International Organizations Archives | Page 5 of 5

Trump Administration Threatens Sanctions against International Criminal Court

September 10, 2018 by Bruce Zagaris Leave a Comment

On September 10, 2018, in a speech before the Federalist Society U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton said the Trump Administration will use any means necessary to protect U.S. citizens, and those of its allies, from unjust prosecution by the International Criminal Court.

Bolton said a major reason for his remarks was that on November 3, 2017, the ICC’s Chief Prosecutor issued a statement concerning her request to start an investigation into the situation in Afghanistan. The Chief Prosecutor indicated the investigation would target the Afghan National Security Forces, the Taliban, and the Haqqani network, as well as war crimes allegedly committed by U.S. service members and intelligence professionals during the Afghan war since May 1, 2003.

Bolton announced that, if the ICC formally opens an investigation, the Trump Administration will consider the following steps: negotiate even more binding, bilateral agreements to prohibit countries from surrendering U.S. persons to the ICC; to the extent allowed by U.S. law; ban ICC judges and prosecutors from entering the U.S.; sanction their funds in the U.S. financial system, and prosecute them in the U.S. criminal system; consider acting in the UN Security Council to limit the ICC’s authority, including to ensure that the ICC does not exercise jurisdiction over U.S. nationals and the U.S. allies that have not ratified the Rome Statute; and take action against entities and persons who cooperate with the ICC with respect to cases against U.S. nationals.

Bolton explained the Trump Administration will protect American constitutionalism, its sovereignty, and its citizens. Bolton observed that, as Trump said in his first foreign policy speech as a Presidential candidate in April 2016, given in the same Mayflower Hotel that Bolton delivered his talk, the Trump promised “in every decision we make, we will put the interests of the American People first.”

In his remarks Bolton explained that the ICC was established in July 2002 with the entry into force of the Rome Statute. While the U.S> originally signed the Rome Statute at the very end of the Clinton Administration, it was not submitted to the Senate for ratification. In May 2002, President George W. Bush authorized the then-Under Secretary of State John Bolton to “unsign” it based on the view of the U.S. government that it was fundamentally illegitimate.

Bolton explained the U.S. government’s position to unsign the Rome treaty is based on concerns of the U.S. government that the ICCC has broad, unaccountable powers that posed a significant threat to U.S. sovereignty and its constitutional protections. Bolton said it is a fundamental principle of international law that a treaty is binding only on its parties, and that it does not establish obligations for non-parties without their consent.

The current issue of the IELR will provide a more comprehensive account of the remarks by Bolton and implications.

EU to Take Hungary to Court over Prime Minister Orban’s Treatment of Immigrants

July 26, 2018 by Madeline Henshaw-Greene Leave a Comment

The European Union is seeking legal action against the government of Hungary for its treatment of asylum seekers, after threatening to do so for nearly three years. On Thursday, July 19, the European Commission, the EU’s executive branch, announced in a formal letter that it planned to ask its highest courts to fine Hungary for not complying with several EU treaties that require member states to provide protection for foreigners seeking refuge. The decision could have fundamental implications for Europe as its nations struggle to reconcile their increasingly different ideas about democracy and human rights in an age of rising nationalism and strongman politics.

The European Union’s decision to take legal action is in direct opposition to Hungarian Prime Minister Orban’s hardline stance against immigration and asylum seekers. President Orban has relied on his nationalist and fear-based politics since 2015, a strategy that carried him to his third consecutive term earlier this year. Details of some of his anti-immigration policies include housing asylum seekers for months on end in remodeled shipping containers and installing a militarized wall along Hungary’s southern border. While Orban’s critics caution that he is neglecting the rule of law and encouraging neighboring countries, such as Austria and Slovenia, to do the same, Hungarian citizens have overwhelmingly endorsed his brand of politics.

