Archives for March 2022

INTERPOL Suspends Russia’s Ability to Make Diffusion Notices Directly and Deploys Team to Moldova While Ukraine Disconnects from INTERPOL Network

March 26, 2022 by Bruce Zagaris Leave a Comment

The conflict in Ukraine has had significant consequences in INTERPOL. Ukraine has disconnected from the INTERPOL network due to its fear of Russia’s misuse of INTERPOL’s channels. On March 10, INTERPOL announced that the Russian National Central Bureau (NCB) can no longer send diffusions directly. On March 25, 2022, INTERPOL announced that it deployed an Operational Support Team to Moldova in response to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

Suspension of Russia’s Right to Send Diffusions Directly

When an INTERPOL NCB wants to send a Red Notice, the NCB sends the request for a Red Notice to the INTERPOL Secretariat. The Secretariat must vet the request to ensure that it meets with the organization’s requirements. Once a Red Notice is approved, it is posted over the INTERPOL network. Such a Red Notice enables INTERPOL members to detain an individual against whom an INTERPOL Red Notice exists. However, INTERPOL points out that a decision by a member country whether to act on a request is exclusively at the discretion of the competent authorities.

A diffusion is less formal. An INTERPOL NCB can directly send diffusions. They are less formal and the Secretariat does not vet them. Nevertheless, many NCBs still detain individuals against whom there is a diffusion.

Since March 10, INTERPOL has required the Russian NCB to send all diffusions to the General Secretariat to be checked for compliance with INTERPOL’s Rules. Only if a diffusion is found compliant will the General Secretariat then disseminate it to member countries. This procedure is in addition to the General Secretariat’s current process of reviewing all Notice requests for compliance.

To prevent any potential misuse of INTERPOL’s channels with respect to the targeting of individuals within or beyond the conflict in Ukraine, the Secretary General with the endorsement of the Executive Committee has increased supervision and monitoring measures in relation to Russia.

INTERPOL has announced that the Secretary General may take additional measures on an urgent basis if the need arises.

INTERPOL Rejects Calls to Suspend or Expel Russia

INTERPOL has issued a statement that Article 2 of its Constitution requires it to maintain police cooperation and ensure communication channels remain open. INTERPOL’s mandate does not include the issuance of sanctions or the imposition of punitive measures. Additionally, no provisions allow for the suspension or exclusion of a member country. As a result, INTERPOL rejects calls as the political level to suspend or exclude Russia from the INTERPOL network.

INTERPOL reiterates that its Constitution strictly forbids it from undertaking any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character.

On March 1, Fair Trials observed that Russia has abused INTERPOL Red Notices and Diffusions to intimidate and threaten critics overseas. Fair Trials joined Ukraine and the United Kingdom in calling for INTERPOL to revoke Russia’s membership in INTERPOL.

INTERPOL Deploys Team to Moldova

At the request of Moldova, on March 25, 2022, the INTERPOL General Secretariat deployed an Operational Support Team to Moldova. The mission is furnishing support to law enforcement and humanitarian agencies managing the large outflow of refugees entering the country from Ukraine.

The INTERPOL team will consult and cooperate with Moldova’s General Inspectorate of Police, the General Inspectorate of Border Police, and international organizations, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the UN International Children’s Emergency Fund and the International Organization for Migration in areas, such as human trafficking, migration and border management.

The INTERPOL’s mission comes within the framework of its cooperation with EU agencies EUBAM (The European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine), Europol and Frontex.

The INTERPOL team will furnish immediate field support to law enforcement and humanitarian organizations and help evaluate the situation on the ground, identifying needs in order to supply relevant training, analysis and operational support. The INTERPOL team will be based in Chisnau and different refugee camps hosting those who have recently fled Ukraine.

INTERPOL has received reports of human traffickers and smugglers waiting at various border control checkpoints to prey on vulnerable populations arriving from Ukraine. Children and unaccompanied minors are particularly vulnerable to exploitation by smugglers and traffickers.

The INTERPOL mission in Moldova is working with national authorities to identify and prevent organized criminal activity from exploiting the crisis.

