Transnat'l Organized Crime, Cybercrime, Narcotics Archives | Page 7 of 8

Attorney General Delivers Remarks on Immigration Enforcement to Border State Sheriffs

April 17, 2018 by Madeline Henshaw-Greene Leave a Comment

Attorney General Jeff Sessions met with a coalition of sheriffs from border states in Las Cruces, New Mexico, on April 11th to deliver a set of highly politicized remarks that illustrated the Trump administration’s hardline, fear-based approach to illegal immigration. Sessions wasted no time in portraying the immigration situation as a black and white, us versus them issue. He thanked the sheriffs present for acting as “the thin blue line that stands between law-abiding people and criminals”, and praised them for protecting the country “from drugs and violence”.

The attorney general appeared to echo remarks made by President Trump on the campaign trail regarding immigrants from Mexico by describing the types of people who come across the border as drug traffickers, gang members, and “other criminals who bring drugs, guns, and gang violence into our communities.” He also made the claim that most of the drugs currently in the U.S., specifically heroin, cocaine, meth, and fentanyl, come from over the border. This is false, as the majority of these drugs are actually smuggled in through ports of entry, which a border wall would not fix. For more on Sessions’ attempts to blame the drug crisis on illegal immigrants, click here.

Attorney General Sessions also used the speech as an opportunity to promote one of the administration’s most controversial and as yet unrealized promises, the border wall. Sessions blamed Congress for failing to take action on the wall and for providing illegal immigrants with an open invitation to cross the border. He criticized the Obama administration for allowing immigrants to exploit the “credible fear” policy, which allows immigrants to remain in the country legally if they can prove that they were endangered in their home countries. The Trump administration, with Sessions at the helm, is already doing everything in their power to limit the number of asylum seekers allowed to remain in the country. One strategy, which the attorney general mentioned briefly in his speech, is to put quotas on federal immigration judges to complete a certain number of immigration cases a year. For more on Sessions’ attempts to expel illegal immigrants, click here.

To read Sessions’ full speech, click here.

Subscribe to the International Enforcement Law Report for more in-depth analysis on the Trump administration’s efforts to suppress immigration.

U.S. Government Needs Better Control on International Arms Sales

March 24, 2018 by Bruce Zagaris Leave a Comment

On March 13, 2018, CATO published a report by A. Trevor Thrall and Caroline Dorminey entitled Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy.

The report observes that since 2002, the U.S. has sold more than $197 billion worth of major conventional weapons and related military support to 167 countries. In just his first year in office, President Donald Trump signed arms deals at an accelerated rate, generating hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of potential sales.

According to the report, U.S. government-to-government arms sales since 2002 reveals that the U.S. has repeatedly sold weapons to nations engaged in deadly conflicts, and to those with horrendous human rights records, under circumstances in which the U.S. has not been able to predict where the weapons would end up or how they would be used.

The report argues that economic benefits of arms ales are dubious and that their strategic utility is far more uncertain and limited than most realize. The authors persuasively argue that the U.S. should revise its arms sales policy to improve the risk assessment process, to ban sales to countries where the risk of negative consequences is too high, and to limit sales to cases in which they will directly enhance U.S. security.

The U.S. sells arms to a large number of risky customers in the world, and the U.S. sells weapons to most of them. The data shows that the U.S. does not discriminate between high- and low-risk customers. The average sales to the riskiest nations are higher than those to the least risky nations. Due to the lack of discrimination, these recipient governments have used their U.S. weapons to promote oppression, commit human rights abuses, and perpetuate bloody civil wars.

A result of the lack of discrimination in arms sale is blowback: U.S. troops and their allies have faced U.S.-made weapons in almost every military engagement since the end of the Cold War, including in Panama, Haiti, Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Syria.

Arms sales do not just affect the recipient nation; they also affect and can destabilize the local balance of power, often causing ripple effects throughout the region.