According to EU policy, Hungary has two months to respond to the Commission before it begins assessing whether or not Orban and his government have violated any rules. In the meantime, the investigation may empower Prime Minister Orban by keeping public attention on him. This may help him with his plan to pass a constitutional amendment that would prevent the EU from forcing refugee settlement in Hungary. Since virtually none of Hungary’s opposition parties are willing to criticize the administration, the odds for the amendment successfully passing are in Orban’s favor. This is not the first time the EU has demonstrated concern over Prime Minister Orban’s legislation. In the past, he has also been criticized for discrimination against Roma children in schools as well as a lack of protection for pregnant women in the workplace.

U.N. Moves Forward on Global Migration Pact, U.S. Remains Absent

July 17, 2018 by Madeline Henshaw-Greene Leave a Comment

On Friday, July 13, the United Nations took steps towards completing an agreement focused on improving human rights for global migrants. The agreement, known as the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, was first adopted as an initiative at the United Nations General Assembly in New York in September 2016, and at the time was heavily favored by all 193 members. The first major goal was to protect the rights of refugees and migrants in ways such as assuring safe resettlement and helping them get access to employment and education. Since then, it has grown into a global compact that promises to improve the way governments handle migration, focusing in particular on the human rights of migrants. The agreement has been in development since April 2017 and was completed last Friday. It is expected to be formally adopted this December at a meeting in Marrakesh, Morocco.

The pact has garnered attention not only because it addresses an important global issue, but also because the United States is no longer involved in its negotiations. Although the U.S. had been part of the talks since the beginning and President Obama had been a strong supporter of the initial declaration, the Trump administration abruptly ended the United States’ involvement last December, indicating that the agreement would hinder its power to control its borders. Migrants rights advocates noted that the decision to withdraw appeared to reinforce the image of the Trump administration as isolationist. They cautioned that the refusal to participate was “shortsighted and counterproductive”. However, administration officials countered that its decision was merely a defense of American sovereignty and national security, not an unwillingness to cooperate with other countries. Still, the decision was celebrated by President Trump’s base as well as several conservative websites, many of whom have demanded stricter laws against immigration since the campaign trail.

The completion of the Global Compact comes in the midst of a major immigration crisis in the United States. The Trump administration has faced bipartisan uproar due to a policy set forth by the government in May 2018 that required DHS officials to separate asylum seekers from their children at the border. The policy was vehemently decried and has now been effectively ended by a federal judge. This lack of regard for the basic rights of migrants seems to confirm the initial fears of migrants rights advocates when the U.S. pulled out of the decision-making process. Back in December when the decision was first announced, Bill Frelick, an official at Human Rights Watch, said that the United States had demonstrated “a callous disregard for the lives of migrants and jaw-dropping irresponsibility toward the community of nations”. This comment was echoed by Kevin Appleby, the international migration policy direction at an immigration rights advocacy group, who observed that the Trump administration seemed to care more about the whims of its base “than working with the world on a pressing global issue”.

CARICOM HEADS ISSUE COMMUNIQUÉ ON SECURITY, MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION AND OTHER ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVES

July 9, 2018 by Bruce Zagaris Leave a Comment

At 39^th meeting of the heads of government of the Caribbean Community in Montego Bay, Jamaica on July 4-6, 2018, several significant actions occurred on international enforcement and security cooperation, as shown by the Communique.

Jamaica signed the CARICOM arrest warrant treaty, which enables Jamaica and CARICOM countries to more easily surrender individuals without need to extradite them.

After receiving an update on current and emerging Crime and Security issues in the region, the Heads mandated the Regional Security Agencies to work closely with the National Security Heads to address the various challenges emphasizing the need to strengthen the network of security head in the region to promote further information and intelligence sharing.

The Heads underscored the importance of strengthening the use of information and Communications technology in the fight against illicit trafficking in narcotics and firearms, trans-border criminal activities and cyber attacks. They emphasized the importance of working more closely with their international development partners to help the region in this regard.

CARICOM Members were encouraged to urgently update all legal instruments to combat crime and enhance regional security.

The Heads observed with great concern the amendment approved by the UK House of Commons to the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill requiring the UK Government to ensure that the British Overseas Territories, but not Crown Dependencies, establish public registers of beneficial ownership information by no later than December 31, 2020.