Analysis

INTERPOL’s suspension of the right of Russia to directly disseminate Diffusions and dispatching a team to Moldova are actions taken in the context of the conflict. Similarly, the decision by the Ukraine NCB to disconnect from the INTERPOL network and the call for INTERPOL to expel Russia by Ukraine, the UK, and Fair Trials all reflect concerns and efforts to respond to instances of the misuse of INTERPOL by Russia and fears that the risks of remaining connected to the INTERPOL network outweigh the benefits.

INTERPOL has the challenge of trying to balance the goals of having universal membership, especially as some of its members have cut or diminished international enforcement cooperation, with the need for proper integrity, governance, and adherence to its Constitution to ensure confidence, trust and integrity in its notices and diffusions.

U.S. Government Accuses Russia of War Crimes

March 24, 2022 by Bruce Zagaris Leave a Comment

On March 23, 2022, Antony J. Blinken, U.S. Secretary of State accused Russia of making “indiscriminate attacks and attacks deliberately targeting civilians, as well as other atrocities. “Russia’s forces have destroyed apartment buildings, schools, hospitals, critical infrastructure, civilian vehicles, shopping centers, and ambulances, leaving thousands of innocent civilians killed or wounded.”

Statement by Antony J. Blinken

Blinken underscored that, according to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights observed in a March 11 report, Russian forces have targeted the Mariupol maternity hospital. It also includes a strike against a Mariupol theater, clearly marked with the word for “children” in Russian in huge letters visible from the sky.

According to Blinken, Putin’s forces used these same tactics in Grozny, Chechnya, and Aleppo, Syria, where their planes bombarded cities to break the will of people.

Blinken observed that last week, both he and President Biden stated that Russian forces had committed war crimes in Ukraine. Blinken said then that deliberate targeting of civilians is a war crime. The Department of State and other U.S. government experts were documenting and assessing potential war crimes in Ukraine.

According to Blinken, the determination that members of Russia’s forces have committed war crimes is based on a careful review of available information from public and intelligence sources. Blinken said a court of law with jurisdiction over the crime is ultimately responsible for determining criminal guilt in specific cases. The U.S. government will continue to track reports of war crimes and will share information it collects with allies, partners, and international institutions and organizations, as appropriate.

Statement by Beth van Schaack

Beth van Schaack, U.S. Ambassador at-Large for Global Criminal Justice, State Department, also gave remarks and answered questions about the allegations that the Russian troops are committing war crimes.

When asked about the potential venues for prosecution, van Schaack answered that Ukraine has a General Prosecutor and a directorate for War Crimes. Some third states also will have jurisdiction. Also she noted that the chief prosecutor of the ICC has announced he is reviewing the situation.

The U.S. is reviewing all possibilities, including potentially cooperation with ICC even though the U.S. is not a party to the International Criminal Court.

It is important to document the evidence for preservation for use in future accountability proceedings. In respect to the need to document and preserve evidence of atrocities, on March 10, Karim A.A. Khan QC, announced that his Office has established a dedicated portal through which any person that may hold information relevant to the Ukraine situation can contact our investigators. He encouraged all those with relevant information to come forward and contact his Team through the news platform, which can be accessed here.

Analysis

The statements of President Biden, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and Ambassador at-Large for Global Criminal Justice Beth van Schaack indicate that the U.S. government has prioritized accountability for atrocities. The statements are analogous to the decision by the U.S. government to pursue this strategy during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.

Having intensive investigations for atrocities exerts pressure on Russian forces and leadership that their conduct may result in eventual indictments. Even though Russia is not a member of the ICC and is not likely to cooperate in the investigations or in surrendering any Russians who are indicted, the investigation and an indictment are punishment. An indictment means the travel of an indicted will be limited and harm to their reputation.

History shows that indictments combined with sanctions against the country in which the indictee resides, and the continuation of sanctions until a country cooperates with the ICC, often harms the political stability of the indictee, if they are political leaders. The weakening of political leaders is illustrated by events in Serbia and Sudan. It weakened Slobadan Miloŝević. He eventually lost power and was handed over to the ICC. In 2009, journalist Gojko Berić commented that “(i)f there was no Hague, Miloŝević would probably still be in power.” If nothing else, he would be the head of his party. Similarly, probably Radovan Karadžić would have continued as a member of Parliament. Ratko Madić could have continued as Chief of Staff of the Army.^[1] Omar al-Bashir, the former head of state of Sudan, was weakened by the ICC indictment. Sudan’s leaders eventually arrested him and have said they will hand him to the ICC.^[2] In both Serbia and Sudan, the combined pressure of sanctions and criminal investigations and ultimately indictments debilitated the standing of the indictees.