The report recommends the U.S. should reorient its arms sales policy to ensure that sales provide strategic benefits and to avoid producing negative unintended consequences. At a practical level, arms sales must be reduced dramatically, especially to nations with high risk factors

The report made several recommendations, including that “the president should issue a new Presidential Policy Directive reorienting U.S. arms sales policy so that the new default policy is “no sale.” The only circumstances in which the United States should sell or transfer arms to another country are when three conditions are met: (1) there is a direct threat to American national security; (2) there is no other way to confront that threat other than arming another country; and (3) the United States is the only potential supplier of the necessary weapons.”

Other (Non-state-to-state arms sales) –

The latest Issue Brief from the Small Arms Survey—Dribs and Drabs: The Mechanics of Small Arms Trafficking from the United States—analyses a side of the arms trade that is less flashy, less centralized, and even more difficult to stop. It reviews the modes of transport, concealment methods, and smuggling techniques employed by arms traffickers in the U.S. The brief finds strong arms export licensing regimes are necessary but not sufficient for stopping small arms trafficking. “The illicit trade in parts and accessories for small arms is more significant than commonly assumed. Networks that traffic in firearms parts are among the most prolific and geographically expansive of the smuggling operations studied.”

The U.S. is the largest producer of small arms in the world, with more than half of the world’s producers based in the U.S. Many arms traffickers buy relatively inexpensive firearms in the U.S. and resell them on the black market abroad because the penalties are relatively light compared with the penalties for smuggling drugs – and the profit margin is high. Arms brokers bypass regulatory norms and facilitate weapons transfers from states to non-state actors and buyers who could not otherwise obtain them.

The rate of U.S. firearms flowing into Central America, particularly the northern triangle countries of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, constitutes a major regional security problem.

The United States is one of three countries that have not ratified the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA). The Convention requires parties to criminalize the illegal manufacture, import, or export of high-powered weapons. It also provides for information exchange and cooperation on initiatives including the marking and tracing of weapons and the identification of criminal transit routes. President Bill Clinton signed CIFTA in 1997 and submitted it for ratification to the Senate, but the Senate failed to act. Twenty-nine countries in the Western Hemisphere have ratified CIFTA.

Just as importantly, the U.S. voted in favor of the United Nations’ Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in April 2013, and it has signed, but not yet ratified the treaty. 93 states participate, including 22 Latin American and Caribbean countries participate in the treaty. The landmark Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), regulating the international trade in conventional arms – from small arms to battle tanks, combat aircraft and warships – entered into force on December 24, 2014.

Strengthening U.S. gun control and participating in CIFTA and the UN Small Arms Treaty will offset widespread regional views that the U.S. remains indifferent to its own role in exacerbating one of Latin America’s most significant challenges.

U.S. Imposes Sanctions For Russian Cyber Interference with the 2016 U.S. Elections and Malicious Cyber-Attacks

March 18, 2018 by Bruce Zagaris Leave a Comment

On March 15, 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated five entities and 19 individuals under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) as well as Executive Order (E.O.) 13694, “Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities,” as amended, and codified pursuant to CAATSA.

Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin explained the new sanctions counter Russia’s continuing destabilizing activities, ranging from interference in the 2016 U.S. election to conducting destructive cyber-attacks, including the NotPetya attack, a cyber-attack attributed to the Russian military on February 15, 2018 in statements released by the White House and the British Government. Mnuchin said the cyber-attack was the most destructive and costly cyber-attack in history. The attack resulted in billions of dollars in damage across Europe, Asia, and the United States, and significantly disrupted global shipping, trade, and the production of medicines. Additionally, several hospitals in the United States were unable to create electronic records for more than a week.

Since at least March 2016, Russian government cyber actors allegedly have also targeted U.S. government entities and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors, including the energy, nuclear, commercial facilities, water, aviation, and critical manufacturing sectors. Indicators of compromise, and technical details on the tactics, techniques, and procedures, are provided in the recent technical alert issued by the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Administration has sanctioned more than 100 individuals and entities under our Ukraine and Russia-related sanctions authorities, including 21 individuals, nine entities, and 12 subsidiaries that are owned 50 percent or more by previously sanctioned Russian companies on January 26, 2018.