They expressed solidarity with the territories “adversely affected by this unfair and unilateral action to legislate in areas of domestic policy constitutionally devolved to the territories without the consent of the people. Moreover, the action ran counter to an alternative arrangement to public registers earlier negotiated and agreed with the UK government and put in place at great cost to the overseas territories.”

According to the Heads, this they view as similar to the “unfair, unilateral and punitive extraterritorial measures such as blacklisting and de-risking taken against their own countries financial services sector, also a critical aspect of their economies, despite their best efforts at transparency and compliance.”

The Heads welcomed the report of the Regional Commission on Marijuana, which reviewed information and studies pertaining to marijuana legislation regulating its use and classification, findings related to research conducted on the medicinal use of marijuana as well as the economic and social impact and its implications for the region.

The Heads accepted in principle the need for changes in the classification of the drug which will make it more available for medicinal purposes and research. The acknowledged the region must intensify its lobbying at the international level to facilitate reclassification.

The Communiqué shows that the Caribbean Single Market Economy continues to facilitate streamlined procedure to enforcement cooperation, such as the CARICOM arrest warrant treaty. They continue to try to develop common approaches and policies to transnational criminal threats, such as illicit trafficking in narcotics and firearms, trans-border criminal activities and cyber attacks.

The Heads are also developing common approaches to efforts by extraregional actors to impose tax transparency and money laundering/counter-terrorism financial regulatory and enforcement policies on them. They are especially supportive of the overseas territories because the same policies, e.g., the requirement to have corporate public registers, will undoubtedly be imposed on them, even as they continue losing their financial service markets to other jurisdictions, especially to states in the U.S. which do not even have any private registers and the Trump Administration has not prioritized or pledged to meet international standards in tax transparency or anti-money laundering.

CARICOM has developed a number of regional enforcement and security mechanisms, including CARICOM Implementing Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS), the Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police, and subregional enforcement mechanisms, such as the Organization of East Caribbean States (OECS) Regional Security System.

Five Countries Form Joint Chiefs of Global Tax Enforcement (J5) Alliance

July 2, 2018 by Bruce Zagaris 2 Comments

On July 2, 2018, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs announced an alliance on tax enforcement between the United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, the United States and Australia to combat international tax crime and money laundering. Members include the heads of tax crime and senior officials from the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACAC) and the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), the Dutch Fiscal Information and Investigation Service (FIOD), Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (HMRC), and Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI).

The group will build on existing international cooperation by sharing intelligence and expertise, and will cooperate on joint operations to investigate persons who are enablers of tax crime.

At their first meeting, the J5 brought leading experts in tax and other financial crimes from each of the five member countries to develop tactical plans and identify opportunities to pursue cyber criminals and enablers of international tax crime.

According to HMRC, the new alliance will help to build on work that has obtained more than £ 2.8 billion from offshore tax evaders since 2010.

The J5 was formed in response to a call to action from the OECD for countries to do more to tackle the enablers of tax crime. All five countries have similar threats: organized crime groups and wealthy offshore tax evaders who are well resourced and have access to professional enablers to hide income and assets using the global financial system.

According to IRS Criminal Investigation division chief Don Fort, the J5 will have three areas of focus: professional enablers, cybercrimes and cryptocurrencies, and increased use of data analytics and new investigation technology. (Nathan J. Richman, Enforcement Collaboration to Focus on Emerging Tax Issues, 2018 Worldwide Tax Daily 126-1, June 29, 2018).

The J5 has similarities to the Joint International Tax Shelter Information and Collaboration (JITSIC). On October 24, 2014, 38 countries, meeting in Dublin, Ireland for the 9th meeting of the Forum on Tax Administration (FTA), agreed to establish the JITSIC. The JITSIC Network focuses specifically on cross border tax avoidance. JITSIC has the goal to deter the promotion of, and investment in, abusive tax schemes by: increasing the community’s awareness of the potential risks of promoting and investing in tax schemes; sharing ideas on how to identify and address abusive tax schemes; enhancing compliance and enforcement efforts through coordinated ‘real-time’ exchanges of information; developing new internet searches and other techniques for the early identification of promoters and investors involved in abusive tax schemes; and identifying emerging trends and patterns to anticipate new abusive tax schemes, and improving knowledge of techniques used to promote cross-border abusive tax schemes.