Another reason to prioritize the atrocity investigations is to win the information war and the accompanying effort to persuade international organizations to expel and/or suspend Russia and/or start their own investigations. On March 8, the OECD has suspended Russia and Belarus from participation while on March 16, the Council of Europe expelled Russia. [3] On March 4, the UN Human Rights Council agreed to establish a commission to investigate violations committed during Russia’s military attack on Ukraine.

The accumulation of statements condemning the alleged atrocities and the multiple investigations will likely make some members of the military and political leadership hesitate to continue the attacks and/or eventually voice their objections or resign. The statements about alleged atrocities will also lead to increased public attention and eventual pressure among some segments of the Russian population.

On March 9, Ukrainian Prosecutor General Iryna Venediktova has called for a “new model” of investigative efforts to tackle alleged war crimes in Ukraine, including the establishment of a special tribunal.

[1] Diane Orentlicher, Some Kind of Justice: The ICTY’s Impact in Bosnia and Serbia 164-165 (2018).

[2] Omar al-Bashir: Sudan agrees ex-president must face ICC, BBC, February 11, 2020.

[3] For additional discussion and analysis, see Michael Plachta, Council of Europe Terminates Membership of the Russian Federation, 38 Int’l Enforcement L. Rep. __ (Apr. 2022)

OECD Announces Public Consultation on Tax Transparency for Crypto-Assets

March 23, 2022 by Bruce Zagaris 1 Comment

On March 22, 2022, the OECD issued a public consultation document involving a new world tax transparency framework to furnish the reporting and exchange of information with regard to crypto-assets and proposed amendments to the Common Reporting Standard (CRS) for the automatic exchange of financial account information between countries. The consultation has the goal to inform the decisions of policy makers on the potential adoption of any such framework and its related components.

A challenge to tax and financial regulators is that a person can transfer and hold crypto-assets without intervention of traditional financial intermediaries and without any central administrator being able to watch either the transactions or the crypto-asset holdings. In addition, the Crypto-Asset market has resulted in a new set of intermediaries, such as Crypto-Asset exchanges and wallet providers, which may currently only be subject to limited regulatory oversight. Crypto-Asset exchanges typically facilitate the purchase, sale, and exchange of Crypto-Assets for other Crypto-Assets or fiat currencies. As a result, individuals can exploit crypto-assets to evade international tax transparency initiatives, such as the CRS.

Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework (CARF)

As a result of the potential to circumvent tax transparency initiatives, the G20 has asked the OECD to develop a framework for the automatic exchange of information on crypto-assets (Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework or CARF). The new framework establishes mechanisms for the collection and exchange of tax-relevant information between tax administrations, with respect to persons engaging in certain transactions in crypto-assets. The framework includes crypto-assets that a person can hold and transfer in a decentralized way, without the intervention of traditional financial intermediaries, as well as asset classes utilizing similar technology that may exist in the future. The framework requires businesses that furnish services to exchange crypto-assets against other crypto-assets or fiat currencies.

Proposed CRS Amendments

In addition to the CARF, the OECD has developed proposals, as part of the first comprehensive review of the CRS, to improve the operation of the CRS, based on the experience of governments and businesses since its adoption in July 2014. The proposal broadens the scope of the CRS to cover electronic money products and the Central Bank Digital Currencies. As a result of the development of the CARF, the proposals also embrace changes to cover indirect investments in crypto-assets through Investment Entities and derivatives. Simultaneously, the proposal has new provisions to achieve an efficient interaction between the CRS and the CARF, including ways to avoid duplicative reporting. The amended CRS endeavors to strengthen the due diligence procedures and reporting outcomes in order to improve the usability of CRS information for tax administrations and limiting burdens on financial institutions.

The OECD is requesting public comments on its proposals. Interested persons should send their comments no later than April 29, 2022 by email (in Word format) to taxpublicconsultation@oecd.org. Additional information on the CARF, the amended CRS, or to comment on the public consultation draft should view the public consultation document. All written comments received will be made publicly available on the OECD website. Comments submitted in response to this invitation will be posted on the OECD website.