The current issue of the IELR will carry a more comprehensive article on the new sanctions.

U.S. Senate Holds Hearing on Beneficial Ownership: Fighting Illicit International Financial Networks Through Transparency

February 6, 2018 by Bruce Zagaris Leave a Comment

On February 6, 2018, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on “Beneficial Ownership: Fighting Illicit International Financial Networks Through Transparency.” The hearing and testimony are available on the Committee’s website. The hearing was the latest in a series of Congressional hearings on the issue of anonymous corporations.

Sen Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa and Chair of the Committee), opened the hearing by expressing his disappointment that no Treasury witness has appeared despite the Committee’s invitation. He underscored that beneficial ownership is a huge problem, as confirmed by the Panama Papers and the Treasury’s 2015 Money Laundering Assessment report. On November 2017, Congress held a hearing on S.1241, the Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing, and Counterfeiting Act of 2017, concerning cross border money laundering.. Bad actors from all over the world have come to the U.S. as their financial safe haven Victor Bout, convicted of arms trafficking, used six shell companies in the U.S. to launder his money.

Kleptocracy is a threat to U.S. national security and that U.S. secrecy contributes to this. The asset forfeiture case, such as the one against Mr. Teodoro Obiang, the son of the President of Equatorial Guinea, illustrates the problem. Obiang agreed to relinquish $30 million in assets in settlement of the suit brought by DOJ.

The problem plays out in the purchase of U.S. real estate, where shell companies are used. Lawyers for kleptocrats are complicit as the Global Witness undercover sting, which was shown on Sixty Minutes, illustrates. Even the former President of the ABA participated.

Sheldon Whitehouse (D-Rhode Island and ranking minority member on the Committee, said the Panama and Paradise Papers show the wide use by criminals of money laundering. The U.S. is a facilitator and target. Fraudsters, kleptocrats, and tax cheats all use shell companies, which are used to own real estate and other assets secretly. It affects and warps the U.S. housing markets. The answer to shell companies is to require private U.S. companies to report and update beneficial ownership information of U.S. entities.

Testifying in support of S. 1454, the True Incorporation Transparency for Law Enforcement (TITLE) Act, the proposed legislation was Panel I – Mr. Kendall Day, Acting Assistant Attorney General and head of the Anti-Money Laundering and Asset Forfeiture Unit, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington , D.C.

Testifying in support of S. 1454 on Panel 2 were Mr. Gary Kalman, FACT Coalition, Washington , DC; and Mr. Chip Poncy, Financial Integrity Network, Washington, D.C. Poncy provided a ten-point plan to responding to the problem of anonymous companies. He called for a centralized data base with access to U.S. and other law enforcement agencies.

Mr. Brian O’Shea, Senior Director, Center For Capital Markets Competitiveness, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Washington, DC, testified that S. 1454 does not properly balance privacy and law enforcement requirements. It would subject small and medium businesses to excessive bureaucracy and unnecessary expense.

As Congress continues to hold hearings on entity transparency, two of the main bills are S.1454 and the Corporate Transparency Act (H.R.3089/S.1717). They both have similar definitions of beneficial ownership. Similarly, they both make the information easily available to law enforcement and financial institutions. Both bills make $40 million available to states for transitional costs from the Treasury and Justice Departments’ asset forfeiture funds.

Both bills exempt publicly-traded companies. Similarly, each bill also exempts companies that have a physical presence in the U.S., more than $5 million in annual revenues, and at least 20 employees in the U.S., so that it narrowly targets those shell entities most likely to be abused by money launderers. In the Q & A period, the rationale for the thresholds was discussed.

In the next issue of the IELR, the differences of the bill and the high points of the debate in the hearing will be discussed.