The J5, unlike JITSIC, will actually engage in joint tax investigations and use increased data analytics and investigation technology in its work.

There will be a more comprehensive article in the July 2018 issue of the International Enforcement Law Reporter.

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Gains Power to Assign Blame

June 29, 2018 by Maria O' Sullivan Leave a Comment

On June 27, 2018, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) gained the power to assign blame for chemical weapons attacks. This British-led move, opposed by Russia, Syria and their allies, is a big step forward in holding perpetrators of such attacks legally accountable, and comes at a time when chemical weapons are in the spotlight following horrific stories of attacks on civilians in Syria and the Sergei Skripal case.

This latter case no doubt could be why Russia not only opposed the motion but tried to filibuster it, which ultimately passed 82 to 24, with 26 countries abstaining.

Notably, the June 26-28 meeting officially condemned attacks in Syria and the UK, as well as the attack on Kim Jong Nam in Malaysia in February of 2017, assigning blame in cases where it had previously not done so.

In the decision from the meeting, responsibility was assigned to the Syrian Arab Republic for various attacks such as in Khan Sheikhoun. On April 4, 2017, over 80 Syrians were killed following a sarin gas attack on the rebel-held town. Witnesses and activists say that the attack happened when many were asleep. Two months after the attack, the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission confirmed that sarin was used, but did not publicly indicate a responsible party until now.

The decision also assigns responsibility to Daesh (or ISIL) for noted attacks.

Markedly, the decision does not assign blame for the attack against Sergei Skripal or Kim Jong Nam. The inclusion of blame would most likely have brought even greater resistance from Russia and potentially even other states.

On March 4, 2018, Sergei Skripal, a former Russian spy, and his daughter were found unconscious on a bench after they had been poisoned with a nerve agent identified as Novichok, which fueled tensions between Britain and Russia. Russia continues to deny involvement.

Britain seeks to “hold Russia legally responsible” given the Soviet origin of Novichok (although Russia has pointed out that other states can synthesize such chemicals), and for putting the lives of British nationals at risk and violating Britain’s sovereignty. Having had OPCW technical assistance with this case which assessed the agent to be highly pure, Britain could potentially move forward with action following the July 27 vote.

The July 27 vote could be another step towards action against the Syrian Arab Republic as well. The OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism in Syria was the only body with the expertise and mandate “to attribute responsibility of use of chemical weapons in Syria,” although multiple other organizations and bodies exist to draw attention to perpetrators. But this body was short-lived surviving from 2015 until 2017 when it was dissolved following Russia’s inability to accept the findings that held Syria responsible, “an illustration of the broader geopolitical cleavage between Russia and the West.”

Ironically, Iran, supporting Russia’s resistance of the July 27 vote, said in a statement at the session that they questioned whether the move to allow the OPCW to assign blame would “politicize” the body and stated that it would “cause a heavy burden of responsibility and liability for the Technical Secretariat and the DG and place their impartiality under question as well.”

Moving forward, cases such as Syria and Skripal will remain contentious in terms of the proper actions to take and the perceived impartiality of the OPCW; however the motion to assign blame passed on July 27 was a large stepping stone towards international accountability.

Maria O’Sullivan is a Legal Assistant at Berliner Corcoran and Rowe LLP.

Transparency Int’l Critiques G20’s Unmet Promises on Ending Anonymous Companies

May 1, 2018 by Bruce Zagaris Leave a Comment

by Bruce Zagaris

On April 19, 2018, Transparency International issued a report G20 Leaders or Laggards? Review G20 promises on ending anonymous companies.

The TI report discusses how the major cross-border “grand corruption” scandals have tarnished the Group of 20 (G20) countries in recent years. It cites the fact that in 2017 Odebrecht the Brazilian engineering company, was assessed a US$2.6 billion fine for bribery after being charged with paying US$788 million in bribes. In the “Russian Laundromat” scandal, exposed in 2017, a group of individuals in G20 member Russia allegedly established 21 shell companies, which then moved and laundered illegal proceeds out of the country, making more than 26,000 payments to 96 different countries including every G20 country aside from Brazil. Increasingly, anonymous companies hide the identity of the person at the source of the funds either to launder and transfer stolen money, or to operationalize corrupt deals, using companies and offshore accounts to pay bribes or buy influence.