The OECD will hold a public consultation meeting at the end of May 2022. Speakers and other participants at the upcoming public consultation meeting will be selected from among those providing timely written comments.

Once it receives and digests the input received through the public consultation, the OECD will make final the rules and commentary to the CARF and the amended CRS. The OECD will also develop the exchange instruments and technical solutions needed to support reporting and exchanges pursuant to the CARF and the amended CRS. The OECD intends to report on the CARF and the amended CRS under the Indonesian Presidency of the G20 for its October 2022 meeting.

Analysis

The public consultation documents explains that the CARF and amended CRS responds to dynamics of the Crypto-Asset market, including both the Crypto-Assets offered, as well as the intermediaries involved. These developments pose a significant risk that recent gains in global tax transparency will be gradually eroded.

Clearly, the Crypto-Asset market and the intermediaries involved are different from the usual information providers in third-party tax reporting regimes, such as the Common Reporting Standard (CRS), to a new set of intermediaries, which only recently became subject to financial regulation and are frequently not subject to tax reporting requirements with respect to their clients. Perhaps, more importantly, the public consultation responds to the ability of individuals to hold Crypto-Assets in wallets unaffiliated with any service provider and transfer such Crypto-Assets across jurisdictions. The ability of persons to hold and transfer Crypto-Assets pose a risk that Crypto-Assets will be used for illicit activities or to evade tax obligations. The potential for persons to possess and transfer Crypto-Assets unaffiliated with any service provider has reduced tax administrations’ visibility on tax-relevant activities carried out within the sector, increasing the difficulty of verifying whether associated tax liabilities are appropriately reported and assessed.

The OECD public consultation complements the work of the J5 countries. On March 25, 2021, the Joint Chiefs of Global Tax Enforcement (J5) assembled investigators, cryptocurrency experts and data scientists in a coordinated push to track down individuals and organizations perpetrating tax crimes around the world. Without having in place an effective framework and reporting mechanisms, the J5 and other tax authorities are limited in their compliance and enforcement abilities.

The public consultation follows closely the U.S. Department of Justice announcement of its first director of National Cryptocurrency Enforcement and President Biden signing an Executive Order (titled “Ensuring Responsible Development of Digital Assets” and issued with an accompanying Fact Sheet) regarding the U.S. government’s strategy for digital assets. The Executive Order orders federal agencies to issue various reports that will set forth future U.S. policy toward digital assets, including the potential launch of a federally issue digital dollar.

Hence, the international and national compliance and enforcement framework for Crypto-assets are changing dynamically.

The current issue of the IELR will discuss in more detail the public consultation and its implications.

Biden Administration Declares Myanmar Rohingya Violence Is Genocide

March 21, 2022 by Bruce Zagaris Leave a Comment

On March 21, 2022, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, speaking at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington D.C., declared that Myanmar’s military has committed genocide against the Rohingya minority. At present the Holocaust Museum features an exhibition on the atrocities against Burma’s Rohingya population.

Blinken Declaration

According to Blinken, the U.S. has examined evidence showing a clear intent to destroy the Rohingya with reports of killings, mass rape and arson.

Blinken characterized the attacks against Rohingya “widespread and systematic.”

Blinken said the administration’s determination was based on a review by the U.S. State Department of documents collected by organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, and independent research by the U.S. government.[1]

Blinken’s declaration marked the eighth time the U.S. has made a formal genocide declaration, committing to supporting international investigations to hold violators accountable and most likely leading to additional sanctions or other penalties to isolate Myanmar’s military-led government.[2]

International Response

In 2019, Gambia, on behalf of the 57-member Organization of Islamic Cooperation, brought a petition against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice , accusing Myanmar of violating the United Nations’ Genocide Convention. In January 2020, the Court ordered the Myanmar government to take all measures to prevent the commission of genocide. On February 28, 2022, the Court announced that the public hearings on the preliminary objections raised by Myanmar in the case were concluded. As a result, the Court has started its deliberations.