Treasury Issues CAATSA Reports on Russian Senior Foreign Political Figures and Oligarchs

January 30, 2018 by Bruce Zagaris Leave a Comment

On January 29, 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, pursuant to the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 (CAATSA), delivered five reports to the designated Congressional committees:

Sec. 241: Report on Senior Foreign Political Figures and Oligarchs in the Russian Federal;

Sec. 104(e): Report on Contributions to Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program:

Sec. 242: Report on Effects of Expanding Sanctions to Include Sovereign Debt and Derivative Products;

Sec. 273: Examining the Counter-Terror Financing Role of the Department of the Treasury in Embassies; and,

Sec. 311(d): Designation of Additional Persons Related to North Korea.

Section 241 of CAATSA required Treasury, in consultation with the Department of State and the Director of National Intelligence, to provide a report regarding senior political figures and oligarchs in the Russian Federation and Russian parastatal entities.

The names of senior political figures and oligarchs in the unclassified version of the report were selected based on objective criteria drawn from publicly available sources.

Senior political figures: The report included individuals who are: i) senior members of the Russian Presidential Administration; ii) members of the Russian Cabinet, Cabinet-rank ministers, and heads of other major executive agencies; iii) other senior political leaders, including the leadership of the State Duma and Federation Council, other members of the Russian Security Council, and senior executives at state-owned enterprises.
Oligarchs: The report included Russian individuals with an estimated net worth of $1 billion or more.
Parastatals: The report analyzed entities that are at least 25% owned by the Government of Russia and that had about $2 billion or more in revenues in 2016.

Treasury’s press release states the report is not a sanctions list. The inclusion of individuals or entities in any portion of the report does not impose sanctions on those individuals or entities. Nor does it create any other restrictions, prohibitions, or limitations on dealings with such persons by either U.S. or foreign persons. Treasury states that inclusion in the report does not constitute the determination by any agency that any of the individuals or entities meet the criteria for designation under the sanctions program.

The law is designed to punish Russia for its alleged interference in the 2016 U.S. elections and its actions in Ukraine.

The unclassified sections has 210 https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/30/politics/full-us-list-of-russian-oligarchs-with-putin-ties-intl/index.html names, 114 senior political figures and 96 oligarchs.

On Jan. 30, 2018, the Trump administration said it will not implement Russia-related sanctions mandated by Congress last year because the threat itself is acting as a “deterrent.”

Although inclusion on the so-called “Putin” list does not mean the persons have been sanctioned, the consequences are potentially significant; (1) financial institutions who subscribe to anti-money laundering and international enforcement watch lists will now encounter their names and some compliance officers will likely determine that the individuals are “high-risk” persons, requiring financial institutions to either close their accounts or pay enhanced due diligence; (2) some of the listed individuals may encounter problems when they travel internationally; and (3) some of the listed persons will likely have trouble doing business, because of the potential negative taint of doing business with listed persons, especially due to the risk that the may be sanctioned in the future.

A more comprehensive discussion will appear in the February issue of the IELR.

Use of Digital Currency to Evade U.S. Sanctions

January 5, 2018 by Bruce Zagaris 2 Comments

In the last month, the Venezuelan and Russian governments have discussed the use of digital currency to evade U.S. sanctions.

In particular, on December 3, 2017, Nicolas Maduro suggested the idea in a television speech. His plans are to create the Petro, which would be backed by Venezuela’s commodities (gold, oil, gas and diamond reserves) similar to the way gold has in the past supported the dollar.

Although the Russian government has expressed concern about the potential use of virtual currencies to commit crimes, more recently Russian President Vladimir Putin has indicated a willingness to explore the use of virtual currency to counteract U.S.. sanctions.

A recent book, Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies: A Comprehensive Introduction by Arvind Narayanan, Joseph Bonneau, Edward Felten, Andrew Miller & Steven Goldfeder, addresses fundamental questions about the pros and cons of using virtual currency. How does virtual currency operate? What makes it different? How secure is virtual currency? How anonymous are virtual currency users? What applications can we build using virtual currency (i.e., Bitcoin) as a platform? Can cryptocurrencies be regulated? If we were to design a new cryptocurrency today, what would we change? What might the future hold?

