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Trump Administration Indicts Venezuela’s Leader, Nicolás Maduro, on Narcoterrorism charges

March 27, 2020 by Alexandra Haris Leave a Comment

On Thursday, March 26, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that it indicted Nicolás Maduro and several of his aids on drug-trafficking and international cocaine trafficking conspiracy charges.

The DOJ accused the group of “conspiring with Colombian rebels to flood the United States with cocaine.” Additionally, the department estimated that the conspired routes carried between 200 and 250 tons of cocaine from Venezuela – an amount that equates to 30 million lethal doses.

Coinciding with the indictment, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that under the Narcotics Rewards Program, the government would offer rewards up to $55 million (up to $15 million for Maduro and up to $10 million for each of the others) for any information. The Narcotics Rewards Program has been operating since 1986 and has paid more than $130 million to informants regarding around 75 drug traffickers.

Pompeo said in a statement, “While holding key positions in the Maduro regime, these individuals violated the public trust by facilitating shipments of narcotics from Venezuela, including control over planes that leave from a Venezuelan air base, as well as control of drug routes through the ports in Venezuela.”

The indictment has been making headlines as these actions against a head of state are very rare and an apparent effort from the Trump administration to pressure Maduro to leave office.

Maduro is currently the leader of Venezuela, but after his disputed re-election in 2018, the U.S. government recognized his opponent, Juan Guaidó, as the official president. However, Maduro has refused to step down and Guaidó has been unable to acquire power, leaving both men claiming to be president.

Attorney General William P. Barr spoke on the matter on Thursday and mentioned that he believes Maduro’s administration is “plagued by criminality and corruption,” and that the DOJ aimed to eliminate “the extensive corruption within the Venezuelan government.” He further said that this was not an unprecedented move as the DOJ was not indicting a head of state, since the U.S. does not recognize Maduro as such.

However, Maduro responded to the indictment with condemnation, accusing Trump of being a “racist cowboy” and accusing the U.S. and Colombia of trying to “fill Venezuela with violence.” He also responded that he is ready to fight by whatever means necessary should the U.S. invade.

The indictment comes after years of U.S. investigators collecting evidence against these Venezuelan offices. Barr began to listen to colleagues, such as Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL), and further prioritized these investigations. By March 16, 2020, the indictment was ready to be unsealed and announced, but was delayed until the 26^th due to COVID-19.

The Impact

It remains unclear how the impact of the indictment will play out, but there is speculation of a few directions the repercussions could go.

On one hand, analysts say this could boost Trump’s chances of being re-elected in the fall as his support in Florida, a key swing state, may increase. Trump won Florida in 2016 by a thin margin and it is a state where many Venezuelans, Cubans, and Nicaraguans go when they flee their authoritarian regimes.

On another hand, the action could backfire on the Trump administration. Currently, much of the world supports the U.S. government in its recognition of Guaidó as Venezuela’s president. However, the indictment could fragment the coalition behind Trump if European and Latin American allies think his administration is overreaching. Heads of state normally enjoy immunity from U.S. prosecution, and even if the U.S. does not recognize Maduro as one, he is still the de facto president.

Another unclear matter is whether or not the U.S. will seek to extradite Maduro, who remains in Venezuela. When asked, Barr declined to comment. Barr also declined to say whether he directly notified Trump or if the State Department had spoken to Guaidó about the charges.

One thing is for sure, however; given this is a fresh matter with massive global speculation, there will be more information in the coming weeks.

U.S. Appropriations Bill Carries More Sanctions and Asset Recovery on the Maduro Regime

December 17, 2019 by Bruce Zagaris Leave a Comment

By Bruce Zagaris and Dale Eppler

The House-Senate Appropriations bill, which is expected to pass this week, has several provisions on Venezuela (at around page 1270 in the 1783 page text), including a new requirements on asset recovery and coordination of economic sanctions with other countries. In April, Senator Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) introduced the “Venezuela Emergency Relief, Democracy Assistance, and Development (VERDAD) Act of 2019 with broad bipartisan support. It directs a new strategy for Venezuela in coordination with Congress, and earmarks substantial funds to support it. We understand there also were very high level meetings in the Executive branch during the past week on Venezuela but, thus far, no word from the White House on any change in the direction of U.S. policy.

The language in the bill is as follows:

Subtitle E—Supporting the 8 Reconstruction of Venezuela

SEC. 151. RECOVERING ASSETS STOLEN FROM THE VENEZUELAN PEOPLE.

(a) RECOVERING ASSETS. —The President, acting through the Secretary of State and in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall advance a coordinated international effort—

(1) to work with foreign governments—

(A) to share financial investigations intelligence, as appropriate;

(B) to block the assets identified pursuant to paragraph (2); and

(C) to provide technical assistance to help governments establish the necessary legal framework to carry out asset forfeitures; and

(2) to carry out special financial investigations to identify and track assets taken from the people and institutions of Venezuela through theft, corruption, money laundering, or other illicit means.