In March 2017, the U.N. Human Rights Council started a fact-finding mission to investigate human rights violations committed by Burma’s military against the Rohingya and other ethnic minorities in the country. In September 2018, it released its report. The mission determined that crimes against humanity had been committed in Rakhine, Shan, and Kachin States. It found that there is “sufficient information to warrant the investigation and prosecution” of senior military officials in order to determine their culpability for genocide.

In September 2018, the U.S. State Department issued the findings of a survey.¹¹The survey emphasized the crimes committed in Rakhine State. It showed that the vast majority of Rohingya refugees who fled from Burma to Bangladesh had witnessed extreme forms of violence, and that the Burmese military was identified as the perpetrator in most cases. US officials characterized the violence “ethnic cleansing”.

Blinken said the Biden administration would continue to furnish humanitarian aid to Rohingya refugees, most of whom have fled to neighboring Bangladesh. According to Blinken, the U.S. would send $1 million to a U.N. fact-finding mission that is collecting evidence on the atrocities.[3]

Analysis

Since the alleged atrocities in Myanmar’s Rakhine State peaked in August 2017, the Myanmar’s military and political leaders have not incurred any meaningful consequences.

U.S. government legal experts have examined the status of Rohingya since the Trump administration. The delay in the determination had met with criticism from both inside and outside the government.

The U.S. declaration that a genocide has occurred could result in other countries increasing the pressure on the Myanmar government.[4]

The next issue of the IELR will have a more comprehensive discussion of the genocide declaration.

[1] Myanmar Rohingya violence is genocide, US says, BBC, Mar. 21, 2022.

[2] Lara Jakes, Myanmar’s Military Committed Genocide Against Rohingya, U.S. Says, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 2022.

[3] Ben Fox, Secretary of State Antony Blinken says Myanmar repression of Muslim Rohingya is genocide, PBS, Mar. 21, 2022.

[4] Id.

U.S. Justice Department Starts Task Force to Enforce Russian Sanctions against Russian Oligarchs

March 3, 2022 by Bruce Zagaris Leave a Comment

On March 2, 2022, U.S. Attorney General Merrick B. Garland announced the start of Task Force KleptoCapture to enforce sanctions, export restrictions, and economic countermeausres the U.S. has issued, in coordination with U.S. allies, in response to Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine. Task Force KleptoCapture will aim to enforce these actions that are designed to isolate Russia from global markets. In particular, the U.S. restrictions target the crimes of Russian officials, government-aligned elites, and persons who help or conceal their unlawful conduct.

Andrew C. Adams, co-chief of the Money Laundering and Transnational Criminal Enterprise Unit in the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the Central District of New York, will manage the Task Force.[1] The Task force leadership will include Deputy Directors from both the National Security and Criminal Divisions, and more than a dozen attorneys from these divisions, as well as the Tax Division, Civil Division, and U.S. Attorneys’ Offices across the country. It will be staffed with prosecutors, agents, analysts, and professional staff across the Department of Justice who are experts in sanctions and export control enforcement, anti-corruption, asset forfeiture, anti-money laundering, tax enforcement, national security investigations, and foreign evidence collection. The Task force will strengthen DOJ’s abilities and authorities against efforts to evade or undermine the restrictions the U.S. government has imposed in response to Russian military aggression.[2]

The Task Force’s mission will include the following: investigating and prosecuting violations of new and future sanctions imposed in response to the Ukraine invasion, and sanctions imposed for prior instances of Russian aggression and corruption; combating unlawful efforts to subvert restrictions imposed on Russian financial institutions, including the prosecution of persons who attempt to evade know-your-customer and anti-money laundering measures; targeting efforts to use cryptocurrency to evade U.S. sanctions, launder proceeds of foreign corruption, or evade U.S. response to Russian military aggression; and using civil and criminal asset forfeiture authorities to seize assets belonging to sanctioned individuals or assets identified as the proceeds of unlawful conduct.[3]

The Task Force will be able to use the most cutting-edge investigative techniques, including data analytics, cryptocurrency tracing, foreign intelligence sources, and information from financial regulators and private sector partners, to identify sanctions evasion and related criminal misconduct.[4]

In addition to arrests and prosecution, the Task Force will employ asset seizures and civil forfeitures of unlawful proceeds, including personal real estate, financial, and commercial assets to deny resources that enable Russian aggression. When appropriate, the Task Force will share information obtained in its investigations with interagency and foreign partners to help the identification of assets that are covered by the sanctions and new economic countermeasures.