One obstacle for users of virtual currency involves ensuring that the payments are made without having to use a third party, such as a government agency. A purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial institution. Digital signatures provide part of the solution, but the main benefits are lost if a trusted third party (i.e., financial regulator) is still required to prevent double-spending.

Some experts have proposed a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer network.

A recent article has mapped the design space for numerous proposed modifications, providing comparative analyses for alternative consensus mechanisms, currency allocation mechanisms, computational puzzles, and key management tools.

The same article surveys anonymity issues in Bitcoin and provides an evaluation framework for analyzing a variety of privacy-enhancing proposal.

In addition, the article provides new insights on what we term disintermediation protocols, which absolve the need for trusted intermediaries in an interesting set of applications.

As governments and other persons seek to evade sanctions regimes and otherwise circumvent international treaties and national laws, governments and stakeholders in those regimes, laws, and treaties will also seek to regulate virtual currency and crack the anonymity in order to implement and enforce the treaties and laws.

The Latest on WannaCry: North Korea Decries Accusations; U.S. Comments on Marcus Hutchins’ Arrest

December 27, 2017 by Zarine Kharazian Leave a Comment

At a White House press briefing on December 19, 2017, President Donald Trump’s Homeland Security Advisor Tom Bossert publicly attributed the destructive WannaCry cyberattack to North Korea.

Over a period of several days in May 2017, the WannaCry ransomware crippled hundreds of thousands of personal and corporate computer networks in over 150 countries, until a UK computer security researcher, Marcus Hutchins, inadvertently discovered a “kill-switch” in the malware’s code that disabled the attack. Until Tuesday, the attack had not been publicly attributed to any particular state or non-state actor.

“After careful investigation, the United States is publicly attributing the massive WannaCry cyberattack to North Korea,” Bossert said during the briefing. “We do not make this allegation lightly. We do so with evidence, and we do so with partners.”

Bossert went on to praise corporate partners, in particular Microsoft and Facebook, for their role in disabling North Korean hacking and cyber operations directed towards the U.S. “Last week, Microsoft and Facebook and other major tech companies acted to disable a number of North Korean cyber exploits and disrupt their operations as the North Koreans were still infecting computers across the globe. They shut down accounts the North Korean regime hackers used to launch attacks and patched systems.”

Bossert then introduced Jeanette Manfra, Assistant Secretary for the Office of Cybersecurity for DHS. Bossert and Manfra went on to repeatedly stress the importance of public-private sector cooperation in cybersecurity matters. “In many ways, WannaCry was a defining moment and an inspiring one,” Manfra said. “It demonstrated the tireless commitment of our industry partners, a moment that showed how the government and private sector got it right; that our preparation, our investments in cybersecurity, keeping our systems up to date, and sharing information paid off.”

The Assistant Secretary also called for strengthening international cooperation with regards to cyber: “To prevent another attack like WannaCry, we are calling on all companies to commit to the collective defense of our nation. And this commitment does not end on our borders… it is only through international partnerships that the United States had time to prepare.”

On December 26, 2017, North Korea’s envoy in charge of U.S. affairs at the UN, Pak Song Il, demanded that the U.S. prove that the North Koreans were behind WannaCry. North Korea’s state-controlled media denounced the U.S.’s allegations as “reckless.”

Comments on the Recent Indictment of Marcus Hutchins

During the briefing, a reporter asked Bossert for comments on the recent DOJ indictment of Marcus Hutchins on unrelated computer fraud charges in early August. The DOJ has charged Hutchins for his alleged involvement of the Kronos banking Trojan, which experts believe was created in 2014 and distributed via the now-defunct cryptocurrency exchange AlphaBay. Hutchins is currently awaiting a court date, and has pleaded not guilty to the charges.