(b) STRATEGY REQUIREMENT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President, acting through the Secretary of State and in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit a strategy for carrying out the activities described in subsection (a) to Congress.

(2) ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall—

(A) assess whether the United States or another member of the international community should establish a managed fund to hold the assets identified pursuant to subsection (a)(2) that could be returned to a future democratic government in Venezuela; and

(B) include such recommendations as the President and the Secretary of State consider appropriate for legislative or administrative action in the United States that would be needed to establish and manage the fund described in subparagraph (A).

Subtitle F—Restoring the Rule of Law in Venezuela

SEC. 161. DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING A COORDINATED SANCTIONS STRATEGY WITH PARTNERS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE AND THE EUROPEAN UNION.

(a) STRENGTHENING SANCTIONS CAPACITY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall offer to provide technical assistance to partner governments in Latin America and the Caribbean to assist such governments in establishing the legislative and regulatory frameworks needed to impose targeted sanctions on officials of the Maduro regime who—

(1) are responsible for human rights abuses;

(2) have engaged in public corruption; or

(3) are undermining democratic institutions and 18 processes in Venezuela.

(b) COORDINATING INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS.

— The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall engage in diplomatic efforts with partner governments, including the Government of Canada, governments in the European Union, and governments in Latin America and the Caribbean, to impose targeted sanctions on the Maduro regime officials described in subsection (a).

(c) STRATEGY REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit a strategy for carrying out the activities described in subsection (a) to: (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; (2) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; (3) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; (5) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and (6) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

It is not clear yet how the executive branch, working with Congress, will implement the proposed sanctions and asset recovery program. We expect Treasury and State will lead the coordination with other governments. Presumably, the U.S. and its partners will furnish technical assistance to smaller jurisdictions in the region that are willing to help them find, freeze, and even forfeit assets that are the proceeds of crime. Until now, one potential challenge is that some small jurisdictions, especially those that have maintained friendly relations with Chavez and Maduro, and that benefited from PetroCaribe, do not want to take steps inimical to the Maduro regime. Another problem is that governments are much better at freezing accounts than they are at identifying and tracking the proceeds of corruption.

The next issue of the IELR will have a more comprehensive discussion of the provisions.

Spain’s High Court Denies U.S. Extradition Request for ex-Venezuelan General

September 19, 2019 by Alexandra Haris Leave a Comment

On Monday, September 16, Spain’s National Court rejected the United States’ extradition request of Venezuela’s previous head of military intelligence, General Hugo Armando Carvajal, instead ordering for his release by the end of the day. Carvajal, also known as “El Pollo” (the Chicken), had been held in provisional detention since he was arrested in mid-April in Madrid.

The U.S. requested extradition of Carvajal on the grounds of drug trafficking charges. In its response rejecting the request, Spain cited his previous denials to drug trafficking and claimed it found the U.S. prosecutors’ to be politically motivated. Another problem, Spanish officials explained, was that the extradition request failed to name any ‘concrete and precise’ crimes he may have committed that would justify his extradition.

Carvajal, himself, stood in the courtroom told the judges, “I am here because the United States knew I was coming, I advised Spanish authorities that I was coming. I haven’t been hiding from anyone.” His goal was to, once again, deny wrongdoing.

Carvajal’s lawyers further defended him. They told the Court the U.S. sought extradition in order to obtain the information Carvajal possesses on Venezuela’s armed forces so the U.S. could have a better chance of bringing down the current Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. His attorneys also claimed that any contact Carvajal had with drug trafficking rebels was under an order from the president and with approval of Colombian authorities as part of the process to reach a peace deal that was signed in 2016.

As a result of Carvajal’s lawyers arguments, the Court determined Carvajal had, in fact, been following orders and if he were guilty of any crimes because of this matter then they would be classified as military crimes. However, Spanish law dictates that those who are accused of military crimes may not be extradited. In the end, the Spanish government has the final say on extraditions, but it tends to follow whatever is ruled by the court.

It is interesting to note that Spanish officials seemingly attempted to take advantage of Carvajal’s intel – the exact matter they accused the U.S. of doing with their extradition request. According to Carvajal’s lawyer, Ismael Oliver Romer, “The [Spanish] authorities made an offer [to gather information from Carvajal], but seeing that he had no valuable information, they did not go down that road. Everything he knows is already out there.”

For Carvajal, Spain’s decision is a massive relief. He recently became a target for the Venezuelan government, even though he worked for Venezuela’s military intelligence agency for more than a decade and was a close aide to Hugo Chavez. In February 2019, he publically supported Juan Guaido as Venezuela’s acting president, in turn opposing Maduro’s administration, which resulted in his rank being stripped away. This was a chilling event for Maduro, who saw Carvajal’s defection as possible encouragement for other military members to abandon him. Maduro was especially worried because the Venezuelan military have largely remained loyal to him.

