away. After the raid, Hong Chang traveled to Lisbon, where he flew back to the U.S. Five days later, he reached out to the FBI, offering to share the “audiovisual material” he acquired during the raid.

Spanish authorities also identified two other individuals that took part in the raid – U.S. citizen Sam Ruy and South Korean citizen Woo Ram Lee. Jose de la Mata, a judge on Spain’s national court, pioneered the investigation into the raid, and has since issued international arrest warrants for Hong Chang and Ruy. However, their exact locations are unknown, or have at least not been disclosed. The FBI, meanwhile, has refused to comment on the situation.

North Korea did not officially comment on the incident until March 31 – over a month after it occurred. They called the raid “a grave terrorist attack” that served as a “flagrant violation of international law.” According to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the raid was undeniably a violation of international law. Article 22, Section One of the Convention states that “the premises of the mission shall be inviolable,” while Section Three notes that, “the premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and the means of transport of the mission shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment or execution.” Judge de la Mata also mentioned that the raid could result in a variety of charges against the assailants, such as theft using violence, membership in a criminal organization, and illegal detention.

However, this is unlikely to deter the group that has since claimed responsibility for the raid. At the end of March – again, about a month after the raid – Free Joseon (Free North Korea) admitted to leading the raid. A defector group dedicated to overthrowing the North Korean government, Free Joseon has continually served as thorn in the side of the Kim regime. In 2017, they claimed to have taken Kim Han Sol under their protection. Kim Han Sol was the son of Kim Jong Nam, who was the brother to Kim Jong Un. Kim Jong Nam was mysteriously assassinated in 2017 – some think by his brother. Believing him under threat, Free Joseon (then known as Cheollima Civil Defense) stated that they secured Kim Han Sol’s protection. Kim Han Sol has not been seen in public since 2017, when he appeared in a video published by Cheollima Civil Defense.

The mystery and multiple layers behind this case make it sound like a spy thriller. Since North Korea rarely acknowledges events like these – events that may be viewed as failures by the regime – their willingness to do so here stresses not only how far word is spreading of the raid, but how frustrated the regime is by the raid itself. Additionally, U.S. ties to the raid are too coincidental to ignore. With Spanish reporters arguing that two of the raiders possessed ties to the CIA, and Judge de la Mata noting that one was a U.S. resident and another a U.S. citizen, suspicions that the U.S. was to some degree involved in the raid are becoming too pressing to ignore. The raid’s near-timing to the Trump-Kim talks in Vietnam – which the former North Korean Ambassador to Spain played a key role in orchestrating – only adds to the suspicions. Even though Free Joseon claimed responsibility for the raid, their involvement alongside U.S.-affiliated individuals begs the question – to what degree is the U.S. affiliated with the defector group? Finally, Spain’s decision to issue international arrest warrants for at least two individuals allegedly involved in the raid, as well as consider pressing further charges, emphasizes that Spain will not simply let this go, even though Spanish-North Korean relations are far from perfect.

Like a spy thriller, it is difficult to predict what answers, if any, we will get to this mystery.