The report makes 5 major findings and then recommendations as follows:

G20 Countries are starting to tackle anonymous company ownership – but progress is slow. Some 3 years after the G20 adopted their High-Level Beneficial Ownership Principles at the Brisbane G20 Summit, the number of countries with weak or average frameworks has dropped from 15 to 11, but still major weaknesses exist across the principles.
The majority of countries still do not know who owns and controls companies in their territories and do not keep current information on them. The 20 Principles encouraged legal entities to require beneficial ownership information when recording information about their shareholders. Legal entities are now expected to understand their ownership and control structure and monitor individuals who have an interest in a company but are presented through nominee shareholders or other legal entities. However, the great majority of countries evaluated still do not require legal entities to maintain beneficial ownership information themselves. Central beneficial ownership registers improve collection of beneficial ownership information and access to law enforcement, supports domestic and international cooperation between authorities and permits them to do their job more quickly. Six assessed countries now have central beneficial ownership registers.
Verification of information is weak across the board. This undermines the ability of competent authorities to investigate suspicious cases, and the ability of banks and businesses to carry out proper due diligence. All 23 countries analyzed now require financial institutions to identify the beneficial ownership of customers. Unfortunately, in high-risk cases, only 8 G20 countries required financial institutions to use independent and reliable sources to verify the beneficial owner of their customers. Finally, no register authority in any G20 or guest country verifies information collection in company registers.
Rhetoric does not always translate into action. Government are frequently aware of the weaknesses in their system. However, in many cases they fail to implement key measures they know will help mitigate those problems.
Gatekeepers such as lawyers, accountants, real estate agents, and trusts and company service providers remain money laundering weak spots.

TI makes the following recommendations:

— Governments should establish a central register of beneficial ownership information and make it publicly available in open data format.

— Governments should resource and establish mechanisms to ensure that at least some verification of beneficial ownership information occurs, such as cross-checking the data against other government and tax databases, or conducting random inspections.

— Financial institutions or DNFBPs should not be permitted to proceed with transactions if the beneficial owner of their customer cannot be identified.

— Governments should undertake national money laundering risk assessments on a regular basis. These should include an analysis of the risks posed by domestic and foreign legal entities and arrangements. Key stakeholders, including obliged entities and civil society organizations should be consulted. The results of the assessment should be published online.

— Governments should consider prohibiting nominee shareholders. If they are permitted, they should be required to disclose their status upon the registration of the company and registered as nominees. Nominees should be licensed and subject to strict anti-money laundering obligations.

— Governments should require the registration of both domestic and foreign trusts operating in their country. Information on all parties to the trust (trustee, settlor and beneficiaries), and the real individuals behind them should be recorded.

The report illustrates how civil society plays an important role in shaping and implementing commitments by governments and international organizations to transparency and anti-corruption. They invest significant resources before the G20 meetings to develop precise commitments and then lobby the governments to support them. Thereafter, civil society continues to monitor the performance of the governments against the commitments and produce reports, exposing gaps. They also work with other organizations, such as the International Consortium for Investigative Journalists (ICIJ). The current issue of the IELR will have a more comprehensive discussion of the TI report.

VIII Summit of the Americas Commitment on anti-Corruption

April 24, 2018 by Bruce Zagaris Leave a Comment

On April 14, 2018, during the VIII Summit of the Americas, the heads of government agreed to the Lima Commitment with respect to “Democratic Governance against Corruption.”

The commitment includes provisions to reinforce democratic governance, including” the strengthening of democratic institutions for the prevention of and fight against corruption in the Hemisphere.” It comes at a time when many of the governments in the hemisphere, such as Honduras, Venezuela, and Brazil are undergoing a crisis of stability largely due to corruption issues.