Given the significance Maduro placed on Carvajal’s positioning against him, Carvajal no longer felt safe and he fled the country. He first took a boat to the Dominican Republic, and then relocated to Spain. He was initially welcomed in the country but authorities later arrested him after the U.S. issued a request for his extradition.

The extradition request is one of many efforts the United States has made to bring Carvajal to the country for trial. In fact, the U.S. Department of Treasury has sought Carvajal for years on the grounds that he is suspected of providing support to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebels’ drug trafficking efforts, with prosecutors labeling him as a ‘narcoterrorist.’ Investigators with the Drug Enforcement Agency say he used his position to coordinate the smuggling of more than five tons of cocaine that was destined to the U.S. from Venezuela. In order to do this, he allegedly used weapons and helped protect Colombian guerrillas. U.S. prosecutors indicted Carvajal in 2011 and if he were to be brought to the U.S. for trial, he could face between 10 years to life in prison.

In 2014, the Treasury Department came close to obtaining Carvajal when he was arrested in Aruba on another drug warrant. However, to the U.S.’ disappointment, the island’s authorities rejected extradition to the U.S. and sent him back to Caracas. This latest decision by Spain is another blow to the America’s mission to try the former general in the American legal system.

It is unclear what lies ahead of Carvajal following the Spain National Court’s decision, but for the moment he will remain in the country with his wife and children.

U.S. Imposes Sanctions in Effort to Curb Flow of Fentanyl from China

September 5, 2019 by Alexandra Haris Leave a Comment

On August 21, United States Department of Treasury imposed financial sanctions on three Chinese nationals and two companies accused of producing and shipping fentanyl, a deadly synthetic opioid, to the U.S.

The sanctioned nationals include Guanhua Zheng, 63, and Fuijing Zheng, 36, a father and son indicted in Ohio last year on charges of producing and smuggling fentanyl and fentanyl-related substances. The third man, Xiaobing Yan, 42, was linked to similar charges in Mississippi in 2017. The two companies were identified as Qinsheng Pharmaceutical Technology and the Zheng Drug Trafficking Organization, both of which are based in Shanghai.

The Under Secretary of the Treasury Department, Sigal Mandelker, claims their trafficking operations are “directly contributing” to the crisis of opioid addiction, overdoses, and deaths in the U.S. Mandelker also explained to reporters that the Zhengs and Yan shipped hundreds of packages of Fentanyl to the U.S., targeting their customers through online advertising and using commercial mail services to smuggle the deadly substance.

Since the indictments of the three nationals, the U.S. has pressured China to arrest them but they all, along with five other Chinese citizens indicted in the U.S. for fentanyl trafficking, remain free. This catalyzed the U.S. Treasury Department’s decision to identify the nationals as significant foreign narcotics traffickers pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (the “Kingpin Act”), creating legitimate grounds for imposing sanctions.

This act enables anyone who is identified as a significant foreign narcotics trafficker to be placed under a law that freezes any property they control within the U.S. and bars American citizens from doing business with those properties. Additionally, the men face penalties ranging from civil fines up to $1.1 million per violation.

Along with these sanctions, the Foreign Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued an advisory to financial institutions about financial schemes related to the trafficking of these synthetic opioids. The goal is to equip these institutions with sufficient information to assist them in detecting and reporting criminal activity.

White House counselor Kellyanne Conway expressed the administration would “continue to name and shame and prosecute and punish people who are peddling their poison into our kids and into our communities. Meanwhile, U.S. officials point to China as the main source of fentanyl and fentanyl-related substances and claim the substances are primarily entering the country from China via international mail.

China’s foreign ministry spokesman, Geng Shuang, responded to the sanctions on August 22, telling reporters in Beijing that the country’s government and the U.S. were cooperating on the anti-narcotics “front,” and had communicated on specific cases, although he declined to elaborate on specifics.

The two countries appear to have been working together on the issue since November 2018, when Xi made a pledge to Trump to take action as part of trade negotiations. A few months later, on May 1, Beijing announced the expansion of state controls to include the 1,400 known fentanyl-related substances, and new ones developed in the future. This move designated all of these substances as illegal.

Coincidentally, the sanctions come three weeks after President Trump took to Twitter to accuse Chinese President Xi Jinping of revoking its promise to stem the flood of fentanyl into the U.S. China responded to the accusation, labeling it as “blatant slander” and claiming authorities have made “unprecedented efforts” to address the country’s illicit fentanyl production and trafficking.