Bossert declined to comment on the ongoing criminal prosecution. He did acknowledge Hutchins’ role in disabling WannaCry, saying that “we… had a programmer that was sophisticated, that noticed a glitch in the malware, a kill-switch, and then acted to kill it. He took a risk, it worked, and it caused a lot of benefit. So we’ll give him that.”

Bossert did not give Hutchins all, or even most, of the credit, however. “[I]t wasn’t luck — it was preparation,” he clarified. [I]t was partnership with private companies, and so forth.”

Hutchins’ indictment had come as a shock to the cybersecurity community, which considered him somewhat of a hero for his role in disabling WannaCry. Immediately following his arrest, many of his colleagues took to Twitter to voice their skepticism of the charges. In September, however, Brian Krebs, an American investigative reporter and cybersecurity blogger, published an in-depth investigative piece titled, “Who is Marcus Hutchins” on his popular cybersecurity blog, KrebsonSecurity. In intricate detail, complete with screenshots of his process as well as a mindmap of his data points, Krebs excavates the dozens of online pseudonyms, email addresses, and posts in hacker forums linked to Hutchins’ early online accounts. He manages to link Hutchins to several online personas involved in selling malicious software on hacker forums.

International Cyber Operation Dismantles Andromeda Botnet

December 4, 2017 by Zarine Kharazian Leave a Comment

On Monday, Europol announced that, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in cooperation with several European government and private sector partners, had dismantled the Andromeda botnet, the longest-running botnet in existence.

What is a botnet?

The term “botnet” is a portmanteau of the words “robot” and “network.” A botnet is a network of connected computers infected with malware. Botnets allow malicious actors to remotely control a large network of infected computers. Whoever is in control of the botnet can remotely direct the infected computers to send spam emails and viruses, mine Bitcoins, and record sensitive information by downloading keyloggers.

Botnets are also often employed by cybercriminals to launch denial of service (DoS) attacks. DoS attacks result in an interruption in the target’s services, and the owner of the targeted website must often pay the attackers a fee, or comply with some other demand, to regain control of their site.

The Andromeda Malware

According to the Europol press release, the Andromeda malware was detected or blocked on an average of over one million machines each month. Discovered in 2011, this malware is modular and dynamic. It does not have one particular use, but rather, can be modified for many uses through freely-available modules that function as keyloggers, form grabbers, rootkits, etc. The malware is often used to remotely direct computers on the botnet to install additional malicious software. There are many different versions of Andromeda, and they use a variety of infection methods, among them illegal downloads, phishing campaigns, and malicious attachments.

Connection to the Avalanche Platform

Andromeda was infamously used in the Avalanche network, an international criminal infrastructure platform that was dismantled by an international cyber operation in November 2016. Avalanche was used to launch massive malware attacks across the globe, and caused an estimated EUR 6 million in damages to the online banking system in Germany alone. In addition, experts estimate the malware attacks conducted via Avalanche cost hundreds of millions of euros worldwide.

In the end, taking down Avalanche for good demanded close cooperation from the prosecutorial and investigative arms of 30 national governments. The collaborators used a method called sinkholing to ultimately disable the platform. Sinkholing involves redirecting traffic between infected computers to servers controlled by law enforcement authorities or a security company, usually by assuming the domains used by the criminals.

Information obtained during the Avalanche investigation was shared with the appropriate authorities via Europol during the Andromeda case. Andromeda was subject to 48 hours of sinkholing, during which authorities collected approximately 2 million unique victim IP addresses from 233 countries.

Law enforcement authorities have arrested a suspect in Belarus, but have yet to reveal the suspect’s identity.

Joint Spain-UK Transnational Operation Seizes 1.2 Tons of Cocaine; 5 Arrested

November 20, 2017 by Brendan Sakosits Leave a Comment

In a joint Spain-UK effort this month, Spanish national police made a massive 1.2 ton cocaine bust in Granada and Guipúzcoa, dismantling a transnational drug trafficking organization that Spanish national police described as “one of the most active in Europe.” The organization was based in both the UK and Spain.