The commitment has a section on “transparency, access to information, protection of whistleblowers, and human rights, including freedom of expression.” The section commits to increasing national anti-corruption measures or systems and strengthening conditions for the effective participation of civil society, social organizations, academia, the private sector, citizens, and other social actors in monitoring government performance, including the development of prevention mechanisms, channels for reporting possible acts of corruption and facilitating the work of watchdogs including other citizen oversight mechanisms, and incentivizing the adoption of digital means of participation.” One of the initiatives is to promote the establishment of an Inter-American Data Program within the OAS in order to strengthen open information policies and increase the capacity of governments and citizens to prevent and fight corruption.

A section concerns “financing of political organizations and election campaigns.”

A section on the “prevention of corruption in public works and public procurement and contracting.” One element is to request that the Joint Summit Working Group (JSWG), together with other relevant regional and international bodies, develop an infrastructure platform to facilitate the exchange of experiences, training and cooperation programs for project monitoring and development, feasibility and risk analysis studies, transparent bidding procedures, and government procurement.”

A section focuses on “international legal cooperation: the fight against bribery, international corruption, organized crime, and money laundering; and asset recovery.” Among the action agreed is continuing to implement, prior to the IX Summit of the Americas, the applicable recommendations from the specific rounds of the Implementation Review Mechanism of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) as well as the recommendations from the successive rounds of the Mechanism for Follow-Up on the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (MESICIC).

A section focuses on “strengthening of Inter-American Anti-Corruption Mechanisms.” One action item is to identify resources to strengthen its operations with a view to more efficiently address the new challenges that corruption poses in the Hemisphere. The document contains a series of recommendations, such as calling on MESICIC to promote instruments for the exchange and dissemination of best practices, technical capacities, and measures to strengthen legal and institutional frameworks to prevent and combat corruption that will contribute to the implementation of its recommendations.

The final section concerns “follow-up and reports.” The Lima Commitment requests the Joint Summit Work Group (JSWG) to help States with resources and technical capacity-building, so that they can implement the commitments undertaken at the Summit in the area of strengthening democratic governance and anti-corruption efforts. The section calls upon the private sector in general to adopt similar initiatives as those in the “Private Sector Commitment to Transparency” of the American Business Dialogue presented at the III CEO Summit of the America.

The challenges for the stakeholders in the VIII Summit of the Americas will be to garner sufficient resources, implementation, and enforcement mechanisms, so that the lofty commitments can come to fruition. In particular, the Organization of American States, which provided much of the organizational work for the Summits of the Americas, has limited resources. In addition, the JSWG has limited resources and authority to implement the provisions of the commitment. The Summits of the Americas illustrate an effort by governments, the private sector, and civil society to develop government networks. In the VIII Summit of the Americas, the prioritization is on anti-corruption. It is quite appropriate since the prosecutions in Operation Car Wash and especially of heads of government (Dilma Rousseff) and former heads of government (Lula da Silva) have generated an agreement to cooperate in the enforcement of the Oderbrecht case and has triggered investigations and resignations of high-level officials in Ecuador and Peru, as well as a proliferation of prosecutions and civil cases for corruption. There will be a more comprehensive look at the Lima Commitment in the current issue of the IELR journal.

Event Invitation – ENTREPRENEURS ON THE INTERPOL WANTED LIST: BALANCING LAW ENFORCEMENT WITH DUE PROCESS

April 16, 2018 by Zarine Kharazian Leave a Comment

The DC Chapter of the Association of Certified Financial Crime Specialists (ACFCS)

invites you to join us for a

Brown-Bag Lunch Event

On ENTREPRENEURS ON THE INTERPOL WANTED LIST: BALANCING LAW ENFORCEMENT WITH DUE PROCESS

This program will discuss (1) international police cooperation via INTERPOL’s channels: the mechanism and legal framework; (2) the principle of INTERPOL’s neutrality; (3) loopholes in INTERPOL’s rules that make the abuse of its channels possible; (4) member countries known for abusing INTERPOL; (5) the lack of transparency in INTERPOL’s disclosures; (6) why entrepreneurs become victims of INTERPOL abuse; (7) the rights of individuals on the international wanted list; (8) INTERPOL’s recent reforms and what else must be done to redress abuses.