The Trump administration’s urgency to address the Chinese fentanyl trade is part of the government’s attempt to thwart the rampant opioid crisis plaguing the U.S. While there are a range of opioids contributing to the crisis, the presence of synthetic opioids, such as fentanyl, is rapidly increasing due to its ease of synthetization and affordability. Fentanyl, responsible for more than 30 percent of opioid overdoses, is so potent that it is 50 times stronger than heroin and just two milligrams, equivalent to a few grains of sand, can lead to death. The substance can be traced to the deaths of thousands of Americans, including the likes of Prince, Tom Petty, and Mac Miller.

U.S. authorities are continually trying to crack down on drug rings that are trafficking the substance. Most recently, on August 31, law enforcement officials busted a lab in Virginia linked to a multi-state drug ring and seized enough fentanyl from the Shanghai-based vendor to kill 14 million people. The vendor had mailed the fentanyl through the U.S. Postal Service.

Amidst this crisis and the clear tension between the U.S. and China over how it is being handled, is the ongoing trade war between the two countries. It is unknown whether or not the recent sanctions from the Treasury Department will have an impact on Beijing. Some experts believe any crackdown by Beijing on the production and trafficking of opioids will depend on meaningful progress toward resolving trade war. However, implications will soon become clearer. On September 5, the countries announced they will resume trade talks in early October with “good negotiating conditions.”

FinCEN Starts Global Investigations Division

August 29, 2019 by Bruce Zagaris Leave a Comment

On August 28, 2019, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) announced the start of its Global Investigations Division (GID), which will have responsibility to implement targeted investigation strategies based on FinCEN’s unique authorities under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) to combat illicit finance threats and related crimes, both domestically and internationally.[

FinCEN Director Kenneth A. Blanco announced that Matthew Stiglitz, a former Principal Deputy Chief in the United States Department of Justice’s Criminal Division with 24 years as a state and Federal prosecutor, will head GID.

According to the press release, GID will leverage FinCEN’s BSA authorities, including Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, to investigate and target terrorist finance and money laundering threats. GID will work more closely with foreign counterparts to coordinate actions against such threats when appropriate.

Before the creation of GID, the former Office of Special Measures (OSM), which was previously a part of FinCEN’s Enforcement Division, provided the investigative resources. In recent years FinCEN’s strategic use of its Section 311 authority as well as its other information collection authorities, such as the geographic targeting order and foreign financial agency regulation authorities, have significantly grown in recent years. Now FinCEN will have one division that concentrates on achieving these goals.

GID will use FinCEN’s authorities to detect and deter a broad range of potential threats to the United States national security and financial system, including ones that are connected to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, rogue state actors, transnational organized crime, international narcotics trafficking, and terrorism.

Just at the end of August, FinCEN and OFAC have focused on Dominican Republic narcotics kingpins and Chinese importers of fentanyl. In addition, FinCEN has issued an advisory to financial institutions on illicit financial schemes and methods related to the trafficking of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids.

FinCEN is focused on stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially as North Korea and Iran.

Until now, FinCEN has utilized its power to designate foreign financial institutions as being “of primary money laundering concern” judiciously. However, when banks and financial institutions in the European Union countries of Latvia, Cyprus, and Andorra, have been involved in illicit finance threat activities, FinCEN has investigated and subjected them to Sec. 311 while the EU has not had the capacity to act.

The increase of FinCEN international authority comes at a time when the OECD has downgraded the U.S. on exchange of information, transparency of entity, and regulation of gatekeepers. The downgrades have diminished the capacity of the U.S. Department of Justice and Treasury to respond to foreign requests. In addition, the increased capacity of FinCEN’s international authority occurs at a time of disengagement by the United States government with the United Nations, the G7 and G20. However, since the press release states GID “will work more closely with foreign counterparts to coordinate actions against such threats when appropriate,” foreign law enforcement authorities and international organizations will certainly welcome such an outreach, although some may wonder and test the condition of “when appropriate”.

Former-MLB Players’ Alleged Involvement in Drug Trafficking Ring Brings Attention to OFAC’s Kingpin Act

August 28, 2019 by Alexandra Haris 1 Comment

On Tuesday, August 20, two ex-Major League Baseball (MLB) players, Octavio Dotel and Luis Castillo, and 16 others were accused of being linked to a criminal network in the Dominican Republic to smuggle drugs from South America to the United States. Authorities arrested Dotel and cited Castillo for their involvement.

The authorities who made these arrests are attempting to close in on a notorious drug-trafficking and money-laundering ring lead by kingpin César Emilio Peralta, also known as “César El Abusador.” According to prosecutors, this operation, which involves hundreds of narcotics agents, prosecutors, and other government officials, could be the largest targeting of organized crime in the Dominican Republic’s history. In addition, the country’s attorney general, Jean Alain Rodríguez, labeled the dismantlement of Peralta’s network as “the most important drug trafficking structure in the region.”