The trafficking network operated by bringing large quantities of cocaine south from a location near the Basque coastal town of San Sebastian to Granada, before transporting the drugs in small quantities primarily to the UK, “where the average street price for a single gram is around £45.”

After a truck demonstrating abnormal behavior stopped to unload in Granada, police intervened, discovering 531 kilograms of cocaine hidden amongst legal cargo. Later, police unearthed an additional 678 kilos of cocaine that the organization had buried alongside a cannabis plantation less than 50 km’s from the French border, in Zarautz. They also discovered 35 gun cartridges, a list of undercover cops’ license plates, and nearly 5,500 Euros onsite. The operation resulted in the arrests of three British and two Spanish citizens.

While this drug seizure constitutes “one of the largest ever intercepted on Spanish soil,” it is certainly not the first joint Spain-UK international enforcement effort to shake the cocaine trade. As recently as May of this year, the two countries, in a joint operation with Europol criminal intelligence analysis, funding, and operational coordination support, detained 24 traffickers and seized 5.5 tons of cocaine onboard a merchant vessel in Ecuador—also bound for European markets. EU countries often coordinate and cooperate with one another on drug enforcement through transnational law enforcement agencies such as Europol. Focal Point (FP) Cola, Europol’s specialized team tackling cocaine trafficking specifically, has been facilitating such transnational cooperative drug enforcement efforts since 2001.

Europol’s role in this operation demonstrates its utility in the EU’s single-market economy. It will be interesting to watch how UK law enforcement’s relationship with the transnational enforcement agency evolves post-Brexit.

Sessions Declares MS-13 a ‘Priority Target’ and Links Gang to Opioid Crisis

October 27, 2017 by Madeline Henshaw-Greene 1 Comment

Attorney General Jeff Sessions delivered remarks to the International Association of Chiefs of Police on Monday, October 23, in which he announced that the Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13, gang would be elevated to priority status for the Department of Justice’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF). According to the DOJ, this move is the next step in “fulfilling President Trump’s goal of stamping out the brutal transnational crime organization”. During his remarks, Sessions repeatedly emphasized the significance of the threat that MS-13 poses to U.S. national security by equating the street gang with international drug cartels, who both he and the current administration have blamed for the current opioid epidemic.

By making MS-13 a priority target for the branch of law enforcement that deals with organized crime, Sessions is granting the OCDETF more power to use the law against drug crimes. This decision will provide the task forces with the ability to utilize the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), which in turn will widen the federal government’s scope for prosecution of the gang. It will also allow for further collaboration between several other agencies involved in fighting organized and drug-related crime, in particular the DEA and the FBI.

However, Sessions has drawn criticism for exaggerating the level of threat that MS-13 poses, particularly in the case of drug trafficking. In the DEA’s annual report on National Drug Threat Assessment, MS-13 represented only a small portion of illegal drug traffickers nationwide. Furthermore, while there has been an increase in violent crimes committed by members of MS-13 in certain cities, none of these incidents had anything to do with international drug trafficking, as Attorney General Sessions seemed to imply. Even in cases when drug trafficking has been attributed to MS-13, the charges typically amount to selling heroin at the street level, and are in no way similar to the type of crime that is usually attributed to an international drug cartel.

Furthermore, Sessions’ connection between MS-13 and the opioid epidemic seemed to raise eyebrows. Once again, the MS-13 plays little, if any, role in the sale of opioids, and even in cases of microtrafficking, the most common drugs involved are marijuana and cocaine. Some critics are concerned that this is an attempt to deflect blame from the federal government and pharmaceutical companies, who most agree are to blame for the current crisis. These new regulations may aid prosecutors in charging members of MS-13 in homicide cases, but it is difficult to see how a crackdown on a street gang will have a significant effect on resolving the opioid crisis.