DATE/TIME: May 8th, 2018 at Noon. (The program will start promptly at 12:15 so please arrive in time to take your seats.)

LOCATION:

Reed Smith LLP

1301 K Street Northwest

# 1100E

Washington, DC 20005

Speakers:

Mr. Bruce Zagaris (moderator) – Berliner, Corcoran & Lowe LLP
Mr. Yuriy Nemets, Esq – Law Office of Yuriy L. Nemets, PLLC and publisher of http://rednoticeabuse.com/
Ms. Michelle Estlund, Esq. – Estlund Law, Coral Gables, Florida and publisher of www.rednoticelawjournal.com
Mr. Theodore R. Bromund – Senior Research Fellow in Anglo-American Relations, Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom
Mr. Matthew Klecka – Partner, Ernst & Young (formerly with USDOJ)

Please note: THIS IS A BROWN-BAG EVENT. You are encouraged to bring your own lunch. Beverages are generously provided by Reed Smith.

You may register for the event here.

World Bank Office of Suspension and Debarment Publishes New Report

March 7, 2018 by Bruce Zagaris Leave a Comment

On March 6, 2018, the World Bank Office of Suspension and Debarment (OSD) announced that it has recently published its 10-Year Update on Case Data & Metrics in a new report,

Called the Suspension and Debarment: 10-Year Update on Case Data & Metrics 2007-2017: Addendum to the Second Edition (World Bank Office of Suspension and Debarment), it contains information related to the OSD’s sanctions system.

The Addendum contains a series of charts and provides a glimpse into the OSD case review process from a number of angles, and also provides information about the performance of the World Bank’s suspension and debarment system in general. The case tracking data shown reveals no detail about individual cases beyond generic identifiers such as case numbers and milestone dates.

OSD provides the first level of adjudication in the World Bank’s suspension and debarment, or “sanctions,” system. Since 2007, more than 60% of sanctions cases have been resolved on the basis of OSD’s determinations and recommendations. All appealed cases are decided by the World Bank Group Sanctions Board.

OSD works to ensure that the World Bank has an efficient, effective and fair sanctions process. This 10-Year Update furthers the World Bank’s commitment to transparency and accountability regarding its process for sanctioning firms and individuals accused of fraud and corruption in Bank-financed projects. A more detailed description of how the sanctions system operates and the role of OSD can be found in the second edition of OSD’s Report on Functions, Data and Lessons Learned, published in 2015.

This report marks the second edition of OSD’s Report on Functions, Data and Lessons Learned. The first edition was published in 2014 and included data and statistics covering OSD’s first six fiscal years of operations, through June 30, 2013.

The second edition updates these figures to include the next two fiscal years, through June 30, 2015, and includes other revisions necessary to reflect events that have occurred since the first edition’s publication. As with the first edition, the data and statistics in the second edition pertain only to sanctions cases arising from projects financed by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA) within the World Bank Group.

The 10-Year Update provides updated data and information on the following:

Charts and metrics showcasing OSD’s caseload and the general performance of the World Bank’s sanctions system
Updated detailed breakdown of statistics (types of cases, processing times and case outcomes.

All of the proceedings from the World Bank’s Fourth Colloquium on Suspension and Debarment can be accessed. Held on September 14, 2017, the proceedings showcase recent developments in suspension and debarment systems worldwide, examining the various uses of suspension and debarment in the procurement and anti-corruption contexts.

The panelists discussed recent trends and developments in the suspension and debarment arena, both at the national and international level, and compared and contrasted a range of national suspension and debarment systems and their impact on small versus large businesses. Panelists examined the following questions, among others: How has suspension and debarment changed over the years? How are national procurement systems making use of suspension and debarment? How often is suspension and debarment being applied to individuals and small and medium enterprises, and how do their experiences differ from larger corporations? Building on themes discussed in the previous Colloquia, the Colloquium also examined suspension and debarment as it relates to the development missions of several of the multilateral development banks.

The link to the proceedings enables a person to access a video of the proceedings.