The charges of the former MLB players remain unclear, but Rodríguez indicated during a press conference that Peralta utilized them as a means to launder money with a “complicated corporate framework to disguise the origin of his fortune, also using numerous individuals belonging to his family and social circle to hide his assets.” During the press conference, Rodríguez also explained that the players are collaborating with the U.S.’ investigation and are exchanging information with the Federal Bureau of Information (FBI) and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Coincidentally, their alleged connections were announced two months after another Dominican MLB player, David Ortiz, was accidentally shot.

Prior to their present-day situation, Dotel and Castillo experienced fruitful baseball careers. Dotel earned $41.1 million during a 15-year pitching career for the MLB and, before retiring in 2013, he went to the World Series twice. He set a record for playing on more teams than any other player, at a total of 13 teams. Castillo made $56.8 million during his career as an infielder from 1996-2011 and was a three-time All-Star, acquired three Gold Gloves, and won the 2003 World Series with the Florida Marlins. Citing his success, Castillo denied his involvement on Twitter writing, “The truth is my country no longer works, my God, do you think that after making millions of dollars in Baseball I am going to dirty my hands with drugs?”

Shortly after Dotel’s arrest and Castillo’s alleged involvement was announced, the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) got involved by identifying Peralta and his organization as “significant narcotics traffickers” pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (the “Kingpin Act”). As a result, all assets in which Peralta’s organization and members have an interest in the U.S. or in the possession of the U.S. will be blocked and must be reported to OFAC. According to the Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Sigal Mandelker, “Treasury is targeting these Dominican drug kingpins, their front persons, and the nightclubs they have used to launder money and traffic women…This administration continues to systematically target strategically important drug kingpins and cartels fueling our country’s opioid epidemic.”

Since OFAC issued the Kingpin Act, more than 2,100 entities and individuals—namely the Sinaloa Cartel, previously led by kingpin Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzman—have been named pursuant to the Kingpin Act for their role in international narcotics trafficking. The act became law in December 1999 with the intent to deny international narcotics traffickers access to the U.S. financial system and to prohibit trade between the traffickers and the U.S. As listed in Section 805(b) of the law, this denial is authorized when the President determines that a person or entity plays a significant role in international narcotics trafficking. The law was modeled after Executive Order 12978, which was issued in 1995. This order became an effective sanctions program against the Colombian drug cartels.

In order to implement the Kingpin Act, the U.S. Department of Treasury must identify drug kingpins as “significant narcotics traffickers,” and suggest the President impose sanctions on them. Not only may these sanctions target the kingpins themselves, but they can also include their businesses and, as is seen in the present case of Peralta’s organization, their operatives. Individuals who violate the Kingpin Act may face up to 10 years in prison and/or fines pursuant to Title 18 of the U.S. Code. Furthermore, officers, directors, and agents who knowingly participate in a violation of the act can be penalized up to $5 million in fines and/or up to 30 years in prison.

Since the Kingpin Act became law, there have been outspoken proponents and opponents of the law. The former head of the Office of Financial Operations at the DEA, Donald Semeski Jr., said the act has been “tremendously effective” in protecting the U.S. from the “scourge” of illegal drugs. Contrarily, Eric Olson, the deputy director of the Wilson Center’s Latin American Program, said the use of the Kingpin List, while “powerful and legitimate”, “carries with it the risk of collateral damage that can potentially undermine legitimate sectors of the financial system and ultimately the economy.” Olson cited the case of the Rosenthal family and their money-laundering network in Honduras as support for his claim. The family was sanctioned by the U.S. Department of Treasury in 2015, which undeniably hurt their criminal network but, as a result, created sentiments of uncertainly among the U.S. clients and employees of the family’s legitimate businesses.

Another critique of the Kingpin Act is the lack of due process for the sanctioned entities and individuals. Semesky claimed the process for adding names to the Kingpin List is thorough, but did admit to errors in the past. For example, in 2017, the U.S. had to withdraw more than 20 Latin American entities from the list after they successfully argued they were wrongfully sanctioned. In addition, it can sometimes be difficult for American individuals and organizations to determine if they are dealing with a blocked entity since most small U.S. businesses do not have the resources to uncover this information. Former U.S. federal prosecutor David Hall argued that “placing the burden on these businesses is not fair or practical.”

Now, 17 years after the implementation of the Kingpin Act, suggestions are pouring in over improving evaluation of the act’s effectiveness and commissioning a comprehensive review of the pros and cons of the Kingpin List’s sanctions. It is unknown if OFAC plans to make any amendments to the law, but it is clear that the office will continue to pursue Peralta’s operation and similar drug trafficking organizations.

UN Resolution Takes Steps to Hold Duterte Accountable for Extrajudicial Killings Connected with Antidrug Campaign

July 29, 2019 by Alexandra Haris Leave a Comment

Earlier this month, the United Nations’ 47-member Human Rights Council voted to examine the alleged extrajudicial killings connected with President Rodrigo Duterte’s antidrug campaign.