The Task Force KleptoCapture will complement the work of the transatlantic task force under President Biden and leaders of the European Commission, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Canada on February 26. The transatlantic task force has a mission to identify and seize the assets of sanctioned individuals and companies around the world.[5]

The Task Force will involve agents and analysts from various law enforcement agencies, including the FBI; U.S. Marshal Service; U.S. Secret Service; Department of Homeland Security; IRS-Criminal Investigation; and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service.

Meanwhile, on March 2 the Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation (ICRICT) issued a statement in support of the call by Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi’s for an international public register of wealth for Russian oligarchs with more than €10 million in assets.

Analysis

If the US Task Force and the law enforcement authorities of its allies cooperate in terms of intelligence, evidence gathering, and extradition, they will exert pressure on the oligarchs. President Biden announced the creation of the Task Force in his state of the union speech on March 1. The initial one-third of the address dealt with the response by the U.S. and its allies to the Russian invasion. President Biden said:

“Tonight, I say to the Russian oligarchs and the corrupt leaders who’ve bilked billions of dollars off this violent regime: No more.

The United States — I mean it. The United States Department of Justice is assembling a dedicated task force to go after the crimes of the Russian oligarchs.

We’re joining with European Allies to find and seize their yachts, their luxury apartments, their private jets. We’re coming for your ill-begotten gains.”

To some extent the Biden speech and the Garland announcement mix persons who violate past, current and future sanctions against Russia with persons who have or are laundering proceeds of foreign corruption or U.S. responses to Russian military moves, such as export control and other restrictions. In particular, the announcement of the Task Force mentions false statements to a financial institution, bank fraud, tax offenses, and money laundering. In addition, as demonstrated by the non-compliant assessment in FATF’s 2006 and 2016 evaluation of the U.S. and the recent comments to the proposed CTA regulations, U.S. gatekeepers do not meet international standards and remain opposed to complying with the new regulations. As a result, notwithstanding the Task Force KleptoCapture, U.S. law and culture prevent proactive law enforcement cooperation.

Whether the Russian oligarchs will have any influence on Vladimir Putin remains to be seen. However, the sanctions and the emphasis on enforcement follow a recent trend of the U.S. since the Obama Administration: the emphasis on criminal and quasi-criminal enforcement of U.S. sanctions. The rest of world is following this trend. Actual close collaboration among law enforcement authorities and international organizations, informal groups (i.e., G7), and non-governmental organizations will help make sanctions enforcement more effective.

On March 1, Putin signed a decree that prohibits taking more than $10,000 worth of foreign currency in cash and “monetary instruments” out of Russia. The move responds to the sanctions imposed on Russia over its invasion of Ukraine.

As the U.S. is trying to adopt regulations to make its Corporate Transparency Act operational, increasingly the European legislative and executive branches are debating making their corporate and trust registries more publicly accessible without cost and broadening the registries to include not only beneficial ownership of companies and trusts, but diverse assets, such as art, real property, crypto assets, and linking the registries, so that regulators and law enforcement have easy access. One gap is that, since the U.S. has not yet implemented the Corporate Transparency Act, does not fully reciprocate on information exchange pursuant to FATCA Intergovernmental Agreements and does not participate in the Common Reporting Standard, wealth structures have moved to the U.S. both for anonymity and to take advantage of the lucrative U.S. economic market.

[1] Katie Banner, Justice Department Announces Task Force to Go After Russian Oligarchs, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 2022.

[2] DOJ, Attorney General Merrick B. Garland Announces Launch of Task Force KleptoCapture, Press Rel. 22-179, Mar. 2, 2022.

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

INTERPOL Suspends Russia’s Ability to Make Diffusion Notices Directly and Deploys Team to Moldova While Ukraine Disconnects from INTERPOL Network

U.S. Government Accuses Russia of War Crimes

OECD Announces Public Consultation on Tax Transparency for Crypto-Assets

Biden Administration Declares Myanmar Rohingya Violence Is Genocide

U.S. Justice Department Starts Task Force to Enforce Russian Sanctions against Russian Oligarchs

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