On July 12, 2019, Iceland proposed a resolution backed by 18 countries, which 14 opposed and 15 others abstained. The purpose was not to incite a commission of inquiry, but to call upon UN human rights chief, Michelle Bachelet, to prepare a report by July 2020 to ensure tougher follow-up action if the abuses continue. Some of these alleged abuses include killings, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests, and persecution of activists, journalists, and lawyers. The goal is to hold the Philippines accountable for their actions and send a message that they have not gone unnoticed. The Philippines reacted by denouncing the initiative as something “straight from the mouth of the queen in Alice in Wonderland,” and lobbied against it, citing an abuse of procedures and a poor use of resources.

This is not the first time the UN has weighed in on the violence occurring in the Philippines. One month ago, on June 7, 2019, UN human rights experts called for the organization to open an investigation into the country’s human rights violations. For support, the experts referred to the rapid increase in these violations toward people and institutions in the nation. Furthermore, since the inception of the antidrug campaign three years ago, 11 special rapporteurs brought this topic to the UN more than one dozen times.

A plethora of sources alluding to the violence taking place in the Philippines warrants the UN experts’ concerns and actions. One of the most recent alleged atrocities, and arguably the catalyst for Iceland’s resolution, was the death of 3-year-old Myca Ulpina in late June. Ulpina died during a police raid targeting her father who used her as a “human shield”. This is one of 6,600 deaths acknowledged by the Philippine government since the war against drugs began. However, the UN estimates this number to be approximately five times higher. A noticeable characteristic of these deaths is that they occur mostly in impoverished areas. This trend has led to devastation within poor communities as sole breadwinners continue to die, leaving their families with immense financial burdens they cannot pay off.

According to Amnesty International, a reason for the excess in human rights violations is that the campaign is liberal in its accusations. All it takes to be murdered or arrested is an unproven allegation that someone uses, buys, or sells drugs. Outside of the country, the government consistently practices intimidation to quell concerns. Even Duterte has publically bullied human rights defenders, UN experts, and Supreme Court justices. One of his most extreme cases took place when he threatened to bomb the schools of the Lumad indigenous peoples on Mindanao Island.

These tactics are no surprise to the international community, as the Duterte administration has continuously clashed with other states since rising to power. Most recently, the government exercised its disdain of international critique by withdrawing from the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC is the world’s only permanent war crimes tribunal and has pledged to continue to investigate the Philippines alleged killings. Although Duterte claimed the court “can never acquire jurisdiction over my person, not in a million years”, the case can and will still be examined through March 2020.

These trends – increased violence in the Philippines, as well as Duterte’s decision to leave the ICC – reveal the administration’s disregard for the rule of law and draw an eerie parallel to the current dynamics of the U.S. executive branch. From Duterte’s crude and controversial comments to his threats and bribes, he is continuously displaying apathy for the standards of law and government.

Meanwhile, President Trump consistently lauds Duterte on his actions, making it difficult not to draw a connection between the two. Trump may not be as extreme as Duterte on disregarding the law, but he has shown tendencies to lash out when he is questioned or critiqued (i.e. ousting multiple cabinet members, aggressively ranting on Twitter, ridiculing opposing politicians, etc.). Fortunately, it is unlikely the U.S. could be in a situation like the Philippines as the country is centered on relatively strong and established democratic institutions. However, it is important to look at the aforementioned leaders as examples of what can happen when an administration places their own needs and ego above their nation.

Court Sentences El Chapo to Life as Prosecutors Seek to Strip Him of His Wealth

July 24, 2019 by Alex Psilakis Leave a Comment

Months after the guilty verdict against him, there have been a number of developments in the case of Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman.

On July 17, 2019, Judge Brian Cogan sentenced El Chapo to life in prison on 10 counts of crimes, including narcotics trafficking and money laundering, as well as crimes related to murder. Though the life sentence was mandatory, prosecutors pushed for the federal judge to add 30 years to his sentence. There is no possibility of parole. U.S. law enforcement authorities did not pursue the death penalty for El Chapo because, as part of the extradition terms agreed to with Mexico, they pledged not to.

This sentencing comes in light of complaints made by El Chapo’s attorneys on the trial itself. Soon after El Chapo’s conviction, his defense team argued that multiple members of the jury violated the judge’s orders by reading outside, non-court-related sources on the trial while they were serving. “Up to five jurors broke the law,” said Jeffrey Lichtman, El Chapo’s defense attorney, “violated the law while they were judging Mr. Guzman for crimes.” While El Chapo’s defense has called for a fresh trial to investigate these allegations of juror misconduct, Judge Cogan has displayed little interest in moving forward on such an issue.

Lichtman went further with his frustrations, stating, “This case was simply an inquisition. It was a show trial, and how it ended is exactly perfect for that description.” El Chapo, he says, plans to appeal the ruling.

However, prosecutors did not end their case there. Alongside El Chapo’s sentence, they seek to strip him of his entire fortune. Reviewing profits that El Chapo obtained through the narcotics trade from the early 1990s to 2016, prosecutors estimated that his fortune ran above $12 billion. Specifically, El Chapo allegedly handled almost 600,000 kilos of cocaine, 200 kilos of heroine, and 420,000 kilos of marijuana. Cocaine brought in the largest profit by far, with authorities estimating that El Chapo earned $11 billion from his trade in the drug alone. Prosecutors, however, realized that it would be all but impossible to understand the total sum of narcotics that El Chapo traded in. As a result, they view these numbers as a “conservative” estimate.

Throughout his escapades, El Chapo proved a highly effective money launderer. He hid portions of his money in the banking system, as well as in an insurance company run by an associate, and in debit cards issued by a Columbian firm called Monodeaux. As a result, he spent lavishly, owning multiple yachts, as well as a private zoo packed with tigers and panthers. Yet even as they have identified how El Chapo laundered his assets, they have not confirmed that they know specifically where those assets are. Though trial testimony revealed that as much as $30 million may be stored in any number of Mexican houses and apartments, little more is publically known beyond that.

All of this appears visible progress in the global effort against the international narcotics trade. And it is. But only to a degree.

Since El Chapo’s arrest and extradition to the U.S., a power vacuum has emerged in Mexico, leaving immense violence in its wake. In their war against the cartels, the U.S. has pursued the so-called Kingpin Strategy, where authorities prioritize taking down cartel leaders to weaken the overall capacity of said cartel, limiting the traffic of drugs, and ultimately, the violence that cartels spawn. Yet the current level of violence crippling Mexico has climbed higher than when El Chapo remained in power. One cartel, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, for example, has sought to fill the former hegemonic role of the Sinaloa Cartel, fighting other cartels in the hope of controlling trade routes through Mexico into the U.S. Though authorities are less surprised that violence has resurged in former hotspots like Acapulco and Tijuana, its rise in the typically-quiet state of Colima has proven less predictable. As frustrated and cynical as authorities have become, they know that they must continue to pursue key figures like El Chapo, as refusing to do so would convey their impunity.

Whatever comes next in the case of El Chapo, the IELR will be there to monitor it.

U.S. Attorney General Announces Continued U.S. Funding of Law Enforcement Efforts at 3rd Ministerial of Northern Triangle Attorneys General, as Guatemala Prepares to Abolish Anti-Corruption Prosecutor

May 19, 2019 by Bruce Zagaris Leave a Comment

On May 16, 2019, U.S. Attorney General William P. Barr, during the 3^rd Ministerial of the Northern Triangle Attorneys General announced that, as part of a coordinated law enforcement action known as Operation Regional Shield,President Trump has approved continued funding for law enforcement efforts between the U.S. and the Northern Triangle countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras).

In particular Barr said the U.S. will continue fund law enforcement efforts, through the ongoing work of the project’s law enforcement efforts, through the continuing work of the U.S. Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training (OPDAT) Resident Legal Advisors in each of the three countries, through the FBI’s Transnational Anti-Gang teams, through the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Sensitive Investigative Units, and through Homeland Security’s (HSI) work to counter human smuggling and trafficking.

Barr said the meeting has reaffirmed his belief that the safety of the citizens of the U.S. and Northern Triangle is interdependent and together they will not only confront but will defeat the criminal gangs.

Inconsistency of U.S. Enforcement Policy with Northern Triangle Countries

In recent months the Trump Administration’s policy in terms of cooperation with the Northern Triangle has not been consistent. For instance, on March 28, 2019, then Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen M. Nielsen signed, on behalf of the United States, a Memorandum of Cooperation (MOC) on border security cooperation in Central America. Almost simultaneously, U.S. President Donald Trump said that he was planning on cutting U.S. assistance to the three countries and has threatened to close the border with Mexico.

The initiatives of the U.S. and other governments against transnational organized crime in Central America can be classified in eight areas: whole-of-government solutions; interdiction of criminal flows; targeting of transnational criminal organization leaders; use of the military in a domestic law enforcement; institutional reform within law enforcement; targeting the financial flows and resources of organized criminal groups; prison control and reform; and binational and multinational cooperation against organized crime. (See R. Evan Ellis, Transnational Organized Crime in Latin America and the Caribbean 103-4 (2018).

During his trip Barr highlighted DOJ priorities, including interdicting illegal narcotics, dismantling MS-13, the 18th Street Gang and other transnational criminal organizations, and combatting illegal migration and human trafficking. While in El Salvador, the Attorney General visited the International Law Enforcement Academy.

Effort of Guatemalan Morales Administration to End the Work of the International Commission against Impunty (CICIG)

One setback for the fight against anti-corruption is the effort by the current Guatemala Administration of Jimmy Morales to terminate the work of the International Commission against Impunty (CICIG), which the United Nations established to strength the efforts against organized crime and corruption after Guatemala’s 36-year civil war. See Elisabeth Malkin, Latin America Risks Losing Potential Weapon Against Corruption, N.Y. Times, May 19, 2009, at 10, col. 1.

On May 15, the Guatemala high court rejected the appeal of Thelma Aldana, a crusading former prosecutor, to participate in Guatemala’s presidential election. As a result, at least two of the top three candidates, according to polls, will not be able to run in the election. The decision on Aldana seemed to arise from fears over her zealous prosecutions of corruption in politics and business. Aldana has been denied the right to participate in the election because she lacked a document accrediting that she did not have any outstanding accounts after she was responsible for public funds during her serving as from her time as a former prosecutor.

The Trump Administration has not supported the CICIG, as prior U.S. Administrations have. As a result Morales’ announcement to not renew the CICIG’s two-year mandate in September 2019 and his denial of Ivan Velázquez, the Colombian head of the Commission, in September 2018, mean that, notwithstanding its strong record of prosecuting corruption and transnational organized crime, the lack of independent prosecutors in the Guatemalan government, and the importance of strong and independent prosecutors to better stabilize the security situation in Guatemala, the CICIG may well expire in September. Indeed the enormous security problems due to the proliferation of gangs, gun violence, and corruption fuel migration from Guatemala.

U.S. HSA Signs MOC on Border Security Cooperation with 3 Northern Triangle Countries

April 2, 2019 by Bruce Zagaris Leave a Comment

On March 28, 2019, Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen M. Nielsen signed on behalf of the United States a Memorandum of Cooperation (MOC) on border security cooperation in Central America.

HSA Secretary Nielsen met with Guatemalan Minister of Government Enrique Degenhart, Honduran Security Minister Julian Pacheco, and Salvadoran Minister of Justice and Public Security Mauricio Landaverde

The MOC – the first ever multilateral compact on border security – has the goal of improved synchronized cooperation between the countries to strengthen border security, prevent the formation of new migrant caravans, and address the root causes of the migration crisis through synchronized efforts and will include the following: human trafficking and smuggling; combating transnational criminal organizations and gangs; expanding information and intelligence sharing; and strengthening air, land, and maritime border security.

The signatories will pursue each of these focus areas through an array of agreed-upon initiatives. Technical working groups with representatives from each country will monitor the initiatives and ensure they are carried out expeditiously. The law enforcement groups will meet periodically throughout the year, with Secretary Nielsen and the Northern Triangle Ministers continuing to meet in the coming months to ensure continued momentum.

Secretary Nielsen expressed her gratitude for the continued collaboration and partnership of the three countries as they work to slow the increased irregular migration and develop a regional approach to addressing the ongoing humanitarian and security emergency at the southern border of the U.S.

Notwithstanding Secretary Nielsen’s expression of gratitude to the three governments, late on March 28, 2019, U.S. President Donald Trump notified Congress that it intends to reprogram $450 million in aid to the three countries and has already sent instructions to embassies in the region.

In 2016, after an increase of Central American children came to the Texas border, the Obama administration doubled aid to the region to approximately $750 million. The aid targets violence and insecurity as well as governance and corruption. Much of the aid is disbursed through U.S. civil society organizations.

The initiatives of the U.S. and other governments against transnational organized crime in Central America can be classified in eight areas: whole-of-government solutions; interdiction of criminal flows; targeting of transnational criminal organization leaders; use of the military in a domestic law enforcement; institutional reform within law enforcement; targeting the financial flows and resources of organized criminal groups; prison control and reform; and binational and multinational cooperation against organized crime. The MOC is a non-binding document that essentially entails a commitment to continue ongoing talks and cooperation efforts on security and law enforcement.

On March 31, 2019, President Trump threatened to close the border with Mexico, notwithstanding warnings that shutting the border would cause immediate economic damage on U.S. consumers and businesses while doing little to slow the flow of migrants into the U.S.⁵

Clearly cutting aid to the three Northern Triangle countries and shutting the border with Mexico would exacerbate the problem since the violence, insecurity and lack of opportunities in the three countries stimulate the demand to emigrate to the U.S. The lack of a comprehensive and bipartisan approach to immigration continues to deteriorate the U.S. institutions and processes by which the U.S. government is able to deal with the migration crisis. A key country in terms of its location and the similarity of its legal system with the three Northern Triangle countries is Mexico.

The current issue of the IELR will discuss these developments in more detail.

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[5] David J. Lynch, Maria Sacchetti and Joel Achenbach, Threat to close border is pressed, Wash. Post, Apr. 1, 2019, at A1, col. 3.